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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
Using Hierarchical Bayesian Models to Test Complex Theories About the Nature of Latent
Cognitive Processes
By
Beth Baribault
Doctor of Philosophy in Cognitive Sciences
University of California, Irvine, 2019
Professor Joachim Vandekerckhove, Chair
From a computational perspective, the primary goal of cognitive science is to infer the
influence of unobservable psychological constructs on observed behavioral data. Cognitive
models can facilitate this inference by more directly expressing a theoretical cognitive
processes through relationships among psychologically interpretable parameters. If
cognitive models are developed in a hierarchical Bayesian framework, significantly more
nuanced and complex theories may be expressed, thereby allowing for deeper insight into
the nature of latent cognitive processes. Here, I highlight three specific benefits of a
hierarchical Bayesian approach to cognitive modeling, with a special emphasis on
model-based theory testing. First, after a brief introduction to Bayesian methods, I discuss
how hierarchical modeling permits one to coherently analyze data from highly complex
experimental designs. To demonstrate this first benefit, I describe how the development of
a hierarchical Bayesian metaregression model inspired a new technique for quantitative
assessment of the robustness of a psychological theory. Next, I describe how hierarchical
modeling enables simultaneous implementation of multiple different styles of cognitive
models, which permits theory testing at a higher level of abstraction. I demonstrate this
through a cognitive latent variable model-based comparison of theories of attention ability.
Finally, I discuss how hierarchical modeling can be used to express highly complex
x
neurocognitive processes, as demonstrated through a new approach to joint modeling of
neural and behavioral data that is better suited to hypothesis testing than previous
approaches. Ultimately, I contend that hierarchical Bayesian cognitive modeling is an ideal
way to perform more powerful and informative analyses of behavioral data by radically
expanding the scope of questions we may ask about the nature of latent cognitive processes.
xi
INTRODUCTION
A primary goal of cognitive science research is to infer the influence of unobservable
psychological constructs on human behavior. Often, verbal theories about the nature of
these constructs will include a proposed mechanism through which the construct is
expected to systematically shape behavior. In other words, many psychological theories
propose a latent cognitive process and, from a computational perspective, the goal is to
infer whether there is evidence of this process in the observed data.
While analysis of behavioral data using the standard toolbox of general linear models
(such as ANOVA and regression) is common, this approach is a rather indirect way of
testing process-based psychological theories. A more direct approach is to employ formal
mathematical models of cognition, which are used to express theoretical cognitive processes
in a quantitative way. In a cognitive model, a latent process is expressed through
dependencies among model parameters, which typically have meaningful psychological
interpretations. For example, diffusion models are designed to quantify a hypothetical
decision-making process in which evidence is accumulated over time toward either of two
possible choices. If the accumulated evidence crosses one of the two decision thresholds, the
corresponding behavior is executed (see Chapter 3 for a more detailed description). This
process is expressed through a likelihood function and four parameters, each of which
captures a different dynamic of the evidence accumulation process.
Whether a cognitive model captures the data well can suggest whether the theory is a
good approximation of the actual cognitive mechanism underlying people’s behavior. This
is one of many ways that cognitive models can aid in theory testing. Another way is to use
cognitive model parameter estimates as the basis for inference: Assuming the model
provides a good fit to the observed data, examining the inferred parameter values in the
context of their semantic interpretations can provide additional insights about the nature
of the latent cognitive process. Yet another way is to use cognitive models as proxies for
verbal theories. If multiple cognitive models are developed, each of which expresses a
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different theoretical account of the latent cognitive process, performing a model comparison
may serve as as a quantitative comparison of the theoretical accounts. If cognitive models
are implemented in a Bayesian framework, these analyses also inherit the multitude of
benefits offered by Bayesian methods, as outlined in Chapter 1.
If a Bayesian cognitive model is extended hierarchically, a much wider variety of
potential theories may be expressed quantitatively, and therefore tested empirically.
Hierarchical models are distinguished by their effort to mimic the structure of the data or
of latent psychological constructs in the structure of the model. The simplest example of a
hierarchical model is one that accounts for individual differences by introducing a hierarchy
over participants. Rather than assuming that all data points were generated from the exact
same latent process, a model that is hierarchical over participants posits that the data from
each participant were generated from slightly different versions of the process. Consider the
application of a diffusion model to data from participants who completed a simple 2AFC
task. Rather than assuming that all data points were generated from the exact same
Wiener process, a hierarchical diffusion model would now permit a different
parameterization of the process for each participant, where each drift rate parameter, for
example, is drawn from a hierarchical distribution of rates, which may have associated
hyperparameters. By accounting for this structural aspect of the data, the model both
becomes more flexible and offers a more realistic description of how people make decisions.
In a similar fashion, models may be made hierarchical over conditions, sessions, or other
known structural aspects of the data.
In Chapter 2, I introduce the concept of a hierarchy over planned experiments, and
discuss how this hierarchical extension permits one to make novel qualitative conclusions
about the robustness of a psychological theory. Specifically, I describe the metastudy
approach, in which the same theory or hypothesis is tested in a large number of small
experiments or micro-experiments. Unlike a meta-analysis of previously published research
testing the same theory, which is likely to be a biased sample, in a metastudy,
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micro-experiments are systematically sampled without bias from a predefined space of
possible experiments, where each dimension of the space is a possible moderating variable
or facet. With this technique, the robustness of a theory to a large number of facets may
be assessed simultaneously by observing whether the effect sizes are consistent across
micro-experiments (i.e., are consistent across the space of possible experiments). If a
theory is not robust, there may be a subset of micro-experiments in which the effect
vanishes; in this case, the hierarchical nature of the model allows for the effect of each facet
to be observed and genuine moderators to be identified, in a similar fashion to how one
might analyze the strength of individual differences. Thus, the hierarchical extension over
micro-experiments not only is a principled way to analyze data from highly complex
experimental designs, but also allows for a satisfyingly direct test of a theory’s
generalizability.
A yet more interesting approach to introducing hierarchy in Bayesian cognitive models
is to permit the generating process of a cognitive model parameter to be yet another
model. Adding hierarchical structure in this way permits an increased depth of theoretical
abstraction that is highly useful for expressing more nuanced theories. For example, this
approach could be used to express a theory that describes nested cognitive processes. This
general approach could also be used to describe how a small number of large-scale cognitive
constructs exert a common effect on multiple different cognitive processes and thereby
shape multiple different observed behaviors.
In Chapter 3, I offer a tutorial on cognitive latent variable models, which serve to
quantify theories of exactly this type. Cognitive latent variables models (CLVMs) are a
new class of model that join a cognitive process model with a psychometric model
hierarchically to offer a single, unified account of heterogeneous data. In the case
application of this approach described in Chapter 3, I use this technique to analyze data
collected using a battery of established attention measures, including response time tasks
and survey tasks. This procedure resulted in two qualitatively different types of data
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(response times for binary decisions, and Likert-scale responses in self-report scales). At a
shallower level of the model, the data are described by either a formal cognitive model or a
simpler likelihood distribution, depending on the data type. By imposing hierarchical
structure (over tasks and participants) on one selected parameter type in each process, all
of the parameters most closely related to attention ability are able to be collectively
explained with a psychometric model. At this deepest level of abstraction, different
theories of the nature of the psychological construct of attention may be expressed. As
each theory under consideration was expressed in a different CLVM, comparing the fit
across models effectively compared the viability of the theories, while still accounting for
the latent processes that generated each type of data.
In this dissertation, the purpose of Chapter 3 is to emphasize the wide range of
possibilities for theory testing that are created by hierarchically joining cognitive process
models with latent variable models. A CLVM approach places a strong emphasis on the
latent structure of cognitive constructs as they are expressed in cognitive process model
parameters. Because the exact choice of model components is up to the user, this
technique is a flexible approach to model construction. Through the choice of cognitive
model components, CLVMs may be tailored to address different research contexts.
Similarly, how one chooses to distinguish the different CLVMs under consideration, such as
through the specification of the latent variable model component, or in the nature of the
connection between model components, can enable different highly abstract theories about
latent cognitive processes to be expressed. In this way, a CLVM-based model comparison
may be used to address a multitude of different research questions.
I continued my exploration of methods for novel model-based comparisons of
competing theories in my joint modeling work, as described in Chapter 4. Similar to the
work described in Chapter 3, I fuse two different types of models — namely, a neural model
and a behavioral model — in a hierarchical Bayesian framework. However, in Chapter 4,
my goal is to develop models that each describe a single complex neurocognitive process in
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a comprehensive way. I call the theorized neurocognitive process complex, because it
incorporates significant domain knowledge and multiple theoretical concepts in the
structure of the model at different hierarchical levels. I demonstrated my approach by
analyzing a published dataset from an experiment in which mice performed a behavioral
task while electrophysiological data was simultaneously recorded. While the primary theory
being tested was whether neurons encode the planned behavior in their average firing rate
or in a time-dependent rate, the neurocognitive process in both accounts also incorporated
abstract concepts including population-based encoding, individual differences across mice,
and the binary nature of the behavioral response. Including this complexity in the analysis
led to a conclusion about the proportion of neurons encoding the behavioral response that
is qualitatively different from the conclusions of the dataset authors. This approach also
allowed for entirely new types of conclusions to be made about the joint dataset. For
example, I was able to infer individual biases in behavior across mice beyond that which
was accounted for by the neural data. These biases were significant for individual mice,
even though there was no purely behavioral bias evident across the population of mice.
I have called my approach neurocognitive process modeling to emphasize that the
approach is designed to capture both neural and behavioral data with a single, unified
latent process. This is unlike other hierarchical Bayesian approaches to joint modeling,
where a neural model is the generative process for the neural data, a behavioral model is
the generative process for the behavioral data, and both are influenced by a small number
of latent abstract constructs. (Described thus, it is clear that these other approaches have
a model architecture that is more similar to the work discussed in Chapter 3.) Because
these other approaches place a strong emphasis on capturing abstract hierarchical
correlations, they are an excellent approach for theory generation. However, if the goal is
to perform confirmatory analyses, as is more often the goal of empirical research, I argue
that the neurocogntive process modeling approach is preferable because it is more naturally
suited to testing competing theories about hypothetical mechanisms and latent processes.
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Ultimately, the unifying goal of the research described in this dissertation was to push
the boundaries of what theories can be expressed in and tested using computational
models. It is my contention that carefully designed hierarchical Bayesian cognitive models
will become a dominant method for conducting theory testing in future psychological
research due to the exceptional diversity of theories that this general approach is capable of
capturing. In the chapters that follow, I attempt to make the case through example that
we should favor the hierarchical Bayesian approach, as it radically expands the scope of
questions we may ask and hypotheses that we may test concerning the nature of latent
cognitive processes.
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CHAPTER 1: AN OVERVIEW OF BAYESIAN STATISTICS
AND COGNITIVE MODELING
This chapter was published in June 2017 as a peer-reviewed article in Psychonomics Bulletin
& Review.1 This invited paper was part of a special issue on Bayesian inference in psychology.
As the senior author, my primary role in this work was to determine the goals, structure, and
tone of the paper. I wrote all sections that serve to frame the paper (Abstract, Introduction,
each section’s introductory text, Conclusion), summarized the final source, and edited the
paper.
How to become a Bayesian in eight easy steps:
An annotated reading list
Alexander Etza, Quentin F. Gronaub, Fabian Dablanderc,
Peter A. Edelsbrunnerd, & Beth Baribaulta
aUniversity of California, Irvine
bUniversity of Amsterdam
cUniversity of Tübingen
dETH Zürich
Abstract
In this guide, we present a reading list to serve as a concise introduction to
Bayesian data analysis. The introduction is geared toward reviewers, editors,
and interested researchers who are new to Bayesian statistics. We provide
commentary for eight recommended sources, which together cover the the-
oretical and practical cornerstones of Bayesian statistics in psychology and
1https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.3758%2Fs13423-017-1317-5.pdf
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related sciences. The resources are presented in an incremental order, starting
with theoretical foundations and moving on to applied issues. In addition, we
outline an additional 32 articles and books that can be consulted to gain back-
ground knowledge about various theoretical specifics and Bayesian approaches
to frequently used models. Our goal is to offer researchers a starting point for
understanding the core tenets of Bayesian analysis, while requiring a low level
of time commitment. After consulting our guide, the reader should understand
how and why Bayesian methods work, and feel able to evaluate their use in
the behavioral and social sciences.
Introduction
In recent decades, significant advances in computational software and hardware have
allowed Bayesian statistics to rise to greater prominence in psychology (Van de Schoot,
Winder, Ryan, Zondervan-Zwijnenburg, & Depaoli, in press). In the past few years, this rise
has accelerated as a result of increasingly vocal criticism of p-values in particular (Nickerson,
2000; Wagenmakers, 2007), and classical statistics in general (Trafimow & Marks, 2015).
When a formerly scarcely used statistical method rapidly becomes more common, editors
and peer reviewers are expected to master it readily, and to adequately evaluate and judge
manuscripts in which the method is applied. However, many researchers, reviewers, and
editors in psychology are still unfamiliar with Bayesian methods.
We believe that this is at least partly due to the perception that a high level of diffi-
culty is associated with proper use and interpretation of Bayesian statistics. Many seminal
texts in Bayesian statistics are dense, mathematically demanding, and assume some back-
ground in mathematical statistics (e.g., Gelman et al., 2013). Even texts that are geared
toward psychologists (e.g., Lee & Wagenmakers, 2014; Kruschke, 2015), while less mathe-
matically difficult, require a radically different way of thinking than the classical statistical
methods most researchers are familiar with. Furthermore, transitioning to a Bayesian frame-
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work requires a level of time commitment that is not feasible for many researchers. More
approachable sources that survey the core tenets and reasons for using Bayesian methods
exist, yet identifying these sources can prove difficult for researchers with little or no previous
exposure to Bayesian statistics.
In this guide, we provide a small number of primary sources that editors, reviewers, and
other interested researchers can study to gain a basic understanding of Bayesian statistics.
Each of these sources was selected for their balance of accessibility with coverage of essential
Bayesian topics. By focusing on interpretation, rather than implementation, the guide is
able to provide an introduction to core concepts, from Bayes’ theorem through to Bayesian
cognitive models, without getting mired in secondary details.
This guide is divided into two primary sections. The first, Theoretical sources, includes
commentaries on three articles and one book chapter that explain the core tenets of Bayesian
methods as well as their philosophical justification. The second, Applied sources, includes
commentaries on four articles that cover the most commonly used methods in Bayesian data
analysis at a primarily conceptual level. This section emphasizes issues of particular interest
to reviewers, such as basic standards for conducting and reporting Bayesian analyses.
We suggest that for each source, readers first review our commentary, then consult the
original source. The commentaries not only summarize the essential ideas discussed in each
source, but also give a sense of how those ideas fit into the bigger picture of Bayesian
statistics. This guide is part of a larger special issue in Psychonomic Bulletin & Review on
the topic of Bayesian inference that contains articles which elaborate on many of the same
points we discuss here, so we will periodically point to these as potential next steps for the
interested reader. For those who would like to delve further into the theory and practice of
Bayesian methods, the Appendix provides a number of supplemental sources that would be
of interest to researchers and reviewers. To facilitate readers’ selection of additional sources,
each source is briefly described and has been given a rating by the authors that reflects its
level of difficulty and general focus (i.e., theoretical versus applied; see Figure 1.A1). It is
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important to note that our reading list covers sources published up to the time of this writing
(August, 2016).
Overall, the guide is designed such that a researcher might be able to read all eight
of the highlighted articles2 and some supplemental readings within a week. After readers
acquaint themselves with these sources, they should be well-equipped both to interpret
existing research and to evaluate new research that relies on Bayesian methods.
Theoretical sources
In this section, we discuss the primary ideas underlying Bayesian inference in increasing
levels of depth. Our first source introduces Bayes’ theorem and demonstrates how Bayesian
statistics are based on a different conceptualization of probability than classical, or frequen-
tist, statistics (Lindley, 1993). These ideas are extended in our second source’s discussion of
Bayesian inference as a reallocation of credibility (Kruschke, 2015) between possible states of
nature. The third source demonstrates how the concepts established in the previous sources
lead to many practical benefits for experimental psychology (Dienes, 2011). The section con-
cludes with an in-depth review of Bayesian hypothesis testing using Bayes factors with an
emphasis on this technique’s theoretical benefits (Rouder, Speckman, Sun, Morey, & Iverson,
2009).
1. Conceptual introduction: What is Bayesian inference?
Source: Lindley (1993) — The analysis of experimental data: The appreciation of tea and
wine
Lindley leads with a story in which renowned statistician Ronald A. Fisher is having
his colleague, Dr. Muriel Bristol, over for tea. When Fisher prepared the tea—as the story
goes—Dr. Bristol protested that Fisher had made the tea all wrong. She claims that tea
tastes better when milk is added first and infusion second,3 rather than the other way around;
2Links to freely available versions of each article are provided in the References section.
3As a historical note: Distinguishing milk-first from infusion-first tea preparation was not a particular
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she furthermore professes her ability to tell the difference. Fisher subsequently challenged
Dr. Bristol to prove her ability to discern the two methods of preparation in a perceptual
discrimination study. In Lindley’s telling of the story, which takes some liberties with the
actual design of the experiment in order to emphasize a point, Dr. Bristol correctly identified
5 out of 6 cups where the tea was added either first or second. This result left Fisher faced
with the question: Was his colleague merely guessing, or could she really tell the difference?
Fisher then proceeded to develop his now classic approach in a sequence of steps, recognizing
at various points that tests that seem intuitively appealing actually lead to absurdities, until
he arrived at a method that consists of calculating the total probability of the observed result
plus the probability of any more extreme results possible under the null hypothesis (i.e., the
probability that she would correctly identify 5 or 6 cups by sheer guessing). This probability
is the p-value. If it is less than .05, then Fisher would declare the result significant and reject
the null hypothesis of guessing.
Lindley’s paper essentially continues Fisher’s work, showing that Fisher’s classic proce-
dure is inadequate and itself leads to absurdities because it hinges upon the nonexistent
ability to define what other unobserved results would count as “more extreme” than the
actual observations. That is, if Fisher had set out to serve Dr. Bristol 6 cups (and only
6 cups) and she is correct 5 times, then we get a p-value of .1, which is not statistically
significant. According to Fisher, in this case we should not reject the null hypothesis that
Dr. Bristol is guessing. But had he set out to keep giving her additional cups until she
was correct 5 times, which incidentally required 6 cups, we get a p-value of .03, which is
statistically significant. According to Fisher, we should now reject the null hypothesis. Even
though the data observed in both cases are exactly the same, we reach different conclusions
because our definition of “more extreme” results (that did not occur) changes depending on
which sampling plan we use. Absurdly, the p-value, and with it our conclusion about Dr.
Bristol’s ability, depends on how we think about results that might have occurred but never
affectation of Dr. Bristol’s, but a cultural debate that has persisted for over three centuries (e.g.; Orwell,
1946).
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actually did, and that in turn depends on how we planned the experiment (rather than only
on how it turned out).
Figure 1.1 . A reproduction of Figure 2 from Lindley (1993). The left bar indicates the
probability that Dr. Bristol is guessing prior to the study (.8), if 5 right and 1 wrong are
observed (.59), and if 6 right and 0 wrong are observed (.23). The lines represents Lindley’s
corresponding beliefs about Dr. Bristol’s accuracy if she is not guessing.
Lindley’s Bayesian solution to this problem considers only the probability of observations
actually obtained, avoiding the problem of defining more extreme, unobserved results. The
observations are used to assign a probability to each possible value of Dr. Bristol’s success
rate. Lindley’s Bayesian approach to evaluating Dr. Bristol’s ability to discriminate between
the differently made teas starts by assigning a priori probabilities across the range of values of
her success rate. If it is reasonable to consider that Dr. Bristol is simply guessing the outcome
at random (i.e., her rate of success is .5), then one must assign an a priori probability to
this null hypothesis (see our Figure 1, and note the separate amount of probability assigned
to p = .5). The remaining probability is distributed among the range of other plausible
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values of Dr. Bristol’s success rate (i.e., rates that do not assume that she is guessing at
random)4. Then the observations are used to update these probabilities using Bayes’ rule
(this is derived in detail in Etz & Vandekerckhove, this issue). If the observations better fit
with the null hypothesis (pure guessing), then the probability assigned to the null hypothesis
will increase; if the data better fit the alternative hypothesis, then the probability assigned
to the alternative hypothesis will increase, and subsequently the probability attached to the
null hypothesis will decrease (note the decreasing probability of the null hypothesis on the
left axis of Figure 2). The factor by which the data shift the balance of the hypotheses’
probabilities is the Bayes factor (Kass & Raftery, 1995; see also Rouder et al., 2009, and
Dienes, 2011, below).
A key takeaway from this paper is that Lindley’s Bayesian approach depends only on the
observed data, so the results are interpretable regardless of whether the sampling plan was
rigid or flexible or even known at all. Another key point is that the Bayesian approach is
inherently comparative: Hypotheses are tested against one another and never in isolation.
Lindley further concludes that, since the posterior probability that the null is true will often
be higher than the p-value, the latter metric will discount null hypotheses more easily in
general.
2. Bayesian credibility assessments
Source: Kruschke (2015, Chapter 2) — Introduction: Credibility, models, and parameters
“How often have I said to you that when all other θ yield P (x|θ) of 0, whatever
remains, however low its P (θ), must have P (θ|x) = 1?”
– Sherlock Holmes, paraphrased
4If the null hypothesis is not initially considered tenable, then we can proceed without assigning separate
probability to it and instead focus on estimating the parameters of interest (e.g., the taster’s accuracy in
distinguishing wines, as in Lindley’s second example; see Lindley’s Figure 1, and notice that the amount
of probability assigned to p = .5 is gone). Additionally, if a range of values of the parameter is considered
impossible—such as rates that are below chance—then this range may be given zero prior probability.
13
In this book chapter, Kruschke explains the fundamental Bayesian principle of reallocation of
probability, or “credibility,” across possible states of nature. Kruschke uses an example fea-
turing Sherlock Holmes to demonstrate that the famous detective essentially used Bayesian
reasoning to solve his cases. Suppose that Holmes has determined that there exist only four
different possible causes (A, B, C, and D) of a committed crime which, for simplicity in the
example, he holds to be equally credible at the outset. This translates to equal prior prob-
abilities for each of the four possible causes (i.e., a prior probability of 1/4 for each). Now
suppose that Holmes gathers evidence that allows him to rule out cause A with certainty.
This development causes the probability assigned to A to drop to zero, and the probability
that used to be assigned to cause A to be then redistributed across the other possible causes.
Since the probabilities for the four alternatives need to sum to one, the probability for each of
the other causes is now equal to 1/3 (Figure 2.1, p. 17). What Holmes has done is reallocate
credibility across the different possible causes based on the evidence he has gathered. His
new state of knowledge is that only one of the three remaining alternatives can be the cause
of the crime and that they are all equally plausible. Holmes, being a man of great intellect,
is eventually able to completely rule out two of the remaining three causes, leaving him with
only one possible explanation—which has to be the cause of the crime (as it now must have
probability equal to 1), no matter how improbable it might have seemed at the beginning of
his investigation.
The reader might object that it is rather unrealistic to assume that data can be gathered
that allow a researcher to completely rule out contending hypotheses. In real applications,
psychological data are noisy, and outcomes are only probabilistically linked to the underlying
causes. In terms of reallocation of credibility, this means that possible hypotheses can rarely
be ruled out completely (i.e., reduced to zero probability), however, their credibility can
be greatly diminished, leading to a substantial increase in the credibility of other possible
hypotheses. Although a hypothesis has not been eliminated, something has been learned:
Namely, that one or more of the candidate hypotheses has had their probabilities reduced
14
and are now less likely than the others.
In a statistical context, the possible hypotheses are parameter values in mathematical
models that serve to describe the observed data in a useful way. For example, a scientist could
assume that their observations are normally distributed and be interested in which range
of values for the mean is most credible. Sherlock Holmes only considered a set of discrete
possibilities, but in many cases it would be very restrictive to only allow a few alternatives
(e.g., when estimating the mean of a normal distribution). In the Bayesian framework one
can easily consider an infinite continuum of possibilities, across which credibility may still
be reallocated. It is easy to extend this framework of reallocation of credibility to hypothesis
testing situations where one parameter value is seen as “special” and receives a high amount
of prior probability compared to the alternatives (as in Lindley’s tea example above).
Kruschke (2015) serves as a good first introduction to Bayesian thinking, as it requires
only basic statistical knowledge (a natural follow-up is Kruschke & Liddell, this issue). In
this chapter, Kruschke also provides a concise introduction to mathematical models and
parameters, two core concepts which our other sources will build on. One final key takeaway
from this chapter is the idea of sequential updating from prior to posterior (Figure 2.1, p. 17)
as data are collected. As Dennis Lindley famously said: “Today’s posterior is tomorrow’s
prior” (Lindley, 1972, p. 2).
3. Implications of Bayesian statistics for experimental psychology
Source: Dienes (2011) — Bayesian versus orthodox statistics: Which side are you on?
Dienes explains several differences between the frequentist (which Dienes calls orthodox
and we have called classical; we use these terms interchangeably) and Bayesian paradigm
which have practical implications for how experimental psychologists conduct experiments,
analyze data, and interpret results (a natural follow-up to the discussion in this section is
available in Dienes & McLatchie, this issue). Throughout the paper, Dienes also discusses
subjective (or context-dependent) Bayesian methods which allow for inclusion of relevant
15
problem-specific knowledge in to the formation of one’s statistical model.
The probabilities of data given theory and of theory given data. When testing
a theory, both the frequentist and Bayesian approaches use probability theory as the basis
for inference, yet in each framework, the interpretation of probability is different. It is
important to be aware of the implications of this difference in order to correctly interpret
frequentist and Bayesian analyses. One major contrast is a result of the fact that frequentist
statistics only allow for statements to be made about P (data | theory)5: Assuming the theory
is correct, the probability of observing the obtained (or more extreme) data is evaluated.
Dienes argues that often the probability of the data assuming a theory is correct is not
the probability the researcher is interested in. What researchers typically want to know is
P (theory | data): Given that the data were those obtained, what is the probability that the
theory is correct? At first glance, these two probabilities might appear similar, but Dienes
illustrates their fundamental difference with the following example: The probability that a
person is dead (i.e., data) given that a shark has bitten the person’s head off (i.e., theory) is
1. However, given that a person is dead, the probability that a shark has bitten this person’s
head off is very close to zero (see Senn, 2013, for an intuitive explanation of this distinction).
It is important to keep in mind that a p-value does not correspond to P (theory | data);
in fact, statements about this probability are only possible if one is willing to attach prior
probabilities (degrees of plausibility or credibility) to theories—which can only be done in
the Bayesian paradigm.
In the following sections, Dienes explains how the Bayesian approach is more liberating
than the frequentist approach with regard to the following concepts: stopping rules, planned
versus post hoc comparisons, and multiple testing. For those new to the Bayesian paradigm,
these proposals may seem counterintuitive at first, but Dienes provides clear and accessible
explanations for each.
5The conditional probability (P ) of data given (|) theory.
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Stopping rules. In the classical statistical paradigm, it is necessary to specify in ad-
vance how the data will be collected. In practice, one usually has to specify how many par-
ticipants will be collected; stopping data collection early or continuing after the pre-specified
number of participants has been reached is not permitted. One reason why collecting addi-
tional participants is not permitted in the typical frequentist paradigm is that, given the null
hypothesis is true, the p-value is not driven in a particular direction as more observations
are gathered. In fact, in many cases the distribution of the p-value is uniform when the null
hypothesis is true, meaning that every p-value is equally likely under the null. This implies
that even if there is no effect, a researcher is guaranteed to obtain a statistically significant
result if they simply continue to collect participants and stop when the p-value is sufficiently
low. In contrast, the Bayes factor, the most common Bayesian method of hypothesis test-
ing, will approach infinite support in favor of the null hypothesis as more observations are
collected if the null hypothesis is true. Furthermore, since Bayesian inference obeys the like-
lihood principle, one is allowed to continue or stop collecting participants at any time while
maintaining the validity of one’s results (p. 276; see also Cornfield, 1966, Rouder, 2014, and
Royall, 2004 in the appended Further Reading section).
Planned versus post hoc comparisons. In the classical hypothesis-testing approach,
a distinction is made between planned and post hoc comparisons: It matters whether the
hypothesis was formulated before or after data collection. In contrast, Dienes argues that
adherence to the likelihood principle entails that a theory does not necessarily need to precede
the data when a Bayesian approach is adopted; since this temporal information does not enter
into the likelihood function for the data, the evidence for or against the theory will be the
same no matter its temporal relation to the data.
Multiple testing. When conducting multiple tests in the classical approach, it is im-
portant to correct for the number of tests performed (see Gelman & Loken, 2014). Dienes
points out that within the Bayesian approach, the number of hypotheses tested does not
matter—it is not the number of tests that is important, but the evaluation of how accurately
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each hypothesis predicts the observed data. Nevertheless, it is crucial to consider all relevant
evidence, including so-called “outliers,” because “cherry picking is wrong on all statistical
approaches” (Dienes, 2011, p. 280).
Context-dependent Bayes factors. The last part of the article addresses how problem-
specific knowledge may be incorporated in the calculation of the Bayes factor. As is also
explained in our next highlighted source (Rouder et al., 2009), there are two main schools of
Bayesian thought: default (or objective) Bayes and context-dependent (or subjective) Bayes.
In contrast to the default Bayes factors for general application that are designed to have cer-
tain desirable mathematical properties (e.g., Jeffreys, 1961; Rouder et al., 2009; Rouder &
Morey, 2012; Rouder, Morey, Speckman, & Province, 2012; Ly, Verhagen, & Wagenmakers,
2016), Dienes provides an online calculator6 that enables one to obtain context-dependent
Bayes factors that incorporate domain knowledge for several commonly used statistical tests.
In contrast to the default Bayes factors, which are typically designed to use standardized ef-
fect sizes, the context-dependent Bayes factors specify prior distributions in terms of the raw
effect size. Readers who are especially interested in prior elicitation should see the appendix
of Dienes’ article for a short review of how to appropriately specify prior distributions that
incorporate relevant theoretical information (and Dienes, 2014, for more details and worked
examples).
4. Structure and motivation of Bayes factors
Source: Rouder et al. (2009) — Bayesian t-tests for accepting and rejecting the null hy-
pothesis
In many cases, a scientist’s primary interest is in showing evidence for an invariance,
rather than a difference. For example, researchers may want to conclude that experimental
and control groups do not differ in performance on a task (e.g., van Ravenzwaaij, Boekel,
Forstmann, Ratcliff, & Wagenmakers, 2014), that participants were performing at chance
6http://www.lifesci.sussex.ac.uk/home/Zoltan_Dienes/inference/Bayes.htm
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(Dienes & Overgaard, 2015), or that two variables are unrelated (Rouder & Morey, 2012). In
classical statistics this is generally not possible as significance tests are asymmetric; they can
only serve to reject the null hypothesis and never to affirm it. One benefit of Bayesian analysis
is that inference is perfectly symmetric, meaning evidence can be obtained that favors the null
hypothesis as well as the alternative hypothesis (see Gallistel, 2009, as listed in our Further
Reading appendix). This is made possible by the use of Bayes factors.7 The section covering
the shortcomings of classical statistics (“Critiques of Inference by Significance Tests”) can
safely be skipped, but readers particularly interested in the motivation of Bayesian inference
are advised to read it.
What is a Bayes factor? The Bayes factor is a representation of the relative predictive
success of two or more models, and it is a fundamental measure of relative evidence. The
way Bayesians quantify predictive success of a model is to calculate the probability of the
data given that model—also called the marginal likelihood or sometimes simply the evidence.
The ratio of two such probabilities is the Bayes factor. Rouder and colleagues (2009) denote
the probability of the data given some model, represented by Hi, as f(data | Hi).8 The
Bayes factor for H0 versus H1 is simply the ratio of f(data | H0) and f(data | H1) written
B01 (or BF01), where the B (or BF ) indicates a Bayes factor, and the subscript indicates
which two models are being compared (see p. 228). If the result of a study is B01 = 10
then the data are ten times more probable under H0 than under H1. Researchers should
report the exact value of the Bayes factor since it is a continuous measure of evidence, but
various benchmarks have been suggested to help researchers interpret Bayes factors, with
values between 1 and 3, between 3 and 10, and greater than 10 generally taken to indicate
inconclusive, weak, and strong evidence, respectively (see Jeffreys, 1961; Wagenmakers, 2007;
Etz & Vandekerckhove, 2016), although different researchers may set different benchmarks.
7Readers for whom Rouder and colleagues’ (2009) treatment is too technical could focus on Dienes’
conceptual ideas and motivations underlying the Bayes factor.
8The probability (f) of the observed data given (|) hypothesis i (Hi), where i indicates one of the candidate
hypotheses (e.g., 0, 1, A, etc.). The null hypothesis is usually denoted H0 and the alternative hypothesis is
usually denoted either H1 or HA.
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Care is need when interpreting Bayes factors against these benchmarks, as they are not meant
to be bright lines against which we judge a study’s success (as opposed to how a statistical
significance criterion is sometimes treated); the difference between a Bayes factor of, say, 8
and 12 is more a difference of degree than of category. Furthermore, Bayes factors near 1
indicate the data are uninformative, and should not be interpreted as even mild evidence for
either of the hypotheses under consideration.
Readers who are less comfortable with reading mathematical notation may skip over
most of the equations without too much loss of clarity. The takeaway is that to evaluate
which model is better supported by the data, we need to find out which model has done the
best job predicting the data we observe. To a Bayesian, the probability a model assigns to
the observed data constitutes its predictive success (see Morey, Romeijn, & Rouder, 2016); a
model that assigns a high probability to the data relative to another model is best supported
by the data. The goal is then to find the probability a given model assigns the data,
f(data | Hi). Usually the null hypothesis specifies that the true parameter is a particular
value of interest (e.g., zero), so we can easily find f(data | H0). However, we generally do
not know the value of the parameter if the null model is false, so we do not know what
probability it assigns the data. To represent our uncertainty with regard to the true value of
the parameter if the null hypothesis is false, Bayesians specify a range of plausible values that
the parameter might take under the alternative hypothesis. All of these parameter values
are subsequently used in computing an average probability of the data given the alternative
hypothesis, f(data | H1) (for an intuitive illustration, see Gallistel, 2009 as listed in our
Further Reading appendix). If the prior distribution gives substantial weight to parameter
values that assign high probability to the data, then the average probability the alternative
hypothesis assigns to the data will be relatively high—the model is effectively rewarded for
its accurate predictions with a high value for f(data | H1).
The role of priors. The form of the prior can have important consequences on the
resulting Bayes factor. As discussed in our third source (Dienes, 2011), there are two primary
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schools of Bayesian thought: default (objective) Bayes (Berger, 2006) and context-dependent
(subjective) Bayes (Goldstein et al., 2006; Rouder, Morey, & Wagenmakers, 2016). The de-
fault Bayesian tries to specify prior distributions that convey little information while main-
taining certain desirable properties. For example, one desirable property is that changing the
scale of measurement should not change the way the information is represented in the prior,
which is accomplished by using standardized effect sizes. Context-dependent prior distribu-
tions are often used because they more accurately encode our prior information about the
effects under study, and can be represented with raw or standardized effect sizes, but they do
not necessarily have the same desirable mathematical properties (although sometimes they
can).
Choosing a prior distribution for the standardized effect size is relatively straightforward
for the default Bayesian. One possibility is to use a normal distribution centered at 0 and with
some standard deviation (i.e., spread) σ. If σ is too large, the Bayes factor will always favor
the null model, so such a choice would be unwise (see also DeGroot, 1982; Robert, 2014). This
happens because such a prior distribution assigns weight to very extreme values of the effect
size, when in reality, the effect is most often reasonably small (e.g., almost all psychological
effects are smaller than Cohen’s d = 2). The model is penalized for low predictive success.
Setting σ to 1 is reasonable and common—this is called the unit information prior. However,
using a Cauchy distribution (which resembles a normal distribution but with less central mass
and fatter tails) has some better properties than the unit information prior, and is now a
common default prior on the alternative hypothesis, giving rise to what is now called the
default Bayes factor (see Rouder & Morey, 2012 for more details; see also Wagenmakers,
Love, et al., this issue and Wagenmakers, Marsman, et al., this issue). To use the Cauchy
distribution, like the normal distribution, again one must specify a scaling factor. If it is too
large, the same problem as before occurs where the null model will always be favored. Rouder
and colleagues suggest a scale of 1, which implies that the effect size has a prior probability
of 50% to be between d = −1 and d = 1. For some areas, such as social psychology, this is
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not reasonable, and the scale should be reduced. However, slight changes to the scale often
do not make much difference in the qualitative conclusions one draws.
Readers are advised to pay close attention to the sections “Subjectivity in priors” and
“Bayes factors with small effects.” The former explains how one can tune the scale of the
default prior distribution to reflect more contextually relevant information while maintaining
the desirable properties attached to prior distributions of this form, a practice that is a
reasonable compromise between the default and context-dependent schools. The latter shows
why the Bayes factor will often show evidence in favor of the null hypothesis if the observed
effect is small and the prior distribution is relatively diffuse.
Applied sources
At this point, the essential concepts of Bayesian probability, Bayes’ theorem, and the
Bayes factor have been discussed in depth. In the following four sources, these concepts
are applied to real data analysis situations. Our first source provides a broad overview of
the most common methods of model comparison, including the Bayes factor, with a heavy
emphasis on its proper interpretation (Vandekerckhove, Matzke, & Wagenmakers, 2015).
The next source begins by demonstrating Bayesian estimation techniques in the context
of developmental research, then provides some guidelines for reporting Bayesian analyses
(van de Schoot et al., 2014). Our final two sources discuss issues in Bayesian cognitive
modeling, such as the selection of appropriate priors (Lee & Vanpaemel, this issue), and the
use of cognitive models for theory testing (Lee, 2008).
Before moving on to our final four highlighted sources, it will be useful if readers consider
some differences in perspective among practitioners of Bayesian statistics. The application
of Bayesian methods is very much an active field of study, and as such, the literature con-
tains a multitude of deep, important, and diverse viewpoints on how data analysis should be
done, similar to the philosophical divides between Neyman–Pearson and Fisher concerning
proper application of classical statistics (see Lehmann, 1993). The divide between subjec-
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tive Bayesians, who elect to use priors informed by theory, and objective Bayesians, who
instead prefer “uninformative” or default priors, has already been mentioned throughout the
Theoretical sources section above.
A second division of note exists between Bayesians who see a place for hypothesis testing
in science, and those who see statistical inference primarily as a problem of estimation.
The former believe statistical models can stand as useful surrogates for theoretical positions,
whose relative merits are subsequently compared using Bayes factors and other such “scoring”
metrics (as reviewed in Vandekerckhove et al., 2015, discussed below; for additional examples,
see Jeffreys, 1961 and Rouder, Morey, Verhagen, Province, & Wagenmakers, 2016). The
latter would rather delve deeply into a single model or analysis and use point estimates and
credible intervals of parameters as the basis for their theoretical conclusions (as demonstrated
in Lee, 2008, discussed below; for additional examples, see Gelman & Shalizi, 2013 and
McElreath, 2016).9
Novice Bayesians may feel surprised that such wide divisions exist, as statistics (of any
persuasion) is often thought of as a set of prescriptive, immutable procedures that can be
only right or wrong. We contend that debates such as these should be expected due to the
wide variety of research questions—and diversity of contexts—to which Bayesian methods
are applied. As such, we believe that the existence of these divisions speaks to the intellectual
vibrancy of the field and its practitioners. We point out these differences here so that readers
might use this context to guide their continued reading.
5. Bayesian model comparison methods
Source: Vandekerckhove et al. (2015) — Model comparison and the principle of parsimony
John von Neumann famously said: “With four parameters I can fit an elephant, and
9This divide in Bayesian statistics may be seen as a parallel to the recent discussions about use of classical
statistics in psychology (e.g., Cumming, 2014), where a greater push has been made to adopt an estimation
approach over null hypothesis significance testing (NHST). Discussions on the merits of hypothesis testing
have been running through all of statistics for over a century, with no end in sight.
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with five I can make him wiggle his trunk” (as quoted in Mayer, Khairy, & Howard, 2010,
p. 698), pointing to the natural tension between model parsimony and goodness of fit. The
tension occurs because it is always possible to decrease the amount of error between a model’s
predictions and the observed data by simply adding more parameters to the model. In the
extreme case, any data set of N observations can be reproduced perfectly by a model with
N parameters. Such practices, however, termed overfitting, result in poor generalization and
greatly reduce the accuracy of out-of-sample predictions. Vandekerckhove and colleagues
(2015) take this issue as a starting point to discuss various criteria for model selection. How
do we select a model that both fits the data well and generalizes adequately to new data?
Putting the problem in perspective, the authors discuss research on recognition memory
that relies on multinomial processing trees, which are simple, but powerful, cognitive models.
Comparing these different models using only the likelihood term is ill-advised, because the
model with the highest number of parameters will—all other things being equal—yield the
best fit. As a first step to addressing this problem, Vandekerckhove et al. (2015) discuss the
popular Akaike information criterion (AIC) and Bayesian information criterion (BIC).
Though derived from different philosophies (for an overview, see Aho, Derryberry, &
Peterson, 2014), both AIC and BIC try to solve the trade-off between goodness-of-fit and
parsimony by combining the likelihood with a penalty for model complexity. However, this
penalty is solely a function of the number of parameters and thus neglects the functional form
of the model, which can be informative in its own right. As an example, the authors mention
Fechner’s law and Steven’s law. The former is described by a simple logarithmic function,
which can only ever fit negatively accelerated data. Steven’s law, however, is described by
an exponential function, which can account for both positively and negatively accelerated
data. Additionally, both models feature just a single parameter, nullifying the benefit of the
complexity penalty in each of the two aforementioned information criteria.
The Bayes factor yields a way out. It extends the simple likelihood ratio test by in-
tegrating the likelihood with respect to the prior distribution, thus taking the predictive
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success of the prior distribution into account (see also Gallistel, 2009, in the Further Reading
appendix). Essentially, the Bayes factor is a likelihood ratio test averaged over all possible
parameter values for the model, using the prior distributions as weights: It is the natural
extension of the likelihood ratio test to a Bayesian framework. The net effect of this is to
penalize complex models. While a complex model can predict a wider range of possible data
points than a simple model can, each individual data point is less likely to be observed under
the complex model. This is reflected in the prior distribution being more spread out in the
complex model. By weighting the likelihood by the corresponding tiny prior probabilities,
the Bayes factor in favor of the complex model decreases. In this way, the Bayes factor
instantiates an automatic Ockham’s Razor (see also Myung & Pitt, 1997, in the appended
Further Reading section).
However, the Bayes factor can be difficult to compute because it often involves integration
over very many dimensions at once. Vandekerckhove and colleagues (2015) advocate two
methods to ease the computational burden: importance sampling and the Savage-Dickey
density ratio (see also Wagenmakers, Lodewyckx, Kuriyal, & Grasman, 2010 in our in our
Further reading appendix); additional common computational methods include the Laplace
approximation (Kass & Raftery, 1995), bridge sampling (Meng & Wong, 1996; Gronau et al.,
2017), and the encompassing prior approach (Hoijtink, Klugkist, & Boelen, 2008). They also
provide code to estimate parameters in multinomial processing tree models and to compute
the Bayes factor to select among them. Overall, the chapter provides a good overview of
different methods used to tackle the tension between goodness-of-fit and parsimony in a
Bayesian framework. While it is more technical then the sources reviewed above, this article
can greatly influence how one thinks about models and methods for selecting among them.
6. Bayesian estimation
Source: van de Schoot et al. (2014) — A gentle introduction to Bayesian analysis: Appli-
cations to developmental research
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This source approaches practical issues related to parameter estimation in the context of
developmental research. This setting offers a good basis for discussing the choice of priors
and how those choices influence the posterior estimates for parameters of interest. This is a
topic that matters to reviewers and editors alike: How does the choice of prior distributions
for focal parameters influence the statistical results and theoretical conclusions that are
obtained? The article discusses this issue on a basic and illustrative level.
At this point we feel it is important to note that the difference between hypothesis
testing and estimation in the Bayesian framework is much greater than it is in the frequentist
framework. In the frequentist framework there is often a one-to-one relationship between the
null hypothesis falling outside the sample estimate’s 95% confidence interval and rejection of
the null hypothesis with a significance test (e.g., when doing a t-test). This is not so in the
Bayesian framework; one cannot test a null hypothesis by simply checking if the null value
is inside or outside a credible interval. A detailed explanation of the reason for this deserves
more space than we can afford to give it here, but in short: When testing hypotheses in
the Bayesian framework one should calculate a model comparison metric. See Rouder and
Vandekerckhove (this issue) for an intuitive introduction to (and synthesis of) the distinction
between Bayesian estimation and testing.
Van de Schoot and colleagues (2014) begin by reviewing the main differences between
frequentist and Bayesian approaches. Most of this part can be skipped by readers who are
comfortable with basic terminology at that point. The only newly introduced term is Markov
chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods, which refers to the practice of drawing samples from
the posterior distribution instead of deriving the distribution analytically (which may not
be feasible for many models; see also van Ravenzwaaij, Cassey, & Brown, this issue and
Matzke, Boehm, & Vandekerckhove, this issue). After explaining this alternative approach
(p. 848), Bayesian estimation of focal parameters and the specification of prior distributions
is discussed with the aid of two case examples.
The first example concerns estimation of an ordinary mean value and the variance of read-
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ing scores and serves to illustrate how different sources of information can be used to inform
the specification of prior distributions. The authors discuss how expert domain knowledge
(e.g., reading scores usually fall within a certain range), statistical considerations (reading
scores are normally distributed), and evidence from previous studies (results obtained from
samples from similar populations) may be jointly used to define adequate priors for the
mean and variance model parameters. The authors perform a prior sensitivity analysis to
show how using priors based on different considerations influence the obtained results. Thus,
the authors examine and discuss how the posterior distributions of the mean and variance
parameters are dependent on the prior distributions used.
The second example focuses on a data set from research on the longitudinal reciprocal as-
sociations between personality and relationships. The authors summarize a series of previous
studies and discuss how results from these studies may or may not inform prior specifications
for the latest obtained data set. Ultimately, strong theoretical considerations are needed to
decide whether data sets that were gathered using slightly different age groups can be used
to inform inferences about one another.
The authors fit a model with data across two time points and use it to discuss how con-
vergence of the MCMC estimator can be supported and checked. They then evaluate overall
model fit via a posterior predictive check. In this type of model check, data simulated from
the specified model are compared to the observed data. If the model is making appropriate
predictions, the simulated data and the observed data should appear similar. The article
concludes with a brief outline of guidelines for reporting Bayesian analyses and results in a
manuscript. Here, the authors emphasize the importance of the specification of prior dis-
tributions and of convergence checks (if MCMC sampling is used) and briefly outline how
both might be reported. Finally, the authors discuss the use of default priors and various
options for conducting Bayesian analyses with common software packages (such as Mplus
and WinBUGS).
The examples in the article illustrate different considerations that should be taken into
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account for choosing prior specifications, the consequences they can have on the obtained
results, and how to check whether and how the choice of priors influenced the resulting
inferences.
7. Prior elicitation
Source: Lee and Vanpaemel (this issue) — Determining priors for cognitive models
Statistics does not operate in a vacuum, and often prior knowledge is available that can
inform one’s inferences. In contrast to classical statistics, Bayesian statistics allows one to
formalize and use this prior knowledge for analysis. The paper by Lee and Vanpaemel (this
issue) fills an important gap in the literature: What possibilities are there to formalize and
uncover prior knowledge?
The authors start by noting a fundamental point: Cognitive modeling is an extension of
general purpose statistical modeling (e.g., linear regression). Cognitive models are designed
to instantiate theory, and thus may need to use richer information and assumptions than
general purpose models (see also Franke, 2016). A consequence of this is that the prior
distribution, just like the likelihood, should be seen as an integral part of the model. As
Jaynes (2003) put it: “If one fails to specify the prior information, a problem of inference is
just as ill-posed as if one had failed to specify the data” (p. 373).
What information can we use to specify a prior distribution? Because the parameters
in such a cognitive model usually have a direct psychological interpretation, theory may be
used to constrain parameter values. For example, a parameter interpreted as a probability
of correctly recalling a word must be between 0 and 1. To make this point clear, the
authors discuss three cognitive models and show how the parameters instantiate relevant
information about psychological processes. Lee and Vanpaemel also discuss cases in which
all of the theoretical content is carried by the prior, while the likelihood does not make any
strong assumptions. They also discuss the principle of transformation invariance, that is,
prior distributions for parameters should be invariant to the scale they are measured on (e.g.,
28
measuring reaction time using seconds versus milliseconds).
Lee and Vanpaemel also discuss specific methods of prior specification. These include
the maximum entropy principle, the prior predictive distribution, and hierarchical modeling.
The prior predictive distribution is the model-implied distribution of the data, weighted with
respect to the prior. Recently, iterated learning methods have been employed to uncover an
implicit prior held by a group of participants. These methods can also be used to elicit
information that is subsequently formalized as a prior distribution. (For a more in-depth
discussion of hierarchical cognitive modeling, see Lee, 2008, discussed below.)
In sum, the paper gives an excellent overview of why and how one can specify prior
distributions for cognitive models. Importantly, priors allow us to integrate domain-specific
knowledge, and thus build stronger theories (Platt, 1964; Vanpaemel, 2010). For more
information on specifying prior distributions for data-analytic statistical models rather than
cognitive models see Rouder, Morey, Verhagen, Swagman, and Wagenmakers (in press) and
Rouder, Engelhardt, McCabe, and Morey (2016).
8. Bayesian cognitive modeling
Source: Lee (2008) — Three case studies in the Bayesian analysis of cognitive models
Our final source (Lee, 2008) further discusses cognitive modeling, a more tailored ap-
proach within Bayesian methods. Often in psychology, a researcher will not only expect to
observe a particular effect, but will also propose a verbal theory of the cognitive process
underlying the expected effect. Cognitive models are used to formalize and test such verbal
theories in a precise, quantitative way. For instance, in a cognitive model, psychological
constructs, such as attention and bias, are expressed as model parameters. The proposed
psychological process is expressed as dependencies among parameters and observed data (the
“structure” of the model).
In peer-reviewed work, Bayesian cognitive models are often presented in visual form as a
graphical model. Model parameters are designated by nodes, where the shape, shading, and
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style of border of each node reflect various parameter characteristics. Dependencies among
parameters are depicted as arrows connecting the nodes. Lee gives an exceptionally clear
and concise description of how to read graphical models in his discussion of multidimensional
scaling (Lee, 2008, p. 2).
After a model is constructed, the observed data are used to update the priors and gener-
ate a set of posterior distributions. Because cognitive models are typically complex, posterior
distributions are almost always obtained through sampling methods (i.e., MCMC; see van
Ravenzwaaij et al., this issue), rather than through direct, often intractable, analytic calcu-
lations.
Lee demonstrates the construction and use of cognitive models through three case studies.
Specifically, he shows how three popular process models may be implemented in a Bayesian
framework. In each case, he begins by explaining the theoretical basis of each model, then
demonstrates how the verbal theory may be translated into a full set of prior distributions
and likelihoods. Finally, Lee discusses how results from each model may be interpreted and
used for inference.
Each case example showcases a unique advantage of implementing cognitive models in a
Bayesian framework (see also Bartlema, Voorspoels, Rutten, Tuerlinckx, & Vanpaemel, this
issue). For example, in his discussion of signal detection theory, Lee highlights how Bayesian
methods are able to account for individual differences easily (see also Rouder & Lu, 2005, in
the Further reading appendix). Throughout, Lee emphasizes that Bayesian cognitive models
are useful because they allow the researcher to reach new theoretical conclusions that would
be difficult to obtain with non-Bayesian methods. Overall, this source not only provides
an approachable introduction to Bayesian cognitive models, but also provides an excellent
example of good reporting practices for research that employs Bayesian cognitive models.
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Conclusion
By focusing on interpretation, rather than implementation, we have sought to provide a
more accessible introduction to the core concepts and principles of Bayesian analysis than
may be found in introductions with a more applied focus. Ideally, readers who have read
through all eight of our highlighted sources, and perhaps some of the supplementary reading,
may now feel comfortable with the fundamental ideas in Bayesian data analysis, from basic
principles (Kruschke, 2015; Lindley, 1993) to prior distribution selection (Lee & Vanpaemel,
this issue), and with the interpretation of a variety of analyses, including Bayesian analogs
of classical statistical tests (e.g., t-tests; Rouder et al., 2009), estimation in a Bayesian
framework (van de Schoot et al., 2014), Bayes factors and other methods for hypothesis
testing (Dienes, 2011; Vandekerckhove et al., 2015), and Bayesian cognitive models (Lee,
2008).
Reviewers and editors unfamiliar with Bayesian methods may initially feel hesitant to
evaluate empirical articles in which such methods are applied (Wagenmakers, Love, et al.,
this issue). Ideally, the present article should help ameliorate this apprehension by offering
an accessible introduction to Bayesian methods that is focused on interpretation rather than
application. Thus, we hope to help minimize the amount of reviewer reticence caused by
authors’ choice of statistical framework.
Our overview was not aimed at comparing the advantages and disadvantages of Bayesian
and classical methods. However, some conceptual conveniences and analytic strategies that
are only possible or valid in the Bayesian framework will have become evident. For example,
Bayesian methods allow for the easy implementation of hierarchical models for complex data
structures (Lee, 2008), they allow multiple comparisons and flexible sampling rules during
data collection without correction of inferential statistics (Dienes, 2011; see also Schönbrodt,
Wagenmakers, Zehetleitner, & Perugini, 2015, as listed in our Further reading appendix, and
also Schönbrodt &Wagenmakers, this issue), and they allow inferences that many researchers
in psychology are interested in but are not able to answer with classical statistics such as
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providing support for a null hypothesis (for a discussion, see Wagenmakers, 2007). Thus,
the inclusion of more research that uses Bayesian methods in the psychological literature
should be to the benefit of the entire field (Etz & Vandekerckhove, 2016). In this article, we
have provided an overview of sources that should allow a novice to understand how Bayesian
statistics allows for these benefits, even without prior knowledge of Bayesian methods.
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Appendix
Further reading
In this Appendix, we provide a concise overview of 32 additional articles and books that
provide further discussion of various theoretical and applied topics in Bayesian inference.
For example, the list includes articles that editors and reviewers might consult as a refer-
ence while reviewing manuscripts that apply advanced Bayesian methods such as structural
equation models (Kaplan & Depaoli, 2012), hierarchical models (Rouder & Lu, 2005), linear
mixed models (Sorensen, Hohenstein, & Vasishth, 2016), and design (i.e., power) analyses
(Schönbrodt et al., 2015). The list also includes books that may serve as accessible intro-
ductory texts (e.g., Dienes, 2008) or as more advanced textbooks (e.g., Gelman et al.,
2013). To aid in readers’ selection of sources, we have summarized the associated focus and
difficulty ratings for each source in Figure 1.A1.
Recommended articles
9. Cornfield (1966) — Sequential Trials, Sequential Analysis, and the Likelihood Prin-
ciple. Theoretical focus (3), moderate difficulty (5).
A short exposition of the difference between Bayesian and classical inference in sequen-
tial sampling problems.
10. Lindley (2000) — The Philosophy of Statistics. Theoretical focus (1), moderate
difficulty (5).
Dennis Lindley, a foundational Bayesian, outlines his philosophy of statistics, receives
commentary, and responds. An illuminating paper with equally illuminating commen-
taries.
11. Jaynes (1986) — Bayesian Methods: General Background. Theoretical focus (2), low
difficulty (2).
A brief history of Bayesian inference. The reader can stop after finishing the section
41
Figure 1.A1 . An overview of focus and difficulty ratings for all sources included in the
present paper.Sources discussed at length in the Theoretical sources and Applied sources
sections are presented in bold text. Sources listed in the appended Further reading appendix
are presented in light text. Source numbers representing books are italicized.
titled, “Is our logic open or closed,” because the further sections are somewhat dated
and not very relevant to psychologists.
12. Edwards, Lindman, and Savage (1963) — Bayesian Statistical Inference for Psy-
chological Research. Theoretical focus (2), high difficulty (9).
The article that first introduced Bayesian inference to psychologists. A challenging but
insightful and rewarding paper. Much of the more technical mathematical notation can
be skipped with minimal loss of understanding.
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13. Rouder, Morey, and Wagenmakers (2016)—The Interplay between Subjectivity,
Statistical Practice, and Psychological Science. Theoretical focus (2), low difficulty (3)
All forms of statistical analysis, both Bayesian and frequentist, require some subjective
input (see also Berger & Berry, 1988). In this article, the authors emphasize that
subjectivity is in fact desirable, and one of the benefits of the Bayesian approach is
that the inclusion of subjective elements is transparent and therefore open to discussion.
14. Myung and Pitt (1997) — Applying Occam’s Razor in Cognitive Modeling: A
Bayesian Approach. Balanced focus (5), high difficulty (9).
This paper brought Bayesian methods to greater prominence in modern psychology,
discussing the allure of Bayesian model comparison for non-nested models and pro-
viding worked examples. As the authors provide a great discussion of the principle of
parsimony, thus this paper serves as a good follow-up to our fifth highlighted source
(Vandekerckhove et al., 2015).
15. Wagenmakers, Morey, and Lee (2016) — Bayesian Benefits for the Pragmatic
Researcher. Applied focus (9), low difficulty (1).
Provides pragmatic arguments for the use of Bayesian inference with two examples
featuring fictional characters Eric Cartman and Adam Sandler. This paper is clear,
witty, and persuasive.
16. Rouder (2014) — Optional Stopping: No Problem for Bayesians. Balanced focus
(5), moderate difficulty (5).
Provides a simple illustration of why Bayesian inference is valid in the case of optional
stopping. A natural follow-up to our third highlighted source (Dienes, 2011).
17. Verhagen and Wagenmakers (2014) — Bayesian Tests to Quantify the Result of
a Replication Attempt. Balanced focus (4), high difficulty (7).
43
Outlines so-called “replication Bayes factors,” which use the original study’s estimated
posterior distribution as a prior distribution for the replication study’s Bayes factor.
Given the current discussion of how to estimate replicability (Open Science Collabo-
ration, 2015), this work is more relevant than ever. (See also Wagenmakers, Verhagen,
and Ly (2015) for a natural follow-up.)
18. Gigerenzer (2004) — Mindless Statistics. Theoretical focus (3), low difficulty (1).
This paper constructs an enlightening and witty overview on the history and psychology
of statistical thinking. It contextualizes the need for Bayesian inference.
19. Ly et al. (2016) — Harold Jeffreys’s Default Bayes Factor Hypothesis Tests: Expla-
nation, Extension, and Application in Psychology. Theoretical focus (2), high difficulty
(8).
A concise summary of the life, work, and thinking of Harold Jeffreys, inventor of
the Bayes factor (see also Etz & Wagenmakers, in press). The second part of the
paper explains the computations in detail for t-tests and correlations. The first part is
essential in grasping the motivation behind the Bayes factor.
20. Robert (2014) — On the Jeffreys–Lindley Paradox. Theoretical focus (3), moderate
difficulty (6).
Robert discusses the implications of the Jeffreys–Lindley paradox, so-called because
Bayesians and frequentist hypothesis tests can come to diametric conclusions from the
same data—even with infinitely large samples. The paper further outlines the need
for caution when using improper priors, and why they present difficulties for Bayesian
hypothesis tests. (For more on this topic see DeGroot, 1982).
21. Jeffreys (1936) — On Some Criticisms of the Theory of Probability. Theoretical
focus (1), high difficulty (8).
An early defense of probability theory’s role in scientific inference by one of the founders
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of Bayesian inference as we know it today. The paper’s notation is somewhat outdated
and makes for rather slow reading, but Jeffreys’s writing is insightful nonetheless.
22. Rouder, Morey, Verhagen, et al. (2016) — Is There a Free Lunch in Inference?
Theoretical focus (3), moderate difficulty (4).
A treatise on why making detailed assumptions about alternatives to the null hypoth-
esis is requisite for a satisfactory method of statistical inference. A good reference
for why Bayesians cannot do hypothesis testing by simply checking if a null value lies
inside or outside of a credible interval, and instead must calculate a Bayes factor to
evaluate the plausibility of a null model.
23. Berger and Delampady (1987) — Testing Precise Hypotheses. Theoretical focus
(1), high difficulty (9).
Explores the different conclusions to be drawn from hypothesis tests in the classical ver-
sus Bayesian frameworks. This is a resource for readers with more advanced statistical
training.
24. Wetzels et al. (2011) — Statistical Evidence in Experimental Psychology: An Em-
pirical Comparison using 855 t-tests. Applied focus (7), low difficulty (2).
Using 855 t-tests from the literature, the authors quantify how inference based on p
values, effect sizes, and Bayes factors differ. An illuminating reference to understand
the practical differences between various methods of inference.
25. Vanpaemel (2010)— Prior Sensitivity in Theory Testing: An Apologia for the Bayes
Factor. Theoretical focus (3), high difficulty (7).
The authors defend Bayes factors against the common criticism that the inference is
sensitive to specification of the prior. They assert that this sensitivity is valuable and
desirable.
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26. Royall (2004)— The Likelihood Paradigm for Statistical Inference. Theoretical focus
(2), moderate difficulty (5).
An accessible introduction to the Likelihood principle, and its relevance to inference.
Contrasts are made among different accounts of statistical evidence. A more complete
account is given in Royall (1997).
27. Gelman and Shalizi (2013) — Philosophy and the Practice of Bayesian Statistics.
Theoretical focus (2), high difficulty (7).
This is the centerpiece of an excellent special issue on the philosophy of Bayesian
inference. We recommend that discussion groups consider reading the entire special
issue (British Journal of Mathematical and Statistical Psychology, February, 2013), as
it promises intriguing and fundamental discussions about the nature of inference.
28. Wagenmakers et al. (2010) — Bayesian Hypothesis Testing for Psychologists: A
Tutorial on the Savage-Dickey Ratio. Applied focus (9), moderate difficulty (6).
Bayes factors are notoriously hard to calculate for many types of models. This article
introduces a useful computational trick known as the “Savage-Dickey Density Ratio,”
an alternative conception of the Bayes factor that makes many computations more
convenient. The Savage-Dickey ratio is a powerful visualization of the Bayes factor,
and is the primary graphical output of the Bayesian statistics software JASP (Love et
al., 2015).
29. Gallistel (2009) — The Importance of Proving the Null. Applied focus (7), low
difficulty (3).
The importance of null hypotheses is explored through three thoroughly worked exam-
ples. This paper provides valuable guidance for how one should approach a situation
in which it is theoretically desirable to accumulate evidence for a null hypothesis.
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30. Rouder and Lu (2005) — An Introduction to Bayesian Hierarchical Models with an
Application in the Theory of Signal Detection. Applied focus (7), high difficulty (8).
This is a good introduction to hierarchical Bayesian inference for the more mathemati-
cally inclined readers. It demonstrates the flexibility of hierarchical Bayesian inference
applied to signal detection theory, while also introducing augmented Gibbs sampling.
31. Sorensen et al. (2016) — Bayesian Linear Mixed Models Using Stan: A Tutorial
for Psychologists. Applied focus (9), moderate difficulty (4).
Using the software Stan, the authors give an accessible and clear introduction to hi-
erarchical linear modeling. Because both the paper and code are hosted on github,
this article serves as a good example of open, reproducible research in a Bayesian
framework.
32. Schönbrodt et al. (2015) — Sequential Hypothesis Testing with Bayes Factors:
Efficiently Testing Mean Differences. Applied focus (8), low difficulty (3).
For Bayesians, power analysis is often an afterthought because sequential sampling
is encouraged, flexible, and convenient. This paper provides Bayes factor simulations
that give researchers an idea of how many participants they might need to collect to
achieve moderate levels of evidence from their studies.
33. Kaplan and Depaoli (2012) — Bayesian Structural Equation Modeling. Applied
focus (8), high difficulty (7).
One of few available practical sources on Bayesian structural equation modeling. The
article focuses on the Mplus software but also stands a general source.
34. Rouder et al. (in press) — Bayesian Analysis of Factorial Designs. Balanced focus
(6), high difficulty (8).
Includes examples of how to set up Bayesian ANOVA models, which are some of the
more challenging Bayesian analyses to perform and report, as intuitive hierarchical
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models. In the appendix, how to use the BayesFactor R package and JASP software
for ANOVA is demonstrated. The relatively high difficulty rating is due to the large
amount of statistical notation.
Recommended books
35. Winkler (2003) — Introduction to Bayesian Inference and Decision. Balanced focus
(4), low difficulty (3).
As the title suggests, this is an accessible textbook that introduces the basic concepts
and theory underlying the Bayesian framework for both inference and decision-making.
The required math background is elementary algebra (i.e., no calculus is required).
36. McElreath (2016) — Statistical Rethinking: A Bayesian Course with Examples in
R and Stan. Balanced focus (6), moderate difficulty (4).
Not your traditional applied introductory statistics textbook. McElreath focuses on
education through simulation, with handy R code embedded throughout the text to
give readers a hands-on experience.
37. Lee andWagenmakers (2014)—Bayesian Cognitive Modeling: A Practical Course.
Applied focus (7), moderate difficulty (4).
A textbook on Bayesian cognitive modeling methods that is in a similar vein to our
eighth highlighted source (Lee, 2008). It includes friendly introductions to core prin-
ciples of implementation and many case examples with accompanying MATLAB and
R code.
38. Lindley (2006) — Understanding Uncertainty. Theoretical focus (2), moderate diffi-
culty (4).
An introduction to thinking about uncertainty and how it influences everyday life
and science. Lindley proposes that all types of uncertainty can be represented by
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probabilities. A largely non-technical text, but a clear and concise introduction to the
general Bayesian perspective on decision making under uncertainty.
39. Dienes (2008) — Understanding Psychology as a Science: An Introduction to Scien-
tific and Statistical Inference. Theoretical focus (1), low difficulty (3).
A book that covers a mix of philosophy of science, psychology, and Bayesian inference.
It is a very accessible introduction to Bayesian statistics, and it very clearly contrasts
the different goals of Bayesian and classical inference.
40. Stone (2013)—Bayes’ Rule: A Tutorial Introduction to Bayesian Analysis. Balanced
focus (4), moderate difficulty (6).
In this short and clear introductory text, Stone explains Bayesian inference using ac-
cessible examples and writes for readers with little mathematical background. Accom-
panying Python and MATLAB code is provided on the author’s website.
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CHAPTER 2: USING HIERARCHICAL MODELING TO QUANTIFY THE
ROBUSTNESS OF EXPERIMENTALLY OBSERVED EFFECTS
This chapter was published in March 2018 as a peer-reviewed article in the Proceedings of
the National Academy of Sciences.1 My primary role in this work was to design and perform
the research (i.e., developing the radical randomization approach to experimental design and
coordinating data collection across all seven labs), in addition to contributing to the writing
of the paper.
Metastudies for robust tests of theory
Beth Baribaulta, Chris Donkinb , Daniel R. Littlec,
Jennifer S. Truebloodd, Zita Oravecze, Don van Ravenzwaaijf ,
Corey N. Whiteg, Paul De Boeckh, & Joachim Vandekerckhovea
aUniversity of California, Irvine
bUniversity of New South Wales
cUniversity of Melbourne
dVanderbilt University
ePennsylvania State University, State College
fUniversity of Groningen
gMissouri Western State University
hOhio State University
Abstract
We describe and demonstrate an empirical strategy useful for discovering and
replicating empirical effects in psychological science. The method involves the
1https://www.pnas.org/content/pnas/115/11/2607.full.pdf
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design of a meta-study, in which many independent experimental variables—
that may be moderators of an empirical effect—are indiscriminately random-
ized. Radical randomization yields rich data sets that can be used to test the
robustness of an empirical claim to some of the vagaries and idiosyncrasies
of experimental protocols and enhances the generalizability of these claims.
The strategy is made feasible by advances in hierarchical Bayesian modeling
which allow for the pooling of information across unlike experiments and de-
signs, and is proposed here as a gold standard for replication research and
exploratory research. The practical feasibility of the strategy is demonstrated
with a replication of a study on subliminal priming. All materials and data
are freely available online via https://osf.io/u2vwa/.
Introduction
Imagine, if you will, an experiment in the psychological laboratory. In the experiment,
a single participant provides data in each of two conditions. Further suppose an effect is
observed in the form of a mean difference between the two conditions. Unless there are
strong reasons to believe that all humans are largely interchangeable with respect to this
particular effect, readers and reviewers will reasonably point out that this effect might be
idiosyncratic to the participant and hence not generalize to the broader population.
One potential remedy is for the researcher to replicate the experiment with the same
participant and one newly recruited participant – thereby enacting a systematic manipulation
of the suspected moderating variable (i.e., participant identity). Such a design enables at
least two related claims: possibly that there are individual differences in the magnitude of
the effect, and possibly that the effect occurs in some participants but is absent in others.
This strategy is, however, clearly limited: it does not allow for population-level inference.
Rather than merely observing that some individual differences could occur, we might instead
be interested in whether the effect holds for most humans, or on average across humans, or
perhaps for all humans. Such claims call for a hierarchical strategy in which not one or two
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but many participants are randomly sampled from the population towards which we wish to
generalize. If the resultant sample is representative of the population, then the sample mean
effect will be an unbiased estimate of the population mean effect and the sample variance in
the effect will permit statements about the generality of its occurrence.
In the same way that psychological scientists typically want to generalize from one par-
ticipant to all potential participants (within certain boundaries), so too will they often want
to generalize from a small set of conditions to all conditions (within certain boundaries).
For example, researchers who want to claim that stress impairs memory presumably believe
that this effect is not specific to the particular aspects of one specific experiment. However,
testing the myriad experimental facets, or moderators, involved (e.g., setting, stimuli, etc.)
can be burdensome, time-consuming, and expensive. The strategy of random selection is a
sound and viable one for potential moderators of an experimental effect, including potential
moderators other than participant identity. In particular, we believe that extensive ran-
domization can lead to scientific conclusions that are more general in scope, more robust to
incidental variations in experimental setup, and more likely to replicate in future studies.
In what follows, we will we introduce the concept of a meta-study, in which we com-
bine radical randomization of experimental features and systematic pooling of information
with a Bayesian hierarchical model. We argue that sampling from a population of possible
experiments in the same way one would sample from a population of possible participants
is a practically feasible approach that can increase the robustness of empirical findings in
psychology.
Causes of nonreplication and variations on replication
Replicability of empirical findings has been a central topic in recent psychological science.
Following a series of dramatic revelations in which researchers have appeared unable to
reliably replicate empirical effects once thought to be robust, there is now talk of a “crisis
of confidence” (Pashler & Wagenmakers, 2012) in the field. While there are a number of
52
possible explanations for the lack of replicability (Francis, 2012), one commonly indicated
problem is the issue of publication bias: the preference to publish statistically significant
results (i.e., results that lead to the rejection of a null hypotheses; Guan & Vandekerckhove,
2016; Rosenthal, 1979). This statistical significance filter (Vasishth & Gelman, 2017) biases
the published record towards results that capitalize on measurement noise and fluke outcomes
(Sterling, 1959).
Moreover, evidence from psychological studies—even if published without bias towards
certain outcomes—is often weak due to traditions of insufficient sample sizes and noisy mea-
surement tools, which leads to generally low ability to detect true effects and a concomitant
increase in false positive results (Etz & Vandekerckhove, 2016; Gelman & Loken, 2014).
The combination of publication bias and low standards of evidence would naturally cause
frequent failures to replicate, since effects claimed in the published literature are likely to be
false alarms. Given the uncertain nature of one-off effects found in the literature, replica-
tion of empirical results is a clear gold standard of convincing evidence: greater confidence
is warranted in theories whose predictions repeatedly come true (Fisher, 1935) or whose
predictions survive repeated falsification attempts (Popper, 1963).
At the same time, even when a published effect is true, it is possible for effects to fail
to replicate strictly due to seemingly innocuous differences in the implementation of the
experiment (i.e., due to “hidden moderators” that may occur in replication studies). Small
variations in experiments are of course unavoidable: exact replication is strictly impossi-
ble. However, for the purposes of creating generalizable knowledge what matters most is
recreating the necessary and sufficient conditions that will show the effect as predicted by
some theory. By implication, small experiment variations that are not theoretically relevant
should have only minimal impact on the size of a true effect. Indeed, theoretical statements
made by researchers almost without fail imply some degree of robustness to irrelevant vari-
ables. It was recently proposed that authors make these claims explicit as part of every
paper (Simons, Shoda, & Lindsay, in press; Kenett & Rubinstein, 2017).
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Such robustness is, of course, a testable assertion. We could take any one of these
suspected hidden moderators, systematically vary it as an independent variable in an exper-
iment, and quantify any differences so obtained. Much theoretical knowledge grows exactly
in this fashion.
A related distinction that is often made among replication attempts is that between di-
rect and conceptual replications. A direct replication is one in which the replicating team
attempts to follow the original protocol as closely as possible, allowing for no moderating
variables that might distort the findings or obfuscate the effect seen in the original pub-
lication. In a direct replication, the exact same theoretical prediction—that is, the same
hypothesis—is tested. A conceptual replication, on the other hand, is one in which the repli-
cating team tests the same theory, but uses a different instantiation of theory to hypothesis,
with entirely different values on some independent variables and possibly different dependent
and independent variables as well. In such a replication, the issue at hand is the robustness
of a reported effect to theoretically irrelevant design variations.
Both of these approaches have associated problems. A common concern about direct
replications is that it is typically impossible to copy a protocol exactly: replications tend to
take place at a different time and place from the original, with different subjects, and they
are often by a different lab with slightly different ineffable and undocumented practices, and
not all the relevant details are reported in the original publication. Conceptual replications,
on the other hand, lack falsification power: a lack of effect may be due to one of the many
differences between the original and the replication. While irrelevant within the adopted
theoretical framework, an innocuous difference in design might in fact be a genuine moder-
ating factor. As such, the masking of an otherwise replicable effect by a hidden moderator
and a genuine failure to replicate are strictly unable to be teased apart with conventional
techniques.
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Radical randomization
Here we present an alternative take on replication that involves the radical randomization
(RR) of many features of an experiment. As an example, imagine a study in which researchers
are interested in some difference between two manners of stimulus presentation. A visual
stimulus (e.g., the symbol v) is either presented to the participant normally for a short time
(e.g., 30 ms), or it is presented with temporal masking – meaning that it is preceded and
followed by visual masks (e.g., strings of symbols such as &&&). These masks are called
forward masks and backward masks, respectively, and their addition sometimes suppresses
the conscious perception of the temporally flanked stimulus. Such an experiment has a
few immutable features that are necessary to address the question at hand (critically, some
stimuli need to be masked while others are not). However, many of the features of this
experiment are chosen largely arbitrarily: presumably there is nothing special about the
symbol v and the same differences could be illustrated with the symbol b instead; and
presumably ### is as effective a forward or backward mask as &&&. If the effect exists, it
should shine through—if perhaps diminished—for many different symbols and many different
small variations on the experimental setup.
In a RR design, this presumption of robustness is put to a critical test. Rather than
consistently using the symbol v, we instead randomly choose any symbol from a set, and
then choose a new symbol whenever we can (without harming the validity of the study).
Such a design could be considered defensive in the sense that it hardens our conclusions
against minor infidelities in future replication attempts (i.e., replication attempts that are
not strictly faithful and hence are not direct replications) – infidelities such as using a different
symbol. That is, the RR design makes conclusions more robust because it mimics some of
the potential variance between an experiment and future replication attempts that are—as
all replications are—inexact.
In order to distinguish those immutable IVs that are needed to define the effect of inter-
est from the innocuous design features (strictly speaking also IVs) that are randomized, it
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will be useful to introduce some new terminology. Borrowing from Generalizability Theory
(Cronbach, Rajaratnam, & Gleser, 1963), we call these to-be-randomized IVs facets, and we
call a study with many facets a meta-study. While a typical IV has a limited set of values
that we normally call conditions, the values of a facet are drawn randomly from a potentially
infinite population. We call the values of a facet that happened to be drawn for a particular
meta-study its levels, and we call each cell in the multifaceted design a micro-experiment.
The immutable IVs that occur in each micro-experiments will be called elementary IVs. Fi-
nally, it will sometimes be useful to think of the population of possible micro-experiments,
which is defined by the space spanned by all the facets of a study. We call this the method
space.
Facets can be simple design choices (e.g., the exact stimuli selected from a larger pool),
natural constraints (e.g., the geographical location of the lab), or explicitly labeled nuisance
variables that are randomized (e.g., individual differences between participants). The goal
of introducing variability in a facet is to investigate the generality of an effect within a much
broader subspace of the method space than is commonly the case. If an effect remains,
despite variability in some design features, we establish robustness: invariance of the effect
to reasonable variation in the facet. Alternatively, the effect may turn out be sensitive to
such variability.
What constitutes “reasonable variation’—as formalized by the distribution from which
levels of a facet are drawn—is up to the judgment of the researcher. The sampling distribu-
tion of a facet determines the “universe of intended generalization”: the range within which
we aim to establish the existence of the effect. In general, levels should be sampled so that
they well represent the range of the facet across which one hopes to draw conclusions.
Facets may be of particular interest when they are predicted—by one theory or another—
to moderate an empirical effect. In such cases, establishing the moderating influence or the
invariance of the effect are both of theoretical interest. However, the purpose of a RR
procedure is not to build or refine theories as much as it is to establish that an effect holds.
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Researchers setting up a meta-study are therefore recommended to be liberal in which facets
they select for randomization.
We are of course not the first to suggest randomization of experimental features. Indeed,
in 1973 psycholinguist H. H. Clark (Clark, 1973) suggested it as a treatment for what he
called the language-as-fixed-effect fallacy, and R. A. Fisher (Fisher, 1935) famously proposed
it to avoid systematic effects of sampling locations in agricultural experiments. Our position
might be characterized as an objection to a broader error of inappropriate use of fixed effects.
Finally, we should point out that randomization itself is not unique in its suitability
toward the goal of obtaining a representative sample (Worrall, 2007). We merely propose it
here as a convenient practical approach to exploring the space of possible micro-experiments.
Individually weak, jointly powerful
The RR approach that we propose involves the implicit construction of many micro-
experiments and randomly sampling among them. A micro-experiment might consist of all
the trials that share a level of one selected facet (hundreds or thousands of trials), but may
be as small as all the trials in a single block by a participant (a few dozen trials). What
constitutes a micro-experiment is less a design decision than a feature of the statistical
analysis: it is a grouping of observations that is homogeneous in the facet(s) of interest (but
has variability in the elementary IVs so that contrasts can be computed).
Individually, these micro-experiments do not deliver much evidence for or against the
existence of an effect. However, a key component of the approach is the use of modern
statistical techniques (e.g., Bayesian hierarchical modeling and meta-analysis; Gelman &
Hill, 2006; Sutton & Abrams, 2001) to pool information across data sets efficiently.
Theory-testing
A meta-study serves to make a stronger statement about the existence of an empirical
effect – namely, its persistence across variations on an experiment. To test an effect in
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such an hierarchical scenario, it is more beneficial to increase the number of independent
variations than it is to increase the number of data points. Hence, by randomly sampling
many locations in the method space and conducting a small independent experiment in each
location, the multifaceted design allows robust and statistically powerful statements about
the effect.
A theory, with an intended universe of generalizability, can be formalized as an effect
size function over a region within a method space – rather than over a point, which would
represent a more local hypothesis. The region of the method space within which an effect
presents itself allows us to make empirically-backed statements about the constraints on
generality—that is, the boundary conditions of the theory—that are usually only implicit in
psychological theories.
While this strategy seems straightforward—perhaps even obvious—it is to the best of
the authors’ knowledge essentially unused in psychological or cognitive science. Over time,
research groups with a concerted study program eventually develop a portfolio of experi-
ments that vary in small ways, and in that sense these groups work to establish robustness
(or observe the lack of it). However, the systematic execution of such a population of
experiments—in what we here call a meta-study—does not occur, leading to the potential
for bias and correlated error. We believe that the multifaceted design has great potential as
a defensive design strategy that allows for more general statements and tests of theory, and is
likely to yield conclusions that are more robust to small variations in design implementation.
Statistical analysis of multifaceted designs
The multifaceted design affords a number of different statistical approaches. In this
section, we discuss three possibilities. In the case example, we will demonstrate all three.
In what follows, we will assume an experimental meta-study with some set of elementary
independent variables that are theoretically interesting (i.e., whose effect on a dependent
variable we are hoping to quantify) and some set of facets. Most facets are not relevant
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according to the theory we are testing, but might be relevant according to some unspecified
rival theory or be relevant in ways that are simply not yet discovered.
Global tests
Many experimental studies are specifically designed to answer a particular question, often
of the unary form “is A different from 0” or the binary form “is B greater than C”? Even
though we often have multiple, randomly selected participants and we expect there to be
person-level variability, the random effect of participant identity is often ignored on the
(reasonable) assumption that with a sufficiently large sample, any interindividual differences
will “wash out” so the sample is balanced and the sample mean effect is a good estimate of
the population mean effect. With the same argument, we can—in a first pass—ignore the
differences between the randomly sampled levels of the facets in an experiment. This way,
we are able to test for the existence of an inequality on average over the range of possible
values of the facet.
The formulation of the model is somewhat standard. Letting ym(i) stand for the dependent
variable observed at trial i (which is nested in micro-experiment m) and letting xkm(i) stand
for for the corresponding value of the kth elementary IV Xk (where conventionally x0m(i) = 1
to represent the intercept), the global test model has a set of regression weights βk and a
variance ς2. Errors Ôm(i) are i.i.d. standard normal:
ym(i) =
K∑
k=0
βkxkm(i) + ςÔm(i).
This fairly common formulation subsumes as special cases the models associated with the
t test (if K = 1 and X1 is binary), linear regression (if X are continuous), or ANOVA (if
K > 1 and all Xk are binary).
We emphasize, however, that such a global test is only valid if the results are relatively
homogeneous between micro-experiments. In the same way that ignoring large individual
differences may invalidate the results of a conventional experiment, if a facet causes true
59
heterogeneity in the effect size, the global test can be a poor approximation, and it is
important to evaluate whether the test is appropriate before drawing conclusions from it.
Level-2 heterogeneity and moderation
Experimental effect sizes are inherently unstable. Even in the absence of explicit moder-
ators, any set of experiments will show variance even in the true effect size – that is, above
and beyond measurement error. This instability—which occurs due to ephemeral differences
even between superficially identical designs—is sometimes referred to as level-2 heterogeneity.
The global hypothesis test above makes no statement about the robustness of the finding
to variations in the experimental setup. In order to evaluate robustness, we can apply an
hierarchical model in which a facet is allowed to interact with any or all of the elementary IVs
(including the intercept). We then inspect if and how the effect varies over the range of each
of the individual facets. In the hierarchical model, the regression weights are decomposed to
yield the following random-effects model equation:
ym(i) =
K∑
k=0
(βk + σkγkm)xkm(i) + ςÔm(i).
Here, the new parameter γkm indicates the unique contribution of the facet to the effect
of the kth elementary IV. The parameter is i.i.d. standard normal. Of primary interest in
this scenario is σk, the level-2 variance of the contribution of the facet to the effect size βk,
and potentially the pattern of change in γkm across its levels m. The former quantifies the
heterogeneity of the effect size: σk can be compared to the fixed effect size βk for reference;
the ratio ρk = σk/βk is sometimes called the coefficient of variation. The parameter ρk
may be interpreted as a measure of robustness, with small values (say, less than 1/3 or 1/4)
indicating robustness and large values indicating sensitivity to the facet k. The changes in
γkm over the facet allow us to visualize and study its influence.
While it is sometimes sufficient to visualize an effect or a pattern of effects across values
of a moderator, we occasionally need to test whether an effect is nominally present or absent
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in a given condition. For this purpose, we can use a Bayes factor (or likelihood ratio), which
expresses by how much the relative probability of a pair of hypotheses changes when the
data are taken into account. That is, if Ha and Hb are the hypotheses under consideration
and x is the data, the Bayes factor is given by
Bab =
P (Ha|x)/P (Hb|x)
P (Ha)/P (Hb) .
We will interpret Bab ≥ 10 as strong support for Ha.
Planned meta-analysis
A meta-study will typically lead to somewhat larger data sets than are common in psy-
chological science. In order to apply a high-dimensional statistical model to a large data
set, we use one particularly useful approximation that changes our analysis from a standard
hierarchical model into a planned meta-analysis. The approximation is based on the cen-
tral limit theorem, which allows us to substitute nm normally distributed data points ym(i)
with variance ς2 by their means y¯m with standard deviation equal to the standard error of
measurement sm:
y¯m =
K∑
k=0
(βk + σkγkm)xkm + smÔm.
A conventional meta-analysis involves a set of studies, each of which can be represented as
a point in the method space, with the exact location chosen by the experimenters. The
meta-analyst then computes a weighted average of effect sizes across these studies. While
conventional meta-analysis is often plagued by severe issues such as publication bias, this is
not a concern for the meta-study. Similarly, the issue of hidden moderators is reduced here
since at least some differences between micro-experiments are recorded: facets are explicitly
identified and their levels are not arbitrarily chosen but—to the extent possible—fairly and
independently sampled from a well-defined population distribution.
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In the following section, we will apply these methods and analyses to an experimental study
in cognitive science. For the purposes of exposition, we will omit some detail regarding the
experiment (full detail is available via https://osf.io/u2vwa/).
The effect of masked cues on cognitive control
As a toy demonstration, we replicate a recently published experiment in cognitive psy-
chology.2 Reuss et al. (see esp. Fig. 1 Reuss, Kiesel, & Kunde, 2015) describe an experiment
in which a cue that is presented for a subliminal amount of time (i.e., too briefly to be
consciously detected) influences how participants balance speed and accuracy in a response
time task. This design has obvious facets (e.g., the color of the cue) whose exact values are
not expected to affect the finding of subliminal perception: If the effect is robust, it should
appear at all values of the facet; If it is fickle, it should appear in some (contiguous) value
ranges but not in others; If it is false, it should not consistently appear in any range of values.
The basic task
In the experiment, participants were shown a “bullseye” stimulus consisting of a dot
surrounded by nine concentric circles. The stimulus appeared either in the right or the left
half of the screen and participants were instructed to move the mouse pointer from the center
of the screen to the center of the bullseye and then click the left mouse button. Shortly before
the presentation of the stimulus, a single-letter cue was presented, instructing participants
to either favor accuracy (measured in distance from the center) or favor speed. Additionally,
the cue was either masked (by the rapid presentation of two three-symbol strings like ###
and &&&) or not, giving rise to four experimental conditions. Of primary interest is the
effect of the masked cue instruction on the speed and accuracy of the responses that Reuss
et al. (Reuss et al., 2015) first reported.
2The experiment was approved by the institutional review boards of UC Irvine (#2015-1802), Syra-
cuse University (#13-269), Vanderbilt University (#151563), the University of Groningen (#15122-NE),
the University of New South Wales (#153-2387), and the Melbourne School of Psychology (#1544198.3).
All participants provided informed consent at the beginning of the experiment and were informed that
participation was voluntary.
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Table 2.1
Heterogeneity over facets.
Facet Levels Original ρˆa
First forward mask duration 0 – 50 ms 40 ms 0.42
Second forward mask duration 0 – 50 ms 30 ms 0.52
Total forward mask duration 0 – 100 ms 70 ms 0.59
First backward mask duration 0 – 50 ms 40 ms 0.49
Second backward mask duration 0 – 50 ms 30 ms 0.52
Total backward mask duration 0 – 100 ms 70 ms 0.69
Masked cue duration 0 – 50 ms 30 ms 0.90
Blank interval duration 250 – 750 ms 500 ms 0.93
Intertrial interval duration 500 – 1500 ms 1000 ms 0.55
Mask and cue color (13 colors) b white 0.13
Mask and cue contrast 0.5 ≤ x ≤ 1.0 1.0 0.21
Target center color (13 colors) b red 0.10
Target center contrast 0.5 ≤ x ≤ 1.0 1.0 0.21
Target surround contrast 0.5 ≤ x ≤ 1.0 1.0 0.22
First mask symbol @ , #, $, %, &, ? # 0.06
Second mask symbol @ , #, $, %, &, ? % 0.06
Location (6 locations) c 0.36
a: ρˆ indicates the observed heterogeneity that the facet introduces in the effect of masked cues on accuracy
(lower values indicate greater robustness);
b: 12 hues were sampled between integer multiples of 30◦ angles in HSV color space; the 13th color was
white;
c: The locations were the research labs of authors CD (Sydney, Australia), CNW (Syracuse, NY), DRL
(Melbourne, Australia), DvR (Groningen, the Netherlands), JST (Nashville, TN), and JV (Irvine, CA).
Sampling the method space
During the development of the study, the experimenters collaboratively constructed a list
of facets to include. In Table 2.1, we list facets related to timing, including the duration of
the first and second forward mask, of the first and second backward mask, of the masked
and unmasked cue; facets related to color, including the hue and luminance of masks and
cues; and other miscellaneous facets, such as the symbols used in the mask and the testing
location.
Each of these facets was assigned a distribution from which its values were to be randomly
sampled at the beginning of each micro-experiment. In almost all cases, this involved a
uniform distribution over a range of integer values (e.g., the variables relating to presentation
time were naturally expressed as an integer number of frames). For one facet, variance was
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introduced not through random sampling but by a convenience sample: the experiment was
conducted in 6 different geographical locations.
The experiment
Each participant’s session of the experiment began with 16 practice trials whose facets
were set to match the original study by Reuss et al. as closely as possible. After that,
each block of trials consisted of (1) 40 “bullseye” trials whose facets were set to a random
value sampled from the corresponding distribution; and (2) 40 “cue identification” trials
whose facets were set to the same values used in the immediately preceding bullseye block.
The first 8 trials of each type were considered practice trials as well. The goal of the cue
identification trials was to confirm the true subliminal nature of the masked cue. Crucially,
all facets’ values were resampled at the start of each block of bullseye trials, making each
block of trials a unique micro-experiment.
Practice trials were discarded. At each bullseye trial, we recorded two dependent vari-
ables: (1) the participant’s response time and (2) the distance (in mm) between the center
of the stimulus and the point where they clicked. In the cue identification trials, we recorded
(1) the response time and (2) the (binary) accuracy. We discarded trials where the reaction
time was too high (over 2500 ms) or too low (under 150 ms) and where the participant
clicked without moving the pointer.
Each of the 6 participating labs decided how many blocks each participant would complete
(all labs chose 14 blocks, which made for approximately one-hour sessions) and how many
participants would be recruited; with no fixed stopping rule set. Labs recruited between
47 and 78 participants from their institutional human subjects pools, for a total of 346
participants and up to 4,844 micro-experiments, all with randomly drawn levels on each
facet.
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The dependent variable
Throughout the following analyses, the quantity of interest is the magnitude of the con-
ditional effect of the cue when it is masked – that is, the difference between the masked-cue,
accuracy-instruction condition and the masked-cue, speed-instruction condition. For the
purposes of exposition, we will focus only on the dependent variable “accuracy” (negatively
coded as the distance from the center of the bullseye), but similar results were found for the
“reaction time” dependent variable.
Level-2 variability
In order to quantify the heterogeneity between the 4,844 micro-experiments, we applied
an hierarchical Bayesian model (Stan Development Team, 2014) that included a unique effect
size parameter for each micro-experiment (i.e., a random effect of micro-experiment). This
results in a distribution of effect sizes with as many values as there were micro-experiments.
Focusing on the effect of masked cues only, the mean of that effect size distribution was
estimated at βˆ ≈ 3.36 mm. However, its population standard deviation was σˆ ≈ 6.46 mm
and the coefficient of variability was ρˆ ≈ 2, which indicates that the effect is sufficiently
sensitive to the differences between micro-experiments that it will occasionally vanish.
A histogram of the distribution of effect sizes over micro-experiments (Fig. 2.1) shows the
large variability. To construct these histograms, we computed Bayes factors3 to express the
statistical support for a non-zero effect in each micro-experiment. The sample effect sizes
more consistent with a zero effect make up the inverted histogram. The figure shows that
three-quarters of the individual micro-experiments in the masked condition appear more
consistent with no effect than with a positive effect and a small number show an effect
3The Bayes factors express how much less likely the effect size of 0 mm is under its posterior distribution
than under its prior distribution. The prior distribution of the effect size βˆ is derived from the prior
distributions of the condition means, which was in turn derived from the source paper (Reuss et al., 2015).
Assuming a repeated measures correlation of no more than 0.5, the effect size prior worked out to a normal
distribution with mean 0 mm and standard deviation 10 mm. This test is maximally sensitive to effect sizes
that are slightly smaller than the global mean effect size in the original paper. None of our conclusions
regarding Figure 2.1 are sensitive to reasonable variation in these assumptions.
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Figure 2.1 . Level-2 variability. Histograms of estimated effect sizes across micro-experiments
are split between masked (left) and unmasked (right) conditions and between micro-
experiments that support an effect (regular bars) versus no effect (inverted bars). Darker
bars indicate stronger support with a Bayes factor of at least 10. A majority of micro-
experiments show support for the unmasked effect, but a similarly large number support no
effect of the masked cue.
in the opposite direction. By contrast, in the unmasked condition, the large majority of
micro-experiments are more consistent with a positive effect.
The large variability appears to suggest the existence of one or more moderating variables
hidden in our design. We can quantify the heterogeneity of this effect by applying a sequence
of hierarchical models. In each model, we will estimate the variability of the effect size
across levels of one facet (i.e., a random effect of the facet). Each such analysis will yield
an estimated coefficient of variability associated with that facet. These estimates are given
in Table 2.1. The largest heterogeneity is seen in the various timing facets, and the effect
is particularly unstable across levels of ‘masked cue duration’ amd ‘blank interval duration’,
while it appears to be relatively robust to changes in colors and symbols.
Moderator analysis
The observed heterogeneity can be explored by the explicit introduction of potential
moderators of the effect. One candidate moderator that is not included in Table 2.1 is
the subliminality of the cue as presented. Recall that after each block of bullseye trials,
participants completed a block of trials in which they were asked only to identify the cue. In
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Figure 2.2 . The sensitivity and robustness of the effect to two moderators. Left: Micro-
experiments support an effect when participants are able to consciously identify the cue
(square markers), but not otherwise (round markers). Right: The data are split by sublim-
inality. The facet “target center color” was varied over 13 possible levels, but the facet does
not appear to moderate the effect of interest. That is, the effect appears robust against this
facet. Both: Error bars show 99% credibility intervals. Solid square markers indicate strong
evidence (BF > 10) for a nonzero value. Solid round markers indicate strong evidence for a
zero value. Empty markers indicate ambiguous evidence.
these cue-identification blocks, the cue was presented with the same settings (i.e., the same
values on the relevant facets) as in the bullseye trials. We can quantify the subliminality of
the cue under these conditions by the accuracy in the cue-identification trials.
Figure 2.2 (left panel) shows how the effect of the masked cue varies as a function of
the subliminality of the cue presentation. Only in those micro-experiments where the cue
identification accuracy is at least 68% does an effect of the masked cue appear. In the figure,
square markers are filled if the data strongly support an effect (with a Bayes factor of at
least 10), round markers are filled if an effect size of zero is strongly supported, and empty
markers indicate ambiguity. Each facet can be explored in a similar way to evaluate whether
it moderates the effect of interest.
The level-2 variability analysis hinted at the presence of a potential moderator, and
Figure 2.2 identifies subliminality as one. We can construct similar figures to indicate the
lack of a systematic effect of a facet. For example, a facet that is an unlikely moderator is the
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color of the target center. In Figure 2.2 (right panel), we graph the effect size as a function
of this facet, splitting micro-experiments according to whether the cues were consciously
visible. The effect appears to be robust to changes in this facet since it occurs across all
levels of the facet for supraliminal trials (squares) and nowhere for subliminal trials (circles).
Conclusion
The effect of masked cues is strongly qualified by the moderator analysis. Masked cues
seem to have an effect on participant behavior only in those settings where the cue is con-
sciously visible. We find no evidence of an effect of subliminally presented cues. To the
contrary: our data are more consistent with no effect when the cue presentation is truly
subliminal.
Discussion
Robustness and generalizability of empirical results are critical considerations regarding
the reproducibility crisis that has beset psychological science. The radical randomization
approach to experimental design, in which features of an experimental design are strategically
randomized, allows researchers to make statements that are less sensitive to unavoidable
between-study variability. When a single experiment demonstrates the existence of some
effect, there is the risk that the effect is isolated to a particular “sweet spot” in the method
space. By contrast, the meta-study allows us to make statements about effects in regions in
a method space: a well-defined and formalized universe of intended generalization.
In our view, meta-studies complement the standard approach to empirical research. The
radical randomization approach speaks to the robustness of empirical effects, but such in-
formation is only useful to the extent that it informs the development of substantive theory.
Experiments with tight control and fixed effects are an established means of generating theo-
retical explanations for data; we view meta-studies as an efficient way of testing such theories
by complementing the fixed effect approach with random effects.
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The strategy has some weaknesses to keep in mind. First, it is impractical in certain
settings, such as when data is expensive to collect. However, it is particularly well suited for
“many labs” style projects in which an ad-hoc consortium of research labs collaborates in
data collection. Still, a meta-study could very reasonably be run within a single lab – from a
logistical standpoint, the cost to each lab that contributed to the applied example was com-
parable to that of a typical experiment in cognitive science (arguably it was slightly lower
since the study materials were produced entirely by the UC Irvine and UNSW labs). Second,
in all but some cases it will be impossible for a research team to identify all facets that might
moderate an effect. It serves to remember that claims of generality remain confined to the
actually realized method space. However, the randomization of experimental features does
provide for a built-in test of some robustness to small variations in experimental features,
it can be used to spot weaknesses in an experimental design as well as in empirical claims,
and it can be used to generate novel hypotheses when a facet unexpectedly turns out to be
influential.
The major strength of radical randomization, and the reason why we recommend it, is
that it allows for defensive design: a design strategy under which studies are optimized for
generalizability, replicability, and robustness.
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CHAPTER 3: COGNITIVE LATENT VARIABLE MODELING:
A TECHNIQUE FOR HIERARCHICALLY COMBINING COGNITIVE AND
PSYCHOMETRIC MODELS
Abstract
Cognitive latent variable models are a powerful new class of hierarchical Bayesian
models that combine a cognitive model of the data with a psychometric model
of the latent structure of cognitive constructs. This fusion of techniques allows
the researcher to infer a small set of unobserved, large-scale cognitive factors
from the observed data, as seen through the lens of a cognitive model. In
this tutorial, we outline a general method for implementing cognitive latent
variable models using JAGS, a Bayesian sampling package. Specifically, we
describe the development and use of a set of cognitive latent variable models
designed to infer which theorized attention constructs are most likely to have
produced participants’ observed performance on a battery of attention tasks.
We aim not only to demonstrate how a researcher may construct their own
cognitive latent variable models, but also to showcase the unique benefits of
this new approach to cognitive modeling.
I. Introduction
As cognitive scientists, we are generally trying to determine what unobserved cognitive
abilities underlie observed performance on behavioral tasks. Through experimental methods,
these abilities may be indirectly probed by manipulating one or more variables that are
theoretically related to the target ability while holding all other variables constant. However,
this process makes a plethora of assumptions, which may or may not be met. We must
assume that the experimental manipulation is in fact manipulating the variable of interest,
that the data systematically vary with the variable of interest, that participants and items are
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interchangeable, and more. By using computational models, we are able directly account for
one or more of these ambiguous assumptions, and thus may generate more direct inferences
about unobserved cognitive abilities.
There are two general approaches to modeling performance on behavioral tasks. The
first, cognitive modeling, postulates that an unobserved but quantifiable psychological pro-
cess has generated the observed data. The second, latent variable modeling, proposes that
the combination of a small number of latent abilities, which vary across individuals and
tasks, generates the observed data. In order to join these traditionally disparate modeling
approaches, Batchelder (1998, 2010) developed a cognitive psychometrics technique in which
both modeling approaches are sequentially applied in order to infer diﬀerences with respect
to a particular aspect of cognition across items or between groups of individuals (e.g., Riefer,
Knapp, Batchelder, Bamber, & Manifold, 2002).
More recently, Vandekerckhove (2014) introduced cognitive latent variable models, a uni-
fied method for implementing both a cognitive model and a latent variable model simultane-
ously as components of a single hierarchical Bayesian model. In this paper, we demonstrate
how cognitive latent variable models may be constructed from cognitive and latent variable
model components. We begin with an overview of the theoretical background for this new
class of models, then outline a general procedure for implementing cognitive latent variable
models in JAGS (Plummer, 2003), a software package that is commonly used to estimate
parameters in complex Bayesian models.
Cognitive models
Cognitive models, also known as cognitive process models, propose that the observed
data are the result of a psychological process which the model is designed to express quan-
titatively. Because each parameter in the model is included to capture a diﬀerent aspect
of the underlying process, cognitive model parameters often have meaningful psychological
interpretations. Distributions of the estimated parameters, which may or may not be spe-
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cific to participants or items, are used as the basis for inferences about unobserved cognitive
abilities and other constructs.
A primary benefit of this approach is that it allows the researcher to disentangle the
influence of psychological constructs of interest from other sources of variability. Consider a
two-alternative forced choice recognition memory task: In the absence of a cognitive model,
the raw response time data might be used directly to conclude that participants who have
a higher mean response time have a inferior memory ability. However, this assumes that
response time is a measure of an individual’s memory ability and their memory ability only.
More realistically, it may be that certain factors irrelevant of the memory demand of the task,
such as a cautious individual’s desire to avoid responding carelessly in a laboratory setting,
or a tired individual’s slight general delay in pressing the response buttons, are contributing
substantively and systematically to the observed response times. Diﬀusion models (e.g.,
Stone, 1960) are a type of cognitive model that account for the interplay among exactly
these type of factors in response time data. A diﬀusion model can be used to infer separately
each participant’s ability, cautiousness, and overall delay in response by including each as
a parameter in a decision accumulation process (as discussed in the Cognitive components
section). In this way, cognitive models provide a way for researchers to make inferences only
about the particular cognitive ability that they initially intended to study.
By directly incorporating domain knowledge about the psychological construct and the
context in which it is being studied, cognitive models allow for more meaningful conclusions
to be made based on the observed data. However, most cognitive models are designed to
analyze data from a single experimental paradigm. In order to analyze data from multiple
diﬀerent types of tasks simultaneously, a diﬀerent approach to data analysis is typically used.
Latent variable models
Latent variable models, also known as psychometric models, propose that each observed
datum (e.g., for a given participant on a given task) is the result of a linear combination
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of underlying variables, plus error. In contrast to the cognitive modeling approach, in a
latent variable model, the underlying variables need not have psychological interpretations.
Instead, the goal of this approach is sometimes simply to compress the data by identifying
a small number of latent variables that account for most of the variability in the observed
data (see Bollen, 2002, for an overview of perspectives).
From a psychometric perspective, these models are seen as inferring the true scores by
accounting for individual and task-specific diﬀerences in the observed scores. These true
scores are determined by the small set of latent variables (e.g., factors in factor analysis,
components in principal component analysis). Discrepancies between the observed and true
scores are assumed to be due to measurement error. In the context of cognitive science
research, these models are often used to attempt to uncover a small number of cognitive
factors that together predict performance across a diverse set of tasks, or to uncover a few
underlying psychological constructs that are each measured by a large number of task items.
An emphasis is often placed on the latent variable model’s utility in disentangling unique
properties of participants or items, or in determining whether theorized constructs are truly
separable, depending on the research context. The primary benefit of this approach is that it
allows the researcher to provide a comprehensive, yet simply expressed, account of the nature
of large-scale, unobservable influences while accounting for individual and task diﬀerences.
Cognitive latent variable modeling
Often, researchers who wish to make inferences about latent cognitive ability from ob-
served data using traditional models will operate in one of these two data analysis paradigms.
However, this eﬀectively forces a choice between speaking about large-scale latent constructs
(such as attention and working memory) or psychological processes (such as signal detection
or categorization rules). In order to most directly infer what unobserved cognitive abilities
underlie observed data across many cognitive tasks, it would be advantageous to combine
the two approaches.
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This is especially desirable when the experimental design involves diﬀerent types of data
being recorded in diﬀerent tasks. In order to analyze data from all tasks simultaneously,
a psychometric model may be used to infer abilities that predict performance across tasks.
However, this assumes that the data are an excellent proxy for cognitive ability, which, as
discussed earlier, may not be so. In order to most directly assess the contribution of cognitive
ability to the observed data, a cognitive model appropriate for each data type may be used
to infer ability separately from other psychological factors (e.g., bias, risk-taking) based
on the observed data in each task. To analyze data from all tasks in a way that assesses
both individual diﬀerences and psychological processes, a researcher may wish to use both
modeling approaches to analyze their data. A simple way to accomplish this would be to
apply each type of model in sequence, as in Batchelder’s cognitive psychometrics technique
(e.g., Batchelder, 2010).
In a sequential procedure, the data for all participants from each task would be submitted
to the cognitive model separately. The resulting estimates of a parameter selected by the
researcher (e.g., that which most closely reflects cognitive ability) for each participant on each
task would then be submitted to the psychometric model. This second model would in turn
infer a small set of latent variables that predict the cognitive ability parameter values across
tasks. However, this procedure requires that the output of the cognitive model be reduced
from posterior distributions to point estimates. A general benefit of Bayesian methods is
that uncertainty is naturally quantified through the spread of the posterior distribution. By
discarding this information, a researcher risks introducing bias, especially if the posterior
distributions are notably skewed or extremely wide (Pagan, 1984). At a minimum, the
sequential approach leads to a loss of power, by collapsing many data points (i.e., scores on
many trials) to a single summary statistic (i.e., a cognitive parameter estimate).
An alternative approach to merging the cognitive and psychometric approaches is to im-
plement both simultaneously by constructing a cognitive latent variable model (Vandekerckhove,
2014). This is accomplished by treating one or more models of each type as components
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of a single hierarchical Bayesian model. Specifically, the model components are linked by
allowing the large-scale latent ability parameters of the psychometric model to combine to
determine a selected parameter of the cognitive model, which, in conjunction with the other
cognitive model parameters, describes the distribution of the observed data. This composite
model is therefore a single-step, coherent inference procedure.
From a statistical standpoint, this approach is preferable as it allows for uncertainty to be
propagated from the cognitive model component to the psychometric component through the
simultaneous estimation of all model parameters. However, the true appeal of the cognitive
latent variable modeling technique is that it allows for more powerful statements to be
made about the latent structure of cognitive abilities. From a psychological perspective, the
benefit of this approach is the unique statement made by the composite model, that the
observed data are the result of unobserved psychological processes, which are themselves
heavily influenced by a few unobserved psychological constructs.
Goals of this tutorial
In this tutorial paper, we demonstrate how a cognitive latent variable model (CLVM)
may be constructed from cognitive model and psychometric model components using freely
available software packages. We first explain the how each model component may be im-
plemented as a Bayesian model, beginning with defining statistical statements, and building
up to model specification code. We then demonstrate how these components may be fused
to create a CLVM, again including full model specification code. By including CLVMs
that incorporate diﬀerent cognitive components, we are able to showcase the flexibility of
the framework and how the general CLVM approach may be tailored to diﬀerent research
contexts. We also demonstrate how diﬀerent hypotheses about the latent structure of psy-
chological constructs may be expressed in the psychometric component in order to show
how CLVMs may be used for theory testing. Finally, we apply the set of CLVMs under
consideration to a large, heterogeneous attention dataset and discuss practical details such
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as our use of selected software features to facilitate our chosen method of model comparison.
In our discussion of the implications of the model comparison results for attention research,
we review the unique benefits of this comprehensive new approach to modeling cognition.
II. Case example: A comparative evaluation of attention theories
Attention is one of a suite of higher-order cognitive functions, along with metacognition,
decision-making, and working memory abilities. However, as attention is a latent construct,
it cannot be directly measured. A multitude of tasks have been designed to assess attention
indirectly (for an overview, see Lezak, Howieson, & Loring, 2004), each of which taps one
or more aspects of the attention construct. However, it is unclear whether these aspects
should be viewed as independent component abilities or as merely superficially diﬀerent
manifestations of a unitary latent ability.
Posner’s theory of attention is a predominant theory of the former type. It posits that
attention comprises three functionally and anatomically separable abilities including alert-
ing, the ability to sustain attention over time, orienting, the ability to restrict the focus of
attention to a small number of stimuli, and executive control, the ability to shift attention
allocation to meet task demands (Posner & Petersen, 1990). This theory has heavily influ-
enced research across psychology for nearly three decades (Raz & Buhle, 2006; Petersen &
Posner, 2012).
The independence of these abilities is supported by behavioral, clinical, and imaging
research (Fernandez-Duque & Posner, 2001; Petersen & Posner, 2012). While some cortical
areas are believed to be common substrates for all three attention abilities, there is evidence
of distinct neural substrates each for alerting, orienting, and control (Posner & Fan, 2004; Yin
et al., 2012), which suggests anatomical independence for each network. Their separability is
further supported by clinical research that observes selective deficits in just one of the three
attentional networks (e.g., Wang et al., 2005). Their functional independence is supported
by behavioral data collected primarily through the use of the Attention Network Test (Fan,
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McCandliss, Sommer, Raz, & Posner, 2002; Fan, McCandliss, Fosella, Flombaum, & Posner,
2005), which was designed to measure alerting, orienting, and control abilities separately
through diﬀerences in mean response time.
Other research has suggested that these abilities many not be separable. There is now
a growing body of evidence that some or all of the attention networks proposed by Posner
and Petersen interact in replicable ways (Callejas, Lupianez, Funes, & Tudela, 2005; Fuentes
& Campoy, 2008; Fan et al., 2009; Weinbach & Henik, 2012; McConnell & Shore, 2011).
However, the interpretation of these findings is debatable. It may be that the alerting,
orienting, and control are not independent abilities, or it may be that, although the networks
interact during cognitive tasks, the distinction between the three abilities is significant and
useful (Fan et al., 2009).
Finally, other theoretical accounts of the latent structure of attention and related ex-
ecutive cognitive abilities exist that propose alternative divisions (e.g., Mirsky, Anthony,
Duncan, Ahearn, & Kellam, 1991; Miyake et al., 2000). Thus, exactly which component
cognitive abilities give rise to the psychological construct of attention is still an open ques-
tion.
In the case example described here, we sought to resolve this issue as directly as possible
through the use of multiple, competing CLVMs. Specifically, we explored which of seven the-
oretical accounts of latent attention ability is best able to describe participants’ performance
on a small battery of attention tasks. In the following sections, we describe this research
with a heavy emphasis on the development, testing, and use of CLVMs.
Attention dataset
Participants. In our preregistration (https://osf.io/qxk2s/), we declared our in-
tention to collect data from 50–70 participants based on previous similar work (Pe, Vandek-
erckhove, & Kuppens, 2013; Vandekerckhove, 2014). 60 undergraduates (54 female, 6 male)
participated in the experiment. Mean age of these participants was 22.22 (range: 18–64).
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Participants reported ethnicities including Asian (66.7%), Latinx (21.7%), White (5.0%),
Black (3.3%), and Pacific Islander (3.3%).
Only partial data was collected from three participants due to computer failures; data
from these participants was subsequently excluded. An additional seven participants were
excluded due to lack of engagement1 during one or more tasks. Ultimately, data from 50
participants was included for analysis.
Materials & Procedure. All participants completed a small battery of computerized
attention tasks, presented in a random order using PsychoPy (Peirce, 2007). This 1.5-hour
battery included five commonly used response-time tests and two self-report scales:
• Attention Network Test (ANT): This combined cueing and flanker test was explicitly
designed to assess all three of Posner’s theorized components of attention (e.g., Posner
& Petersen, 1990), including alerting, orienting, and conflict (Fan et al., 2002, 2005).
Each trial began with one of three cue types. If a cue was presented, it indicated that
the target was about to appear and, in some trial types, also indicated the upcoming
target’s location. The target arrow, which appeared randomly on the top or bottom
of the screen, was flanked by arrows pointing in either a congruent or incongruent
direction.2 Participants’ goal in each trial was to judge the direction of the center arrow
with a keypress (see Figure 3.1). The full combination of cue and flanker conditions
allowed for six trial types in total.
• Continuous Performance Test, X version (CPT-X): In this intentionally repetitive and
monotonous test of sustained attention ability, participants judge whether each item
1A lack of engagement was operationalized as (1) taking more than 2 hours to complete the battery
and/or (2) accuracy at chance for one or more of the response time tests. This latter criterion was assessed
using a Bayes factor (BF) comparing the null hypothesis that a participant was responding with chance
accuracy, H0 : p = 0.5, to the alternative hypothesis that a participant was responding with some level of
accuracy above chance, H1 : p ∼ Uniform(.5, 1). For this analysis, a lack of response was considered an
incorrect response. If the Bayes factor for any of the five response time tests provided any level of evidence
for the null hypothesis over the alternative (BF01 > 1), the participant was excluded. This assessment was
part of our automated data preprocessing (using preregistered code available at https://osf.io/qhhvg/).
2We also included trials with neutral flankers (dashes) in order to more closely duplicate the original
design of the ANT. However, because these trials were not used to assess latent attention abilities in the
original research (Fan et al., 2005), we likewise discarded this data before data processing and data analysis.
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Figure 3.1 . Attention Network Test. At left, a cascade shows the sequence of presentation
and timing for a single 3500 ms trial. At right, cue types and flanker types are shown.
B
≤ 1700 ms
≥ 400 ms
random
foil
X version
B
X
A
BX
foil
foil
foil
target
foil
target target
AX version
Figure 3.2 . Continuous Performance Tests. On the left, a cascade shows the timing for a
single ≤ 2500 ms trial. On the right, how the trial type (target vs. foil) and, consequently,
the correct response to a given stimulus, depends on the version of the test is shown for a
sequence of four trials.
in a long sequence does or does not follow a rule (Rosvold, Mirsky, Sarason, Bransome,
& Beck, 1956; Conners & Staﬀ, 2000). We adapted two versions of this test (see
Figure 3.2) such that a response should be given on all trials.3 In the X version,
the rule is simple: If the letter presented is X, the stimulus is a target; if the letter
presented is not X, it is a foil.
• Continuous Performance Test, AX version (CPT-AX): In the AX version, the rule is
3In traditional continuous performance tests, a response is given for foil trials, but withheld for target
trials (Conners & Staﬀ, 2000), or vice versa (Rosvold et al., 1956). In either method, it is intentional that for
some trials no data is collected. In order to model performance on the entire CPT, we instructed participants
to respond with one keypress for foils (i.e., the F key) and a diﬀerent keypress for targets (the J key). This
mild change was instituted so that response time and accuracy data were generated for all CPT trial types.
Because the expected eﬀects of trial type on performance were still observed (see Appendix A), we conclude
that the dual-response adaptation was successful.
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more complex: If the letter presented is X, and the previous letter was A, the stimulus
is a target; if the letter presented is not X and/or the previous letter was not A, the
stimulus is a foil. Because targets are infrequent, the participant must remain vigilant
in order to quickly and eﬀectively switch response modes when a rare target trial does
occur.
• Number-Letter (NL): This response time test was designed to measure the eﬀect of
switching the focus of attention (Rogers & Monsell, 1995). In each trial, a stimulus
consisting of a number and a letter as a pair (e.g., 7A) was presented. If the stimulus
appeared on the top half of the screen, the task was to judge whether the number is
odd or even; if the stimulus appeared on the bottom half of the screen, the task was to
judge whether the letter is a consonant or a vowel (see Figure 3.3). Trials where the
previous trial required a diﬀerent judgment are classified as switch trials. Trials where
the previous trial required the same judgment were designated as no-switch trials.
1A
Is the number 
even or odd?
Is the letter a
consonant or vowel?
← 2S →
←  3E →
≥ 750 ms
≤ 2250 ms
Figure 3.3 . Number-Letter. A cascade (left) shows the timing for a single ≤ 3000 ms trial.
The vertical position of the stimulus determines the required judgment (right). The trial
type (switch vs. no switch) depends on the judgment required on the previous trial (not
pictured).
≥ 500 ms
≤ 2000 ms
Consistent trial
Local: H
Global: H
Local: S
Global: H
Inconsistent trial
Figure 3.4 . Local-Global. A cascade (left) shows the timing for a single ≤ 2500 ms trial.
The correct response depends on whether the instruction for the current block is to judge
the local or the global feature (right).
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• Local-Global (LG): This response time test was included to probe selective attention
and inhibition. In each trial, a Navon figure (i.e., a letter composed of smaller letters
Navon, 1977) was presented. Navon stimuli were either consistent (e.g., H composed
of smaller Hs) or inconsistent (e.g., S composed of smaller Hs). In each block, the
task was to identify either the global feature, meaning the large-scale letter, or the
local feature, meaning the small-scale letter, with the corresponding keypress (see
Figure 3.4). Participants were expected to exhibit a global precedence eﬀect such
that global features are automatically more readily perceived, and the reporting of
local features would require suppression of the global percept. The full combination of
feature and consistency conditions allowed for four trial types in total.
• Attentional Function Index (AFI): This scale, developed for use in clinical research,
measures the self-reported ability to accomplish everyday tasks that rely on attention
ability in a general sense (see Figure 3.5A; Cimprich, Visovatti, & Ronis, 2011)4.
• Attention-Related Cognitive Errors Scale (ARCES): This scale, developed for use in
cognitive research, measures the self-perceived frequency of everyday behavioral errors
caused by lapses in sustained attention (see Figure 3.5B; Cheyne, Carriere, & Smilek,
2006).
(A) AFI
At this time, how well do you feel you are
functioning in each of the areas below?
1. Getting started on activities (tasks, jobs)
you intend to do.
Not at all 1 2 ... 10 Extremely well
(B) ARCES
Use the scale to indicate how frequently you
have the following experiences.
6. I begin one task and get distracted into
doing something else.
Never 1 2 3 4 5 Very often
Figure 3.5 . Example items from each survey task.
4The original pencil-and-paper version of the AFI allowed participants to mark their response to each
item on a 100mm line. To adapt this scale for presentation on a computer, we replaced the response line
with a 10-point Likert scale.
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Demographic information was collected separately on paper using three free-response items
at the conclusion of the experiment.
Because participants’ performance on each trial type of a given response time test and on
each survey might rely on diﬀerent components of attention, we treated each trial type and
survey as a separate task for the purposes of our analyses. Across the resultant 18 tasks, data
types included response times, choice accuracy, and Likert scale ratings. During automated
data preprocessing, data from trials where the participant did not respond were excluded
(1.8% of the data). For the response time tasks, response times that were unrealistically fast,
as determined by an exponentially weighted moving average procedure5, were also excluded
(2.9% of the response time data; 2.8% of the data). Planned manipulation checks were
performed to ensure that the expected eﬀects for each response time test were observed.
Descriptive statistics and manipulation check results are presented in Appendix A.
Model design
Cognitive components. Data from 16 of the 18 tasks included response time data.
As discussed earlier, although raw response time is often treated as a proxy of cognitive
ability, it is a complex and noisy measure. The two models we selected as options for the
cognitive component of the CLVM were designed to estimate task-specific ability separately
from other sources of variability in observed response times. Both are evidence accumulation
process models.
This general type of model proposes that when a stimulus is presented, an individual
samples information from the stimulus sequentially in time. Each sample provides some
amount of information, or evidence, for or against a choice. Samples continue to be collected
over time until the amount of evidence accumulated passes a threshold, at which point a
decision is made. This idea successfully accounts for latencies in response time in simple re-
5This algorithm determined the lowest response time at which a participant responds above chance
accuracy, then censored response times below that threshold (for further details, see Vandekerckhove &
Tuerlinckx, 2007). Code for this function is available at osf.io/x99sz/.
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action time tasks beyond that which is accounted for by conductance lag and motor response
execution (Carpenter, 1981).
Two features of this process are captured by most evidence accumulation models. The
speed of evidence accumulation reflects an individual’s ability to complete the task at hand.
An individual who is skilled at the task will gain more information with each sample from the
stimulus, and therefore will accumulate enough evidence to make a decision more quickly
than an individual who is less skilled at the task and gains less information with each
sample from the stimulus. The evidence threshold reflects an individual’s personal level of
cautiousness in making a decision. An individual who is cautious may set a high threshold
of evidence for making a decision, and thus require more samples to be accumulated before
making a decision, leading to longer response times overall. More complex models include
parameters that capture additional features of this proposed process (e.g., Stone, 1960;
Ratcliﬀ & Rouder, 1998).
A benefit of these models is that they naturally account for speed-accuracy tradeoﬀs (i.e.,
the finding that slow decisions tend to be accurate, while fast decisions tend to be error-
prone; Wickelgren, 1977). Given a high speed of evidence accumulation, a low threshold will
lead to fast response times, however, the decisions made will be less accurate as less samples
are required to reach the decision threshold. In contrast, a high threshold will lead to slower
response times, however, the decisions that are ultimately made will be more accurate, as
more samples from the stimulus were collected before reaching the decision threshold.
The first option for the cognitive component is the LATER model (Linear Approach
to Threshold with Ergodic Rate; Carpenter, 1981). In this model, the speed of evidence
accumulation is captured by the mean decision rate parameter, ν, and the evidence threshold
is captured by the threshold parameter, θ. Thus, ν reflects task-specific ability, and θ reflects
an individual’s cautiousness. The accumulation process is deterministic and is assumed to
be linear (see Figure 3.6A). The observed response time, x, for an individual participant, p,
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on each trial, i, is determined by the following relationship:
1
xpi
= γpi
θp
where the trial-specific decision rate, γ, is a draw from a hierarchical distribution of rates:
γpi ∼ Normal(νp, ω2p)
If ω2 is fixed to 1 for all participants, combining the two equations above gives the defining
equation of the model:
1
xpi
∼ Normal(νp
θp
,
1
θ2p
) (1)
To implement this as a Bayesian model, we must also set priors on the parameters that will
be estimated:
νp ∼ Normal(0, 1)
θp ∼ Uniform(0, 10)
(2)
In this way, the LATER model is able to quantitatively describe a possible cognitive
process that might underlie observed response times. However, the LATER model is not
able to account for response accuracy, which is known in our attention dataset. In order to
incorporate both sources of information, we include another evidence accumulator model,
the diﬀusion model, as a second option for the cognitive component.
(A) LATER model
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Figure 3.6 . Schematic representation of the cognitive components.
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Various versions of the diﬀusion model have been widely and successfully used in cog-
nitive science to address the underlying cognitive processes that produce response times in
binary choice contexts (Wagenmakers, 2009). In the version of the diﬀusion model that we
elected to use (Stone, 1960; see Figure 3.6B), task-specific cognitive ability is captured by the
drift rate parameter, δ, which expresses the average rate of the stochastic evidence accumu-
lation process. Because the diﬀusion model describes a choice between two distinct response
options, there is now a threshold for each possible response. Thus, the threshold parame-
ter is reconceptualized as the distance between two thresholds, or the boundary separation,
α. Because a wider boundary separation implies that more evidence must be accumulated
to reach either decision threshold, α is interpreted as an individual’s cautiousness. As a
second result of this reconceptualization, the model also includes a bias parameter, β, to
reflect where the evidence accumulation process begins relative to the two thresholds. If β
is high, then less evidence is required to reach the top threshold than is required to reach
the bottom threshold; if β is low, then more evidence is required to reach the top threshold
than is required to reach the bottom threshold. As such, β is interpreted as a bias toward
either response before the stimulus is seen (or no bias, if β = 12). The final parameter of the
diﬀusion model is the non-decision time parameter, τ . This accounts for time that must be
reserved for stimulus encoding and motor response execution, and thus is not reflective of
the cognitive evidence accumulation process.
The distribution of choice response times for a given participant on each trial is described
as a Wiener diﬀusion process:
xpi ∼Wiener(αp, βp, δp, τp) (3)
where x represents signed response times6. In our use of the diﬀusion model, we defined
the two choice options (Response A and Response B in 3.6B) as the correct versus incorrect
6Such that x = axraw, where xraw is raw response time and a is choice accuracy, defined as 1 for correct
responses and −1 for incorrect responses.
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choice on a given trial. Because of this, the bias parameter, β, may be set to 0.5, as we expect
no bias toward the correct or incorrect response before the stimulus is seen. To implement
this as a Bayesian model, we also set priors on each parameter to be estimated:
αp ∼ Uniform(0.01, 4)
βp = 0.5
δp ∼ Normal(0, 1)
τp ∼ Uniform(0.01, 1)
(4)
We will return to the equations for the LATER model and the diﬀusion model in a later
section when we establish the model specification for each component in JAGS.
Psychometric component. Factor analysis is used to reduce a number of observed
variables to a smaller set of latent variables. When the observed variables are data from
cognitive tasks, the latent variables may be interpreted as unobserved cognitive constructs.
For this analysis, we elected to use confirmatory factor analysis as it as it allows us to
express diﬀerent theoretical accounts of which latent variables might comprise the attention
construct a priori.
The general factor analysis model can be written as a single mathematical statement:
X = ι+ ΛΦ + ε
In this equation, X is a matrix of observed data for N tasks from P participants. This
data is primarily determined by a product of the factor loadings matrix, Λ, and the factor
scores matrix, Φ. In the factor loadings matrix, Λ, each row represents a task, and each
column represents one of the F proposed factors. As such, each entry, λnf , expresses the
strength and direction of the relationship between observed scores on the nth task (e.g.,
the spatial cue/congruent flanker condition of the ANT) to an unobserved fth factor (e.g.,
alerting ability). If an entry λnf of the loadings matrix is 0, it would indicate no relationship
88
between the nth task and the fth factor; if an entry λnf of the loadings matrix is -.8, it would
indicate an inverse relationship. In the factor scores matrix, Φ, each of the F rows represents
a factor, and each of the P columns represents a participant. This is interpreted similarly:
Each entry, ϕfp expresses how an individual participant p would score on the unobserved
fth factor (e.g., orienting ability), if that could be measured. Lastly, ι is an N-length vector
of intercepts, or baselines scores for each task.
The product of the factor loadings matrix and the factor scores matrix, ΛΦ, plus the
corresponding intercepts, ι, is an N × P matrix of the true scores for each participant on
each task, which we denote M . Some error of measurement, ε, is added to these true scores
to reflect the discrepancy between the true scores, M , and the observed scores, X.
In order to implement factor analysis as a Bayesian model, we rework the general factor
analysis above by first defining the true scores in a deterministic statement:
µnp = ιn + Λ⃗nΦ⃗p (5)
then defining the distribution of the observed data stochastically, using a variance parameter,
σ2, in place of explicit error, in a second statement:
xnpi ∼ Normal(µnp, σ2n) (6)
and finally setting priors for all free model parameters:
ιn ∼ Normal(0, 1)
λnf ∼ Normal(0, 1)
ϕfp ∼ Normal(0, 1)
σn ∼ Uniform(0, 10)
However, as we will specifically use confirmatory factor analysis, not all entries in the factor
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loadings matrix will be freely estimated7; some entries will be fixed8 to 0 or 1 in order to
express our hypotheses about relationships between tasks and latent attention abilities.
To allow for clarity and brevity in our in-text model descriptions, we include a loadings
matrix with fewer tasks (N = 5) than in our attention dataset and a small number of factors
(F = 2). We refer to this example loadings matrix as Λ0 to distinguish it from the seven
loadings matrices used in our final data analysis (Λ1–Λ7). In the example loadings matrix,
printed below, we use a common method which ensures model identification. Specifically, we
fix the entries on the diagonal (λnf , n = f) to 1, fix entries above the diagonal (λnf , n < f)
to 0, and allow all other entries to be estimated.
Λ0 =

1 0
λ2,1 1
λ3,1 λ3,2
λ4,1 λ4,2
λ5,1 λ5,2

In this matrix, we will assume that the first three rows reflect data from tasks where response
time and accuracy data were collected, and that the final two rows reflect data from tasks
where survey data were collected.
To incorporate this example loadings matrix in the confirmatory factor analysis model,
we redefine the priors above and set an assignment or prior for each loading in a separate
7We also do not allow all entries in the factor loadings matrix to be freely estimated to ensure model
identification; including both a completely free factor loadings matrix and a completely free factor scores
matrix would lead to an unidentified model.
8In a classical implementation of factor analysis, individual loadings are normalized (−1 ≤ λnf ≤ 1,∀n ∈
{1, 2, ...N},∀f ∈ {1, 2, ...F}), and so fixing an entry to 1 implies that the corresponding task is a perfect
measure of a given factor. This is not so in the Bayesian implementation as loadings are not normalized
(λnf ∈ R,∀n, f). Fixing a single entry in a column of the loadings matrix to 1 simply allows that loading
to serve as a scaling factor for the remaining free loadings on that factor. Thus, fixing a single entry implies
only that the corresponding task has a nonzero relationship to the factor. Fixing multiple entries in a column
to 1 implies that the corresponding tasks have the same strength relationship to that factor, and scales the
remaining nonzero loadings.
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statement:
ιn ∼ Normal(0, 1)
λ1,1 = 1
λ1,2 = 0
λ2,1 ∼ Normal(0, 1)
λ2,2 = 1
λ3,1 ∼ Normal(0, 1)
λ3,2 ∼ Normal(0, 1)
λ4,1 ∼ Normal(0, 1)
λ4,2 ∼ Normal(0, 1)
λ5,1 ∼ Normal(0, 1)
λ5,2 ∼ Normal(0, 1)
ϕfp ∼ Normal(0, 1)
σn ∼ Uniform(0, 10)
(7)
The numbered equations above will determine our JAGS model specification for the psycho-
metric component in the next section.
Cognitive latent variable models. To create each of our CLVMs, cognitive model
and psychometric model components were simultaneously implemented in a hierarchical
Bayesian model. In this demonstration, all model specifications are written for JAGS
(Plummer, 2003), an automated Gibbs sampling package. We facilitated calls to JAGS
from MATLAB by using the Trinity interface (Vandekerckhove, 2015). Readers may wish to
consult Matzke, Boehm, and Vandekerckhove (2018) to establish familiarity with how these
three utilities work in concert. (We also relied on the the jags-wiener module (Wabersich
& Vandekerckhove, 2014) to implement the diﬀusion model in JAGS.)
The entire implementation process may be distilled to three steps:
Step 1: Write a separate model specification for the cognitive model component and for the
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psychometric model component.
We began by writing a JAGS model specification for each component as if we intended
to use them separately. This is accomplished by taking the distributional statements that
define each model, as outlined in the previous two sections, and and translating them, line
by line, into JAGS code.
(A)
participants, p
trials, i
xpi
νp θp
(B)
1 #data (eqn. 1)
2 for(p in 1:P){
3 for(i in 1:I){
4 x[p,i] ~ dnorm(nu[p]/theta[p],theta2[p])
5 }
6 }
7
8 #priors (eqn. 2)
9 for(p in 1:P){
10 nu[p] ~ dnorm(0,1)
11 theta2[p] <- pow(theta[p],2)
12 theta[p] ~ dunif(0,10)
13 }
14 }
(C)
participants, p
trials, i
xpi
δp αp βp τp
(D)
1 #data (eqn. 3)
2 for(p in 1:P){
3 for(i in 1:I){
4 x[p,i] ~ dwiener(alpha[p],tau[p],0.5, delta[p])
5 }
6 }
7
8 #priors (eqn. 4)
9 for(p in 1:P){
10 alpha[p] ~ dunif(.01,4)
11 tau[p] ~ dunif(.01,1)
12 delta[p] ~ dnorm(0,1)
13 }
Figure 3.7 . Cognitive components. Graphical model (A) and model specification (B) for the
LATER model; graphical model (C) and model specification (D) for the diﬀusion model.
The JAGS model specification for the LATER model, one of the two options for the
cognitive component, is presented in Figure 3.7B. This is a direct translation of the likelihood
distribution in Equation 1 and the prior distributions in Equation 2. A model specification for
the diﬀusion model (see Figure 3.7D) can be created in a similar fashion from the likelihood
distribution in Equation 3 and the prior distributions in Equation 4. Graphical models for
each cognitive component are presented in parts A and C of Figure 3.7.
The JAGS model specification for confirmatory factor analysis, the latent variable com-
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ponent, is presented in Figure 3.8B. This is a direct translation of Equations 5, 6, and 7.
The graphical model for this component is presented in part A of Figure 3.8.
Translation of these equations does require the addition of a few lines of code to reflect
the use of precision, rather than variance or standard deviation, to parameterize the normal
distribution in JAGS. For example, in the model specification for factor analysis, the second
argument to dnorm is not the standard deviation, σ, on which we have set a prior, but
rather the precision, 1
σ2 . We accommodate this alternative parameterization by using an
intermediate variable, invsigma2, to indicate the inverted and squared version of sigma
(see Line 26 in Figure 3.8B). Similarly, in the model specification for the LATER model,
the desired variance, 1
θ2 is already inverted, so we need only to square the threshold, theta,
to generate the correct precision, theta2 (see Line 11 in Figure 3.7B).
If there are data from any task that are not applicable as input to the cognitive model,
it is during this step that JAGS code for the distribution of data from these tasks and for
any necessary priors should be written. In our case example, data from the cognitive tests,
x, is modeled as an evidence accumulation process, but data from the self-report scales, y,
is not. Instead, we assume that the self-report scale data, when standardized, is normally
distributed:
ypi ∼ Normal(κp, η2) (8)
with associated priors:
κp ∼ Normal(0, 1)
η ∼ Uniform(0, 5)
(9)
Based on the above equations, we write a few lines of JAGS code for the distribution
of the scale data and its associated priors. Again, this code is written as if the data from
each self-report scale were the only data to be modeled. This model specification and a
representative graphical model are presented in Figure 3.9. As in the specification for the
confirmatory factor analysis model, we add a line to reflect the transformation of the standard
deviation, η, to a precision 1
η2 (see Line 11 in Figure 3.9B).
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(A)
participants, p
tasks, n
trials, i
xnp
µnpΛn
Φp
ιn σn
(B)
1 #data (eqn. 6)
2 for(n in 1:N){
3 for(p in 1:P){
4 for(i in 1:I){
5 x[n,p,i] ~ dnorm(mu[n,p],invsigma2[n])
6 }
7 }
8 }
9
10 #factor analysis, true scores (eqn. 5)
11 for(n in 1:N){
12 for(p in 1:P){
13 mu[n,p] <- iota[n] + inprod(lambda[
n,],phi[,p])
14 }
15 }
16
17 #priors (eqn. 7)
18 lambda[1,1] <- 1
19 lambda[1,2] <- 0
20 lambda[2,1] <- 1
21 lambda[2,2] ~ dnorm(0,1)
22 lambda[3,1] ~ dnorm(0,1)
23 lambda[3,2] ~ dnorm(0,1)
24 lambda[4,1] ~ dnorm(0,1)
25 lambda[4,2] ~ dnorm(0,1)
26 lambda[5,1] ~ dnorm(0,1)
27 lambda[5,2] ~ dnorm(0,1)
28 for(n in 1:N){
29 iota[n] ~ dnorm(0,1)
30 invsigma2[n] <- pow(sigma[n],-2)
31 sigma[n] ~ dunif(0,10)
32 }
33 for(f in 1:F){
34 for(p in 1:P){
35 phi[f,p] ~ dnorm(0,1)
36 }
37 }
Figure 3.8 . Psychometric component. Graphical model (A) and model specification (B) for
confirmatory factor analysis.
Step 2: Identify which parameter in the cognitive model is most closely related to the latent
constructs captured by the psychometric model.
In the confirmatory factor analysis model, the matrix of true scores, M = ΛΦ, captures all
information about the latent cognitive constructs. This is due to the reliance of the true
scores, M , on the proposed factors through the factor loadings matrix, Λ, which captures
relationships between latent constructs and tasks, and the factor scores matrix, Φ, which
captures relationships between latent constructs and individual participants.
To create the CLVM, we will allow the unobserved cognitive constructs inferred by the
psychometric model, as expressed in the matrix of true scores, to fully determine a parameter
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(A)
participants, p
trials, in
ypiκp ηp
(B)
1 #data (eqn. 8)
2 for(p in 1:P){
3 for(i in 1:I){
4 y[p,i] ~ dnorm(kappa[p],inveta2)
5 }
6 }
7
8 #priors (eqn. 9)
9 for(p in 1:P){
10 kappa[p] ~ dnorm(0,1)
11 }
12 inveta2 <- pow(eta,-2)
13 eta ~ dunif(0,5)
Figure 3.9 . Covariate data model. Graphical model (A) and model specification (B) for the
normally-distributed survey task data.
of the data distribution in the cognitive model and of the normal distribution for the scale
data. In this step, we must therefore select which parameter in each distribution is most
suitable for this assignment based on domain knowledge. Specifically, we will select the
parameter in each data distribution that we expect to most closely relate to latent attention
ability.
As mentioned in the Cognitive components section above, task-specific ability is captured
by the mean decision rate, ν, in the LATER model, and by the drift rate, δ, in the diﬀusion
model. In the normal distribution of the survey data, the mean score, κ, should reflect
(self-perceived) attention ability. Thus, we select these three variables to be determined by
the psychometric component in the next step.
Because we will specifically link these variables to the true scores, µ, special care should
be taken to ensure that the dimensions for all selected parameters can reasonably be made
to match the dimensions of µ in the next step. In the psychometric component, µ is indexed
by task and participant. In order to link this to the data distributions for the response time
data and the scale data in the next step, all of the selected parameters must be made to
vary across tasks in addition to varying across participants.
It is sensible to expect that the task-specific ability parameter values in the cognitive
components, ν and δ, will diﬀer across the response time tasks. Thus, before moving on to
the next step, we will edit each cognitive model specification such that the response time
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data, x, and the selected parameters for each model, nu and delta, are now indexed by task
in addition to their respective existing indices (i.e., x[n, p,i], nu[n, p], delta[n, p]). To
accommodate these new indices, we also add loops over the response time tasks (n = 1–3 in
our example loadings matrix, Λ0) where necessary.
For the survey data, it is sensible to expect that the mean score parameter values, κ,
will diﬀer across the two survey tasks. Therefore, we will edit the model specification for
the survey data similarly such that the data, y, and the mean score, kappa, are now indexed
by task (i.e, y[n, p,i], kappa[n, p]). Finally, loops over the survey tasks (n = 4–5 in our
example loadings matrix, Λ0) are added where necessary.
Step 3: Link the two component models hierarchically by replacing the selected cognitive
model parameter(s) with the selected parameter(s) of the psychometric model.
To compile the model specification for each version of the the CLVM, we begin by pooling
all relevant model specifications from the previous steps in a single text document. For the
LATER model version, we collect the code for the LATER model (as in Figure 3.7B), for the
survey data (as in Figure 3.9B), and for confirmatory factor analysis (as in Figure 3.8B). For
the diﬀusion model version, we collect the code for the diﬀusion model (as in Figure 3.7D), for
the survey data (as in Figure 3.9B), and for confirmatory factor analysis (as in Figure 3.8B).
To shape each assortment of code into a viable model specification, we will make some slight
changes and deletions.
The first action will make the statistical statement that ultimately distinguishes the
CLVM approach by linking the cognitive component to the psychometric component directly.
Now, we replace the parameters selected in Step 2 with the true scores, µ), in each data
distribution statement. In each cognitive component, we replace the task-specific ability
parameters, nu[n,p] and delta[n,p], each with the true scores, mu[n,p]. In the survey
data model specification, we will replace the mean score, kappa[n,p] with the true scores,
mu[n,p]. As a consequence of this substitution, the selected parameters, ν, δ, and κ, are no
longer used in the model. Therefore, we may delete the corresponding prior for each of these
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parameters (Line 10 in Figure 3.7B, Line 12 in Figure 3.7D, and Line 10 in Figure 3.9B).
We should also now delete redundant statements. Specifically, we delete the now-unused
likelihood distribution and its surrounding loops from the psychometric model component
(Lines 1–8 in Figure 3.8B) in both versions. As a consequence of this deletion, the parameter
σ is no longer used, and so the prior for sigma and its reparameterization as invsigma2
(Lines 26 and 27 in Figure 3.8B) should be removed also.
Final model specifications for the LATER model version of the CLVM and the diﬀusion
model version of the CLVM are presented in Appendix B in Figure B1 and B2 respectively,
and represented as graphical models in Figure 3.10. In the model specifications presented
in Appendix B, we rely on the example loadings matrix, Λ0, for clarity. However, in the
CLVMs we used to analyze our attention dataset, each model specification expressed one of
seven loadings matrices.
(A)
participants, p
tasks, n
trials, in
xnpi
ynpi ηp
θp
µnp
Λn
Φp
ιn
(B)
participants, p
tasks, n
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αp βp τp
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ιn
Figure 3.10 . Graphical models for each version of the CLVM. Response time data (x) is
LATER model-distributed in A and diﬀusion model-distributed in B. The survey data (y)
is normally distributed in both A and B.
Loadings matrices. Each loadings matrix used in this analysis was designed to cap-
ture a diﬀerent theoretical account of the latent structure of the psychological construct of
attention. By incorporating each of the seven loadings matrices in each of seven otherwise
identical CLVMs, we were able to compare the theoretical accounts of attention ability by
performing a model comparison across the CLVMs. Below, we briefly describe the concep-
tual basis for each matrix. A summary is presented in Table 3.1 and a more detailed account
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of how we developed each loadings matrix, including their exact specification, is included in
Appendix C.
Our first loadings matrix, Λ1: Posner, was designed to express Posner and Petersen’s
(1990) theory of attention, as described at the beginning of this section. To capture their
hypothesized three components of attention, we fixed a subset of entries in the loadings
matrix to 0 or 1 based on the knowledge of what each test and each survey was designed to
measure. In this way, we were able to define one factor each to reflect alerting, orienting,
and control abilities.
Our second loadings matrix, Λ2: Posner + Working Memory, extends Posner and Pe-
tersen’s theory of attention through the addition of a fourth factor. Because two trial types
of the CPT require that participants recall the stimulus from the last trial to respond cor-
rectly, we consider the possibility that disentangling working memory from attention abilities
will allow for a better description of the observed data. Therefore, in this loadings matrix
we include factors to reflect alerting, orienting, control, and working memory.
Λ3: Mirsky reflects an alternative division of attention into component constructs pro-
posed by Mirsky and colleagues (1991). While the components, sustain, focus-execute, shift-
ing, and encode, are similar to those expressed in Λ2, alerting, orienting, and control, and
working memory, respectively, Mirsky’s description of the some factors diﬀers substantively
in a number of ways. For example, Mirsky’s shifting component only refers to breaking an
attentional set, while Posner’s control is much more broadly defined.
The next two loadings matrices, Λ4 and Λ5, blend ideas from Mirsky (Mirsky et al., 1991)
and Miyake (Miyake et al., 2000) and so are referred to as Composite 1 and Composite 2
respectively. One of three constructs uncovered by Miyake and colleagues in their research on
executive functions is inhibition, the specific ability to suppress a response. This is in contrast
to shifting, present in both Miyake and Mirsky’s theories, which emphasizes breaking and
reforming an attentional set or filter. Both Λ4 and Λ5 oﬀer two plausible theoretical blends
of these theories of attention and executive function.
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Our final two loadings matrices are unlike the previous matrices in that they do not
divide attention into component abilities. Instead, we consider the possibility that all pro-
posed divisions are superficial, and therefore attention is best described a single ability. In
Λ6: Unitary, the sole factor included is a general attention factor which relates to scores on
all tasks. In Λ7: Unitary + Working Memory, we propose that the only useful distinction is
that between attention and memory. Thus, this final loadings matrix includes two factors:
a general attention factor, and a memory factor which only relates to the two tasks with a
known memory load.
Table 3.1
Summary of theories under consideration
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ry
Λ1: Posner ✓ ✓ control
Λ2: Posner + Working Memory ✓ ✓ control ✓
Λ3: Mirsky ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Λ4: Composite 1 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Λ5: Composite 2 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Λ6: Unitary attention
Λ7: Unitary + Working Memory attention ✓
In the table above, each row describes a theory of attention ability, as quantified in a loadings
matrix (see Appendix C). Each column represents a latent attention ability, or factor. A
checkmark (or italicized factor name) indicates that a factor is included the corresponding
loadings matrix.
For our analysis of the attention dataset, we incorporated each loadings matrix in turn
in the psychometric component of the LATER model version of the CLVM and the diﬀusion
model version of the CLVM. This procedure generated two groups of seven models each.
Model comparison. To observe which of these theoretical accounts of latent attention
abilities provided the best description of our attention dataset, we compared fit across all
CLVMs that incorporated the LATER model and across all CLVMs that incorporated the
diﬀusion model. We opted to use the deviance information criterion (DIC; Spiegelhalter,
Best, Carlin, & Van Der Linde, 2002, 2014) as our method of model comparison as it was
designed to compare hierarchical Bayesian models specifically and is easily calculated from
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MCMC samples. Similar to other model comparison metrics used in Bayesian analysis, the
DIC balances goodness of fit against model complexity, as the DIC penalizes models with
a high eﬀective number of model parameters. Although the raw DIC value is not easily
interpreted, comparatively low DIC values (i.e., at least 3–7 units lower; Spiegelhalter et al.,
2002) indicate notably better fit. Other options for model comparison metrics include Bayes
factors, AIC, and BIC (for a brief review, see Vandekerckhove, Matzke, & Wagenmakers,
2015).
In order to calculate the DIC for each model, we included ‘dic’ as a module in the
Trinity call for each model (see Matzke et al., 2018, for examples). This inclusion triggered
JAGS to monitor the deviance in addition to the monitored model parameters. Chains for
the deviance variable were submitted to getdic, a built-in Trinity function (Vandekerckhove,
2015). This function calculates DIC across the entire range of kept samples, across the first
and last 50% of samples, and across each quarter of the samples. The calculation across
subdivisions of samples facilitates observance of DIC stability, which is important to track
as DIC convergence is notoriously more diﬃcult to establish than chain convergence.
As such, we required that a high level of convergence was attained across all parameters
for each model. We operationalized “a high level of convergence” as (1) a Gelman-Rubin
diagnostic statistic (Rˆ; Gelman & Rubin, 1992) under 1.01 for all model parameters, and
(2) a DIC value that appears stable across quartiles of samples.
Results
The model comparison results are presented in Table 3.2. For ease of interpretation,
rather than presenting raw DIC values, we have presented diﬀerences in DIC from the best-
fitting model within each set. Thus, ∆DIC was calculated by subtracting the lowest DIC
from the DIC value for each model.
To assess the comparative merit of the seven theoretical accounts of attention ability,
we can observe which loadings matrix enabled the CLVMs to best to fit the observed data.
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Table 3.2
Model comparison results
Cognitive component Psychometric component ∆ DIC
LATER model
Λ1: Posner 2.69 ×102
Λ2: Posner + WM 2.06 ×102
Λ3: Mirsky 1.99 ×102
Λ4: Composite 1 3.47 ×102
Λ5: Composite 2 2.90 ×102
Λ6: Unitary 0.87 ×102
Λ7: Unitary + WM 0
Diﬀusion model
Λ1: Posner 3.44 ×103
Λ2: Posner + WM 2.93 ×103
Λ3: Mirsky 2.38 ×103
Λ4: Composite 1 4.28 ×103
Λ5: Composite 2 4.52 ×103
Λ6: Unitary 0.56 ×103
Λ7: Unitary + WM 0
Overall, the model with the lowest DIC value, and therefore the theoretical account that
provided the best description of the observed data, was Λ7, the Unitary + Working Memory
account. It is reassuring that, qualitatively, we can draw the similar general conclusions from
the set of CLVMs incorporating the LATER model and the set of CLVMs incorporating the
diﬀusion model. Specifically, we observe a similar same rank order of models by DIC value
when only the response time data is used (in the LATER model versions) and when both
the response time data and accuracy data are used (in the more nuanced diﬀusion model
versions). This suggests our conclusions about the relative suitability of the seven theories
of attention are robust to the likelihood.
One could question whether the superior fit of the Unitary + Working Memory model
might be accounted for by the addition of the working memory component. It is clear
that the Unitary + Working Memory model fit better than the Unitary model, due to the
inclusion of the working memory factor in the former account. However, although we believe
that this is a contributing factor, the beneficial addition of a memory factor cannot be the
sole reason for Λ7’s superior performance. Multiple other accounts (Λ2, Λ3, and Λ5) also
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include a working memory factor, but the models incorporating these loadings matrices do
not consistently have lower DIC values than those models that do not include a working
memory factor (Λ1, Λ4, and Λ6).
Our results suggest that the lack of division of attention into component abilities is the
main reason that the Unitary + Working Memory model outperformed the other models
in each set. The two models that proposed a single factor to capture unobserved attention
abilities (Λ6, the Unitary account, and Λ7, the Unitary + Working Memory account) bested
all models that divided attention into component abilities by a comfortable margin. Of those
models that propose separable components of attention ability, the models that proposed the
highest number of divisions of attention, Λ4 and Λ5, the two Composite accounts, consistently
yielded the worst fit. Therefore, we believe that the division of attention into component
abilities is what accounts for the most of the comparatively poor fit of all models as compared
to the Unitary + Working Memory model.
It certainly still may be that there are independent components of attention ability; our
results simply indicate that a unified theory of attention is the best description of this partic-
ular dataset out of the particular set of models we considered. To validate these results, we
would suggest this study be replicated with a sample of participants that would be expected
to have a more diverse range of attention abilites than our sample of college students. How-
ever, this conclusion is supported by previous research, mentioned at the beginning of this
section, that reports significant and replicable interactions among the attention subsystems
proposed by Posner and Petersen (1990). In light of our results, it appears possible that
these previous findings were observed because attention ability is not composed of separable
abilities. Our findings suggest that attention, similar to intelligence (g), is best described as
a single latent ability that aﬀects performance across superficially diverse tasks. We contend
that attention ability is truly distinct only from other executive functions, such as working
memory. Therefore, viewing attention as one of a small collection of executive functions may
be the most viable framework to guide future research on attention.
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III. Conclusion
Through the use of CLVMs, we were able to take a more direct approach to compar-
ing theories of attention than would be possible with either a cognitive model alone or a
psychometric model alone. Only a CLVM approach allows the researcher to infer latent abil-
ities from data from all tasks while also accounting for the complexity of the psychological
processes that produced the data. In general, the CLVM technique expands the scope of
research questions that may be asked by making the unique psychological statement that
observed task performance is due to unobserved task-specific ability, which in turn is a result
of underlying general cognitive abilities. This is because CLVMs takes a more statistically
nuanced approach by removing sources of variability that are not cognitive in nature before
inferring large-scale latent abilities. As such, this approach also makes the unique statisti-
cal statement that the latent variables uncovered by the psychometric model determine a
parameter of the cognitive model, which in turn generates the observed data.
Because the CLVM approach is a Bayesian hierarchical modeling technique, it not only
inherits the benefits of Bayesian modeling generally, such as the propagation of uncertainty
through all levels of a model, but also gains the subtlety of hierarchical modeling, allowing
one model to account for the structure of a parameter of multiple other models. In this
way, the CLVM approach implements the core idea of Batchelder’s cognitive psychometrics
technique in a more statistically powerful way.
In this tutorial, we sought to introduce a general implementation procedure for CLVMs
in JAGS that should be accessible to any researcher who has becomes familiar with Bayesian
sampling software. As demonstrated in our case example, switching out the cognitive com-
ponent, from the simpler LATER model to the more complex diﬀusion model, was a straight-
forward process after the initial CLVM was constructed. To construct a new CLVM, both
cognitive model components and psychometric components may be flexibly interchanged.
Other cognitive models that might be used in place of the options discussed here include
models such as the linear ballistic accumulator model (Brown & Heathcote, 2008) which
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may be used to describe multi-alternative choice response times, or multinomial processing
tree models (Batchelder & Riefer, 1999) which capture elaborate decision-making processes
underlying categorical choice data. Other latent variable models that might be used in place
of factor analysis include regression, structural equation models, and nonlinear combinations
of latent variables. A few studies including CLVMs with diﬀerent components already exist.
For example, Guan, Lee, and Vandekerckhove (2015) combined a cognitive model of optimal
stopping behavior with a regression model to infer latent risk-taking and bias, and Nunez,
Srinivasan, and Vandekerckhove (2015) combined a diﬀusion model with a regression model
that incorporates neural data.
In this article, we hope to have demonstrated the unique capabilities of CLVMs through
our case example of a comparative evaluation of theories of attention. Through the inclusion
of one or more cognitive components, CLVMs can be tailored to the specific research context
and account for the latent generating processes of a wide variety of data types. Through
the inclusion of the psychometric component, CLVMs are able to assess common influences
across a heterogeneous dataset in a single model. To create a new CLVM, model components
may be easily switched out by changing just a few lines in JAGS. It is our hope that this
tutorial will enable researchers to build their own cognitive latent variable models, and use
this flexible and powerful new approach to data analysis to answer a host of novel questions
about the structure of cognitive constructs underlying diverse data.
104
References
Batchelder, W. H. (1998). Multinomial processing tree models and psychological assessment.
Psychological Assessment, 10 (4), 331.
Batchelder, W. H. (2010). Cognitive psychometrics: Using multinomial processing tree
models as measurement tools. In S. E. Embretson (Ed.), Measuring psychological con-
structs: Advances in model-based approaches (pp. 71–93). Washington, DC: American
Psychological Association.
Batchelder, W. H., & Riefer, D. M. (1999). Theoretical and empirical review of multinomial
process tree modeling. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 6 (1), 57–86.
Bollen, K. A. (2002). Latent variables in psychology and the social sciences. Annual review
of psychology, 53 (1), 605–634.
Brown, S. D., & Heathcote, A. (2008). The simplest complete model of choice response
time: Linear ballistic accumulation. Cognitive Psychology, 3 (57), 153–178.
Callejas, A., Lupianez, J., Funes, M. J., & Tudela, P. (2005). Modulations among the alert-
ing, orienting and executive control networks. Experimental Brain Research, 167 (1),
27–37.
Carpenter, R. H. S. (1981). Oculomotor procrastination. In D. F. Fisher, R. A. Monty,
& S. J. W (Eds.), Eye movements: Cognition and visual perception (pp. 237–246).
Erlbaum.
Cheyne, J. A., Carriere, J. S., & Smilek, D. (2006). Absent-mindedness: Lapses of conscious
awareness and everyday cognitive failures. Consciousness and Cognition, 3 (15), 578–
592.
Cimprich, B., Visovatti, M., & Ronis, D. L. (2011). The Attentional Function Index – a
self-report cognitive measure. Psycho-Oncology, 2 (20), 194–202.
Conners, C., & Staﬀ, M. (2000). Conners’ continuous performance test ii. Multi-Health
Systems Inc., North Tonawanda, NY .
Fan, J., Gu, X., Guise, K. G., Liu, X., Fossella, J., Wang, H., & Posner, M. I. (2009).
105
Testing the behavioral interaction and integration of attentional networks. Brain and
cognition, 70 (2), 209–220.
Fan, J., McCandliss, B. D., Fosella, J., Flombaum, J., & Posner, M. I. (2005). The activation
of attentional networks. Neuroimage, 2 (26), 471–479.
Fan, J., McCandliss, B. D., Sommer, T., Raz, A., & Posner, M. I. (2002). Testing the
eﬃciency and independence of attentional networks. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience,
3 (14), 340–347.
Fernandez-Duque, D., & Posner, M. I. (2001). Brain imaging of attentional networks in
normal and pathological states. Journal of Clinical and Experimental Neuropsychology,
23 (1), 74–93.
Fuentes, L. J., & Campoy, G. (2008). The time course of alerting eﬀect over orienting in the
attention network test. Experimental Brain Research, 185 (4), 667–672.
Gelman, A., & Rubin, D. (1992). Inference from iterative simulation using multiple se-
quences. Statistical Science, 4 (7), 457–472.
Guan, M., Lee, M. D., & Vandekerckhove, J. (2015). A hierarchical cognitive threshold
model of human decision making on diﬀerent length optimal stopping problems. In
Proceedings of the 37th Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society. Austin, TX:
Cognitive Science Society.
Lezak, M., Howieson, D., & Loring, D. (2004). Neuropsychological assessment (4th ed.).
Oxford University Press.
Matzke, D., Boehm, U., & Vandekerckhove, J. (2018). Bayesian inference for psychology,
part III: Parameter estimation in nonstandard models. Psychonomic bulletin & review,
25 (1), 77–101.
McConnell, M. M., & Shore, D. I. (2011). Mixing measures: testing an assumption of the
attention network test. Attention, Perception, & Psychophysics, 73 (4), 1096–1107.
Mirsky, A. F., Anthony, B. J., Duncan, C. C., Ahearn, M. B., & Kellam, S. G. (1991).
Analysis of the elements of attention: A neuropsychological approach. Neuropsychology
106
review, 2 (2), 109–145.
Miyake, A., Friedman, N. P., Emerson, M. J., Witzki, A. H., Howerter, A., & Wager, T. D.
(2000). The unity and diversity of executive functions and their contributions to com-
plex frontal lobe tasks: A latent variable analysis. Cognitive Psychology, 1 (41), 49-100.
Navon, D. (1977). Forest before trees: The precedence of global features in visual perception.
Cognitive Psychology, 9 (3), 353–383.
Nunez, M. D., Srinivasan, R., & Vandekerckhove, J. (2015). Individual diﬀerences in atten-
tion influence perceptual decision making. Frontiers in Psychology(8), 1–13.
Pagan, A. (1984). Econometric issues in the analysis of regressions with generated regressors.
International Economic Review, 221–247.
Pe, M., Vandekerckhove, J., & Kuppens, P. (2013). A diﬀusion model account of the rela-
tionship between the emotional flanker task and rumination and depression. Emotion,
13 (4), 739.
Peirce, J. W. (2007). PsychoPy — psychophysics software in Python. Journal of Neuro-
science Methods, 162 (1-2), 8–13.
Petersen, S. E., & Posner, M. I. (2012). The attention system of the human brain: 20 years
after. Annual review of neuroscience, 35 , 73.
Plummer, M. (2003). Jags: A program for analysis of bayesian graphical models using gibbs
sampling. In Proceedings of the 3rd international workshop on distributed statistical
computing (Vol. 124, p. 125).
Posner, M. I., & Fan, J. (2004). Attention as an organ system. In J. R. Pomerantz (Ed.),
Topics in Integrative Neuroscience: From Cells to Cognition (p. 266-290). Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Posner, M. I., & Petersen, S. E. (1990). The attention system of the human brain. Annual
Review of Neuroscience, 1 (13), 25–42.
Ratcliﬀ, R., & Rouder, J. N. (1998). Modeling response times for two-choice decisions.
Psychological Science, 9 (5), 347–356.
107
Raz, A., & Buhle, J. (2006). Typologies of attentional networks. Nature Reviews Neuro-
science, 7 (5), 367–379.
Riccio, C. A., Reynolds, C. R., Lowe, P., & Moore, J. J. (2002). The continuous perfor-
mance test: A window on the neural substrates for attention? Archives of clinical
neuropsychology, 17 (3), 235–272.
Riefer, D. M., Knapp, B. R., Batchelder, W. H., Bamber, D., & Manifold, V. (2002).
Cognitive psychometrics: Assessing storage and retrieval deficits in special populations
with multinomial processing tree models. Psychological Assessment, 14 (2), 184.
Rogers, R. D., & Monsell, S. (1995). Costs of a predictible switch between simple cognitive
tasks. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 124 (2), 207.
Rosvold, H. E., Mirsky, A. F., Sarason, I., Bransome, E. D., & Beck, L. H. (1956). A
continuous performance test of brain damage. Journal of Consulting Psychology, 5 (20),
343–350.
Spiegelhalter, D. J., Best, N. G., Carlin, B. P., & Van Der Linde, A. (2002). Bayesian
measures of model complexity and fit. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society: Series
B (Statistical Methodology), 4 (64), 583–639.
Spiegelhalter, D. J., Best, N. G., Carlin, B. P., & Van Der Linde, A. (2014). The deviance
information criterion: 12 years on. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society: Series B
(Statistical Methodology), 76 (3), 485–493.
Stone, M. (1960). Models for choice-reaction time. Psychometrika, 3 (25), 251–260.
Vandekerckhove, J. (2014). A cognitive latent variable model for the simultaneous analysis
of behavioral and personality data. Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 60 , 58–71.
Vandekerckhove, J. (2015). Trinity: A matlab interface for bayesian analysis. Retrieved
from http://tinyurl.com/matlab-trinity.
Vandekerckhove, J., Matzke, D., & Wagenmakers, E.-J. (2015). Model comparison and the
principle of parsimony. In (p. 300). Oxford University Press, USA.
Vandekerckhove, J., & Tuerlinckx, F. (2007). Fitting the ratcliﬀ diﬀusion model to experi-
108
mental data. Psychonomic bulletin & review, 14 (6), 1011–1026.
Wabersich, D., & Vandekerckhove, J. (2014). Extending jags: A tutorial on adding custom
distributions to jags (with a diﬀusion model example). Behavior research methods,
46 (1), 15–28.
Wagenmakers, E. J. (2009). Methodological and empirical developments for the ratcliﬀ diﬀu-
sion model of response times and accuracy. European Journal of Cognitive Psychology,
21 (5), 641–671.
Wang, K., Fan, J., Dong, Y., Wang, C.-q., Lee, T. M., & Posner, M. I. (2005). Selective
impairment of attentional networks of orienting and executive control in schizophrenia.
Schizophrenia research, 78 (2), 235–241.
Weinbach, N., & Henik, A. (2012). The relationship between alertness and executive control.
Journal of experimental psychology: human perception and performance, 38 (6), 1530.
Wickelgren, W. A. (1977). Speed-accuracy tradeoﬀ and information processing dynamics.
Acta psychologica, 41 (1), 67–85.
Yin, X., Zhao, L., Xu, J., Evans, A. C., Fan, L., Ge, H., . . . Liu, S. (2012). Anatomical
substrates of the alerting, orienting and executive control components of attention:
focus on the posterior parietal lobe. PLoS One, 7 (11), e50590.
109
Appendix A
Manipulation check results
Eight secondary confirmatory analyses were performed to check expected eﬀects (based on
the corresponding source material) for each of the five response time tasks.
For each comparison below, the first condition listed (e.g, the no cue condition) was
expected to be more diﬃcult than the second condition listed (e.g, the center cue condition).
As such, we expected to observe that response times would be higher in the first condition
than in the second condition. We report standardized eﬀect sizes (δ = µ1−µ2
σ
), which were
expected to be positive, and Bayes factors (BF 10), which were expected to be > 1. Bayes
factors indicate the strength of evidence for (or against) the hypothesis that a diﬀerence in
means between the two conditions is observed (H1 : δ ̸= 0 vs. H0 : δ = 0 for all comparisons).
Analysis code for the Bayes factors and a note on our method of calculation is available at
osf.io/u7h27/.
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Table A1
Descriptive statistics and Bayes factors
Accuracy Response time
Conditions Means Means δ BF10
ANT, Alerting eﬀect No cueCenter cue
.973 (.002)
.968 (.003)
669.80 (2.67)
627.91 (2.44) .24 3.84×10
4 ✓
ANT, Orienting eﬀect No cueSpatial cue
.973 (.002)
.986 (.002)
669.80 (2.67)
561.46 (2.66) .60 3.91×10
4 ✓
ANT, Control eﬀect Congruent flankerIncongruent flanker
.992 (.001)
.959 (.002)
658.82 (2.18)
580.97 (2.08) .44 3.20×10
4 ✓
CPT-X, Vigilance eﬀect TargetFoil
.723 (.009)
.995 (.001)
443.03 (2.75)
378.30 (0.89) .55 4.04×10
4 ✓
CPT-AX, Vigilance eﬀect TargetFoil
.880 (.008)
.985 (.001)
381.96 (2.37)
343.82 (0.94) .32 2.78×10
4 ✓
NL, Switching eﬀect SwitchNo switch
.846 (.008)
.927 (.006)
1070.10 (6.44)
849.90 (6.30) .73 5.21×10
4 ✓
LG, Global precedence eﬀect LocalGlobal
.927 (.004)
.948 (.004)
587.02 (2.45)
493.04 (2.69) .59 1.92×10
4 ✓
LG, Consistency eﬀect ConflictingConsistent
.904 (.005)
.971 (.003)
559.18 (2.86)
523.13 (2.44) .22 3.67×10
4 ✓
Mean accuracy is reported as a proportion; mean response time is reported in ms. For each
condition mean, standard error of the mean is in parentheses. BF10 ≥ 10 provide support for the
alternative hypothesis; 110 < BF10 < 10 are inconclusive; BF10 ≤ 110 are provide support for the
null hypothesis. Results that are consistent with the expected results (i.e., δ > 0 and BF10 ≥ 10)
are noted with a ✓.
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Appendix B
Model specifications
1 #data: response time tasks
2 for(n in 1:3){
3 for(p in 1:P){
4 for(i in 1:I){
5 x[n,p,i] ~ dnorm(mu[n,p]/theta[p],theta2[p])
6 }
7 }
8 }
9
10 #priors: response time tasks
11 for(p in 1:P){
12 theta2[p] <- pow[theta[p],2]
13 theta[p] ~ dgamma(2,2)
14 }
15
16 #data: survey tasks
17 for(n in 1:2){
18 for(p in 1:P){
19 for(i in 1:I){
20 y[n,p,i] ~ dnorm(mu[n,p],inveta2[n])
21 }
22 }
23 }
24
25 #priors: survey tasks
26 for(p in 1:P){
27 inveta2[p] <- pow(eta[p],-2)
28 eta[p] ~ dgamma(1,2)
29 }
30
31 #factor analysis, true scores
32 for(n in 1:N) {
33 for(p in 1:P) {
34 mu[n,p] <- iota[n] + inprod(lambda[n,],phi[,p])
35 }
36 }
37
38 #priors: factor analysis
39 for(n in 1:N){
40 iota[n] ~ dnorm(0,1)
41 }
42 lambda[1,1] <- 1
43 lambda[1,2] <- 0
44 lambda[2,1] <- 1
45 lambda[2,2] ~ dnorm(0,1)
46 lambda[3,1] ~ dnorm(0,1)
47 lambda[3,2] ~ dnorm(0,1)
48 lambda[4,1] ~ dnorm(0,1)
49 lambda[4,2] ~ dnorm(0,1)
50 lambda[5,1] ~ dnorm(0,1)
51 lambda[5,2] ~ dnorm(0,1)
52 for(f in 1:F){
53 for(p in 1:P){
54 phi[f,p] ~ dnorm(0,1)
55 }
56 }
Figure B1 . Model specification for the LATER model version of the CLVM.
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1 #RT data: diffusion model
2 for(n in 1:3){
3 for(p in 1:P){
4 for(i in 1:I){
5 x[n,p,i] ~ dwiener(alpha[p],tau[p],0.5,mu[n,p])
6 }
7 }
8 }
9
10 #priors: diffusion model
11 for(p in 1:P){
12 alpha[p] ~ dunif(.01,4)
13 ter[p] ~ dunif(.01,1)
14 }
15
16 #survey data: normal distribution
17 for(n in 1:2){
18 for(p in 1:P){
19 for(i in 1:I){
20 y[n,p,i] ~ dnorm(mu[n,p],inveta2[p])
21 }
22 }
23 }
24
25 #priors: normal distribution
26 for(n in 1:2) {
27 inveta2[n] <- pow(eta[n],-2)
28 eta[n] ~ dunif(0,10)
29 }
30
31 #factor analysis, true scores
32 for(n in 1:N) {
33 for(p in 1:P) {
34 mu[n,p] <- iota[n] + inprod(lambda[n,],phi[,p])
35 }
36 }
37
38 #priors: factor analysis
39 for(n in 1:N){
40 iota[n] ~ dnorm(0,1)
41 }
42 lambda[1,1] <- 1
43 lambda[1,2] <- 0
44 lambda[2,1] <- 1
45 lambda[2,2] ~ dnorm(0,1)
46 lambda[3,1] ~ dnorm(0,1)
47 lambda[3,2] ~ dnorm(0,1)
48 lambda[4,1] ~ dnorm(0,1)
49 lambda[4,2] ~ dnorm(0,1)
50 lambda[5,1] ~ dnorm(0,1)
51 lambda[5,2] ~ dnorm(0,1)
52 for(f in 1:F){
53 for(p in 1:P){
54 phi[f,p] ~ dnorm(0,1)
55 }
56 }
Figure B2 . Model specification for the diﬀusion model version of the CLVM.
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Appendix C
Loadings matrices
Each loadings matrix descried here represents a theoretical account of the latent structure
of attention. In each matrix (Λi), rows correspond to observed variables (i.e., tasks), while
columns correspond to the proposed factors (i.e., latent constructs). A verbal theory of
attention is quantified in each matrix by fixing a subset of entries. This allows us to ex-
press a priori beliefs about the relationships between tasks and factors and eﬀectively lends
psychological interpretation to the factors.
Entries fixed to 0 imply that there is no relationship between the corresponding task
and latent construct. As was mentioned in an earlier footnote, entries fixed to 1 do not imply
that the corresponding task is a perfect measure of a given latent construct, as would be so in
a classical implementation of confirmatory factor analysis; in the Bayesian implementation
of confirmatory factor analysis, fixing an entry to 1 makes the weaker statement that there
is a positive relationship of unknown relative strength between the corresponding task and
factor.
Each loadings matrix is preceded by a brief description of the proposed latent cognitive
abilities as defined by these fixed entries. For visual clarity, subscripts for all distinct freely
estimated loadings parameters have been omitted (e.g., λ3,5 and λ3,6 are both represented as
λ). In addition, factor names are printed above the corresponding column and task names
are printed to the right of the corresponding row for every proposed loadings matrix. Finally,
horizontal lines are overlaid on each matrix to make the division between tasks representing
trial types in a single test more readily apparent.
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Λ1: Posner
Our first loadings matrix is inspired by inspired by Posner and Petersen’s highly influ-
ential theory of attention (Posner & Petersen, 1990; Petersen & Posner, 2012). As mentioned
earlier, they propose that the psychological construct of “attention” comprises three anatom-
ically and functionally separable abilities: altering, the ability to sustain attention over an
extended period, orienting, the ability to select and attend only to a small number of stimuli,
and control, the ability to shift and change attention allocation to meet task demands. In
order to express these abilities in a loadings matrix (Λ1, printed below), we fixed a subset of
matrix entries to either 0 or 1 based on prior knowledge of the abilities that each task was
designed to measure.
The ANT was explicitly designed to assess altering, orienting, and control abilities
separately (Fan et al., 2002, 2005). In this test, diﬀerences in mean response times between
the “no cue” condition and the “center cue” condition are interpreted as a measure of alerting
ability (Fan et al., 2005). When no cue is presented, participants must maintain a high level
of attentional vigilance in order to be respond to the target within the time limit, and thus
alerting ability is required on these trials. When a cue of any type is presented, participants
know that the target will appear soon, thus circumventing the need for alerting ability on
those trials. Therefore, for tasks where no cue is presented, the loading on the alerting
factor is permitted to be nonzero, however, for tasks where a cue of any type is presented,
the loading on the alerting factor is set to 0.
Diﬀerences in mean response times between the “center cue” condition and the “spatial
cue” condition are interpreted as a measure of orienting ability (Fan et al., 2005). When a
central cue or no cue is presented, participants must be able to quickly find and focus on
the target in order to respond within the time limit, and thus orienting ability is required
on those trials. When a spatial cue is presented, participants already know what position
to attend to, thus circumventing the need for orienting ability. Therefore, for tasks where
a central cue or no cue is presented, the loading on the orienting factor is permitted to be
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nonzero, however, for tasks where a spatial cue is presented, the loading on the orienting
factor is set to 0.
Diﬀerences in mean response times between the “incongruent flanker” condition and
the “congruent flanker” condition are interpreted as a measure of control ability (Fan et al.,
2005). When incongruent flankers appear, participants must be able to eﬀectively inhibit
a response to the four flankers, which point in the opposite direction to the single target
arrow, in order to respond accurately to the target within the time limit. Thus, control
ability is required on the incongruent flanker trials. When a congruent flanker is presented,
the information conveyed by the flankers need not be inhibited as it is consistent with the
target, and so control ability is not required. Therefore, for tasks where incongruent flankers
appear, the loading on the control factor is permitted to be nonzero, however, for tasks where
congruent flankers appear, the loading on the control factor is set to 0.
Various versions of the CPT are widely used as measures of sustained attention ability
(see Riccio, Reynolds, Lowe, & Moore, 2002, for a review). As sustained attention is very
similar to Posner and Petersen’s description of alerting, all tasks derived from each version
of the CPT (CPT-X and CPT-AX) should load on the alerting factor. We do not expect any
condition of this task to require orienting ability, so all loadings on the orienting factor were
set to 0. However, the target trials in each version of the CPT may rely on control abilities.
Because target trials are rare, participants must to inhibit their prepotent response (i.e., the
response to the foil stimuli) in order to respond accurately to a target within the time limit.
Therefore, the tasks including targets trials in each version of the CPT are permitted to load
on the control factor. For model identification purposes, we have set the loading for the foil
tasks in the CPT-AX on the alerting factor to 1 (λ10,3 = 1).
The NL task was developed to assess the cost of switching attention (Rogers & Monsell,
1995). On each trial, participants must selectively attend to either the number portion
or the letter portion of the stimulus based on the position of the stimulus. Therefore,
regardless of condition, this task should relate to orienting ability. Switching cost is assessed
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using the diﬀerence in performance on “switch” trials, where participants must attend to a
diﬀerent portion of the stimulus than they did on previous last trial, and “no-switch” trials,
where participants must attend to the same portion of the stimulus as on the previous trial.
Because an eﬀortful switch in the focus of attention is required for successful performance
on switch trials, this task condition is permitted to load on on the control factor. For model
identification purposes, we have set the loading for the no-switch task on the orienting factor
to 1 (λ11,2 = 1).
The LG task is used to demonstrate the global precedence eﬀect (Navon, 1977). In the
“local” condition, participants must not allow the automatic global percept to interfere with
their response. Therefore, local task conditions are permitted to load on the control factor
to reflect this eﬀortful reallocation of attention to the local feature over the global feature.
In the “conflicting” conditions, participants must ensure their attention is oriented to the
correct feature (either local or global) in order to respond correctly. Therefore, conflicting
conditions are permitted to load on the orienting factor. For model identification purposes,
we have set the loading for the local judgment and consistent stimulus task on the control
factor to 1 (λ14,3 = 1).
Finally, because the AFI conceptualizes attention as a general ability, this task is
permitted to load on all three latent attention abilities. In contrast, because the ARCES
was designed to measure the frequency of lapses in sustained attention specifically, this task
is only permitted to load on the alerting factor.
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Λ1 =

λ λ 0
0 λ 0
0 0 0
λ λ λ
0 λ λ
0 0 λ
λ 0 λ
λ 0 0
λ 0 λ
1 0 0
0 1 0
0 λ λ
0 0 0
0 0 1
0 λ 0
0 λ λ
λ λ λ
λ 0 0

ANT: no cue, congruent
ANT: center cue, congruent
ANT: spatial cue, congruent
ANT: no cue, incongruent
ANT: center cue, incongruent
ANT: spatial cue, incongruent
CPT-X: targets
CPT-X: foils
CPT-AX: targets
CPT-AX: foils
NL: no switch
NL: switch
LG: global, consistent
LG: local, consistent
LG: global, conflicting
LG: local, conflicting
AFI
ARCES
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Λ2: Posner + Working Memory
This loadings matrix extends the Posner loadings matrix (Λ1) through the addition
of a fourth factor. We conjecture that attention may be divided into the same three latent
abilites as proposed in the Posner structure, however, we add a fourth factor to reflect the
known working memory load in two of the 16 tasks.
In the CPT-X and CPT-AX, participants’ task is to judge whether the current stimulus
is a target or a foil based on whether a rule is obeyed. In the CPT-AX, the rule not only
relies on the current stimulus’ identity, but also relies on the identity of the previous stimulus.
Thus, in order to make the correct response on both trial types, participants must accurately
recall the stimulus from the last trial. In the simpler CPT-X — and in all other tasks for
that matter — there is no such memory demand. As such, the working memory factor is
defined by nonzero loadings for the two memory-dependent CPT-AX tasks, and by loadings
fixed to 0 for all other tasks. For model identification purposes, the first nonzero loading is
fixed to 1 (λ9,4 = 1).
In the loading matrix printed below (Λ2), the first three columns, corresponding to
alerting, orienting, and control abilities, respectively, are identical to the three columns in
the Λ1 loadings structure. The fourth column of Λ2 represents the added working memory
factor.
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Λ2 =

λ λ 0 0
0 λ 0 0
0 0 0 0
λ λ λ 0
0 λ λ 0
0 0 λ 0
λ 0 λ 0
λ 0 0 0
λ 0 λ 1
1 0 0 λ
0 1 0 0
0 λ λ 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 λ 0 0
0 λ λ 0
λ λ λ 0
λ 0 0 0

ANT: no cue, congruent
ANT: center cue, congruent
ANT: spatial cue, congruent
ANT: no cue, incongruent
ANT: center cue, incongruent
ANT: spatial cue, incongruent
CPT-X: target
CPT-X: foil
CPT-AX: target
CPT-AX: foil
NL: no switch
NL: switch
LG: global, consistent
LG: local, consistent
LG: global, conflicting
LG: local, conflicting
AFI
ARCES
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Λ3: Mirsky
Our third loadings matrix is inspired by inspired an alternative theory of latent at-
tention ability proposed by Mirsky and colleagues (1991). They contend that attention is
composed of four independent abilities, including: sustain, the ability to maintain an atten-
tional focus over time, focus-execute, the ability to select a specific task or stimulus to attend
to, shift, the ability to shift or change the focus of attention flexibly, and encode, the ability
to register, retain, and possibly manipulate information.
The former two abilities, sustain and focus-execute, map fairly closely to Posner and
Petersen’s (1990) theorized alerting and orienting abilities, respectively. As such, we allow
for the first two columns in Λ3 below, the sustain and focus-execute factors, to be defined
by duplicating the first and second columns of the Posner loadings matrix (Λ1).
The third ability, shift, is a new conception of the executive aspect of attention which
focuses exclusively on switching attention, in contrast to Posner and Petersen’s (1990) control
ability, which is more broadly defined. Conditions of the CPT-X, CPT-AX, and NL tasks
that previously loaded on the control factor are now permitted to load on the shifting factor.
For target trials in each version of the CPT, participants must switch from one mode of
responding (correct response behavior on foil trials) to another (correct response behavior on
target trials). Therefore, these two tasks may load on the shift factor. The “switch” condition
of the NL task is also permitted to load on the shift factor, as successful performance on
this trial type requires a shift in one’s mental set. For model identification purposes, this
loading is fixed to 1 (λ12,3 = 1). Finally, the AFI may capture the shift ability, as it measures
the ability to complete everyday tasks that draw on attention ability in a general sense. As
such, this survey is allowed a nonzero loading. All other tasks do not involve a mental shift
or purport to measure this ability, and therefore are not permitted to load on the shifting
factor.
The fourth and final component of attention proposed by Mirsky is encode. The
definition of this ability is strikingly similar to descriptions of working memory. As such, we
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allow the both conditions of the CPT-AX, the only response time tasks that entail a memory
load, to have nonzero loadings for the encode factor. We also permit our general attention
measure, the AFI, to load on this factor. All other tasks do not involve a memory load or do
not measure activities aﬀected by attention-related memory and therefore are not permitted
to load on the shifting factor.
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Λ3 =

λ λ 0 0
0 λ 0 0
0 0 0 0
λ λ 0 0
0 λ 0 0
0 0 0 0
λ 0 λ 0
λ 0 0 0
λ 0 λ 1
1 0 0 λ
0 1 0 0
0 λ 1 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 λ 0 0
0 λ 0 0
λ λ λ λ
λ 0 0 0

ANT: no cue, congruent
ANT: center cue, congruent
ANT: spatial cue, congruent
ANT: no cue, incongruent
ANT: center cue, incongruent
ANT: spatial cue, incongruent
CPT-X: target
CPT-X: foil
CPT-AX: target
CPT-AX: foil
NL: no switch
NL: switch
LG: global, consistent
LG: local, consistent
LG: global, conflicting
LG: local, conflicting
AFI
ARCES
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Λ4: Composite 1
As mentioned in the description for the previous loadings matrix, there are some simi-
larities between Posner and Petersen’s (1990) and Mirsky and colleagues’ (1991) theories of
the structure of attention ability. Related research on the latent structure of executive func-
tions by Miyake and colleagues’ (2000) further overlaps with these theories. In our fourth
and fifth loadings matrices, we propose novel theories of attention that draw from all three
of these sources to create plausible theories of underlying attention abilities.
A major area of overlap in the previously discussed theories is seen in the repeated
descriptions of sustained attention, referred to as “alerting” by Posner and Petersen and
as “sustain” by Mirsky and colleagues, and selective attention, referred to as “orienting”
by Posner and Petersen and as “focus-execute” by Mirsky and colleagues. In this loadings
matrix, we again include these abilities. The first factor, sustained, duplicates previous
definitions of alerting (the first column in Λ1) and sustain (the first column in Λ3). The
second factor, selective, duplicates previous definitions of orienting (the second column in
Λ1) and focus-execute (the second column in Λ3).
These theories diverge in their descriptions of executive attention abilities. Posner and
Petersen’s third attention component, control, is thought to comprise all executive attention
functions, including switching the focus of attention, inhibiting prepotent responses, and
other supervisory functions. In contrast, Mirsky and colleagues provide a more constrained
view of executive attention in their description of the shift ability. Finally, Miyake and col-
leagues explicitly capture diﬀerent elements of executive attention as separable components,
specifically shifting and inhibition abilities. We include shifting, described by both Mirsky
and Miyake, as the third factor in the present loadings matrix. We have previously described
how shifting may be defined in our discussion of Mirsky and colleagues’ theory of attention.
Therefore, to incorporate this ability in the present loadings matrix, we duplicate the third
column of the Mirsky matrix (Λ3).
The final component of attention ability included in this matrix is inhibition. As in
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Miyake and colleagues’ description, we view inhibition as the ability to suppress a prepotent
response. For ANT trial types with incongruent flankers, participants must ignore the con-
flicting direction information given by the flanking arrows in order correctly respond to the
center target arrow. Thus, successful performance on these trial types requires the inhibi-
tion of a response to the more numerous flankers. In the CPT-X and CPT-AX, a successful
response on target trials, which are rare, requires that the prepotent response to foil trials,
which are common, is inhibited (in addition to requiring a successful mental set update). In
local conditions of the LG task, participants must inhibit a tendency to respond in a way
that is influenced by the global precedence eﬀect. For model identification purposes, we have
set the loading for the local judgment and consistent stimulus task on the inhibition factor
to 1 (λ14,4 = 1). The NL task is exclusively a switching attention task, and therefore is not
permitted to load on the inhibition factor.
Because the AFI was designed to assess everyday functioning relying on attention
ability in a general sense, it is permitted to load on the inhibition factor. Because the
ARCES was designed to assess lapses in sustained attention ability only, it assumed to have
no relationship to inhibition abilities (λ18,4 = 0).
One may also see this loadings matrix as a reconceptualization of Posner and Petersen’s
theory, where the control ability (column 3 in Λ1) has been “split” to create two independent
abilities, shifting and inhibition.
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Λ4 =

λ λ 0 0
0 λ 0 0
0 0 0 0
λ λ 0 λ
0 λ 0 λ
0 0 0 λ
λ 0 λ λ
λ 0 0 0
λ 0 λ λ
1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 λ 1 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1
0 λ 0 0
0 λ 0 λ
λ λ λ λ
λ 0 0 0

ANT: no cue, congruent
ANT: center cue, congruent
ANT: spatial cue, congruent
ANT: no cue, incongruent
ANT: center cue, incongruent
ANT: spatial cue, incongruent
CPT-X: target
CPT-X: foil
CPT-AX: target
CPT-AX: foil
NL: no switch
NL: switch
LG: global, consistent
LG: local, consistent
LG: global, conflicting
LG: local, conflicting
AFI
ARCES
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Λ5: Composite 2
This loadings matrix extends the Composite 1 loadings matrix (Λ4) through the ad-
dition of a fifth factor. Both Mirsky (1991) and Miyake (2000) discuss the ability to hold
and manipulate information as a possible component of attention and executive function
abilities. In addition to the four factors proposed in the Composite 1 structure, we include a
factor to express working memory as an aspect of attention, which is defined by duplicating
the encode factor from the Mirsky loadings matrix(Λ3).
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Λ5 =

λ λ 0 0 0
0 λ 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
λ λ 0 λ 0
0 λ 0 λ 0
0 0 0 λ 0
λ 0 λ λ 0
λ 0 0 0 0
λ 0 λ λ 1
1 0 0 0 λ
0 1 0 0 0
0 λ 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0
0 λ 0 0 0
0 λ 0 λ 0
λ λ λ λ λ
λ 0 0 0 0

ANT: no cue, congruent
ANT: center cue, congruent
ANT: spatial cue, congruent
ANT: no cue, incongruent
ANT: center cue, incongruent
ANT: spatial cue, incongruent
CPT-X: target
CPT-X: foil
CPT-AX: target
CPT-AX: foil
NL: no switch
NL: switch
LG: global, consistent
LG: local, consistent
LG: global, conflicting
LG: local, conflicting
AFI
ARCES
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Λ6: Unitary
Unlike the previous loadings matrices, our penultimate proposed loadings matrix does
not divide attention into component abilities. Instead, we propose that attention is best
described as a single latent ability. Because all 18 tasks included in the battery may rely on
attention, the column of the loadings matrix corresponding to the attention factor includes
all nonzero loadings. Only one entry is fixed for model identification purposes (λ1,1 = 1).
att
ent
ion
Λ6 =

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Λ7: Unitary + Working Memory
Our final loadings matrix is similar to the last in that we again contend that attention
ability is best described as a unitary ability. However, in this theoretical account, we addi-
tionally consider the contribution of working memory. The first factor in the matrix below
represents the unified attention factor, and is a duplicate of the the single column in the pre-
vious loadings matrix (Λ6). The second factor represents the working memory factor, and is
a duplicate of the working memory factor included in a previous loadings matrix (column 4
in Λ2). Overall, this matrix quantifies the idea that task performance is best described by a
small set of large-scale cognitive abilities.
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CHAPTER 4: A HIERARCHICAL BAYESIAN APPROACH TO JOINT
MODELING OF NEURAL AND BEHAVIORAL DATA
Abstract
The noisiness and complexity of behavioral data can make the creation of effec-
tive joint models of neural and behavioral data challenging. Cognitive models,
especially those developed in mathematical psychology, can be incorporated to
infer specific psychological variables that shape the observed behavioral data.
However, previous work on joint models of neural and behavioral data that
incorporates cognitive models has been primarily correlational in nature, and
so is not suitable for theory testing. In this paper, we develop a new joint
modeling framework called neurocognitive process modeling, in which a cogni-
tive model of the behavioral data and a probabilistic model of the neural data
are combined in a single hierarchical Bayesian model. We describe how this
approach may be used to construct models that describe comprehensive latent
processes, and how the models may be used for the comparative evaluation of
complex hypotheses and theories about unobserved neurocognitive processes.
In two case studies, we demonstrate how this approach extends the scope of
questions that may be asked about the origin of behavior in neural signals.
Introduction
Different fields have developed a wide variety of approaches to inferring the neural pro-
cesses and cortical systems that underlie behavior. In both computational and cognitive
neuroscience, models may be used to express a unified quantitative account of behavioral
and neural data, and therefore aid in generating new conclusions and insights about the
underlying neurocognitive process. However, the significant noise and complexity inherent
in behavioral data can make developing effective models challenging. In psychology, compu-
tational cognitive models are frequently used to quantify a theoretical underlying cognitive
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process. Cognitive models excel in accounting for how individual differences in psychological
factors and features of the experimental context might systematically affect observed behav-
ior. In recent decades, researchers have begun to link cognitive model accounts of behavioral
data to patterns observed in neural data. To do so, there have been two primary approaches
used: two-stage analyses and joint modeling.
Two-stage analysis
In a two-stage analysis, the goal is to assess the nature of the relationship between the
neural data and the behavioral data, as seen through the lens of a cognitive model. First, the
behavioral data is submitted to the cognitive model to derive estimates of various features
of the proposed underlying cognitive process. Then, a summary statistic of the neural data,
such as the mean activation across fMRI voxels in a given cortical area, are correlated to
each of the cognitive model parameter point estimates. This process may be repeated in
order to observe how changes in cognitive model parameters due to systematic alterations
of elements of the behavioral task relate to fluctuations in the neural data.
However, this approach suffers from two shortcomings. First, it provides limited evidence
about the nature of neurocognitive relationships. From this analysis, conclusions might be
drawn about the relationship between neural activity and inferred features of a cognitive
process. However, often an assumption is made that a significantly correlated cortical area
is the neural substrate for the cognitive model parameter. This is not only faulty because
correlations do not imply causation, but also because this method assumes that a summary
statistic of the neural data is sufficient to capture the neural activity. However, just as
using raw behavioral data ignores the complexity of the cognitive process, using raw neural
data ignores complexity of the underlying neural process. Yet research in this vein (e.g.,
Forstmann et al., 2008; Van Veen, Krug, & Carter, 2008; Forstmann, Brown, Dutilh, Neu-
mann, & Wagenmakers, 2010; van Maanen et al., 2011) often overstates the strength and
nature of the evidence by making causal conclusions.
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Second, even if researchers’ conclusions are tempered, the method is statistically un-
desirable. In order to reach the second stage of the procedure, in which cognitive model
parameters are correlated to the neural data, the uncertainty associated with the point es-
timates for each parameter must be discarded. By discarding this information, a researcher
risks introducing bias, especially if the posterior distributions are notably skewed or ex-
tremely wide (Pagan, 1984). At a minimum, a two-stage approach leads to a loss of power,
as many data points (i.e., response times on many trials) are collapsed to a single summary
statistic (i.e., a cognitive parameter estimate).
Joint models
A joint modeling approach (e.g., in the style of Turner et al., 2013) resolves these issues
by implementing both a neural model and a behavioral model in a single step as a hierarchical
Bayesian model. A joint model is constructed by specifying a model of the neural data with
a set of associated parameters:
x ∼ Neural(∆)
a model of the behavioral data, such as a diffusion model (as in Turner, Van Maanen, &
Forstmann, 2015) or a linear ballistic accumulator model (as in Turner, Rodriguez, Norcia,
McClure, & Steyvers, 2016), with a set of associated parameters:
y ∼ Behavioral(Θ)
and a stochastic linking function which may act as a joint distribution of the parameters of
both model components:
(∆,Θ) ∼ Joint(Ω)
This joint distribution may be any function that would allow for the parameters of the
component models to be hierarchically linked, although in practice, only distributions that
allow for the strength and the direction of the relationship between the each neural and
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behavioral model parameter have been used. For example, the joint distribution may be a
multivariate normal distribution (as in Turner et al., 2013, 2016, 2015) or factor analysis
(Turner, Wang, & Merkle, 2017). The approach is statistically sound, as it allows the
uncertainty in the parameter estimates for each component to be propagated through the
model.
Two analyses are typically performed with this style of model. First, the model may be
used to make predictions about either the neural data or the behavioral data or both. Second,
the parameters capturing the relationships between neural model parameters and behavioral
model parameters (e.g., correlations, ρ) are used to make inferences about the structure
of cognition. Both goals are accomplished by “treat[ing] the two sources of information as
separate measurements of the same cognitive construct” (Turner et al., 2013, , p. 193).
This perspective suggests that the joint modeling approach is not intended to describe
a latent process, but rather is designed to infer abstract relationships. As such, a joint
modeling approach might be considered an approach to generating theories about latent
processes. The traditional choices for the joint distribution makes it clear that the goal is
ultimately to observe which, if any, features of the behavioral process are related to the
neural data.
However, researchers may have strong hypotheses about the particular way in which
the neural data determines behavior, and so may wish to more directly model and test the
viability of a theorized latent process. As such, a correlational method may be restrictive,
as it is agnostic about the source of the data. Furthermore, in practice, joint models do not
account for the complexity of the neural data. Rather than specifying a true neural model,
a normal distribution is almost exclusively used (Turner et al., 2015, 2016, 2017).
An alternative framework
In the novel approach proposed here, we do not intend to measure any singular abstract
construct. Rather, we seek to establish a viable description of the underlying process. To do
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this, we include both a cognitive model of behavioral data capable of capturing individual
differences in psychological factors as well as a nuanced model of the neural data that captures
both domain knowledge about the area of cortex under study and theoretical ideas about
how populations of neurons work together encode information. Similar to the previous joint
modeling approach, the neural model and a cognitive model are both implemented in a
hierarchical Bayesian framework. However, unlike the joint modeling approach, we employ
a directed link between the model components in order to express a more theoretically-
committed statement about the underlying neurocognitive process. The ultimate goal of this
new approach, which we call neurocognitive process modeling, is to establish a comprehensive
framework for describing comprehensive latent processes where models are easily altered and
components are easily replaced, similar to the cognitive latent variable modeling framework
established by Vandekerckhove (2014).
In this article, we describe how a pair of customized neurocognitive process models were
constructed and used to analyze a published dataset (Li, Gerfen, & Svoboda, 2014), which
includes electrophysiological recordings and binary behavioral responses. We place special
emphasis on how we used two competing versions of the model to test a complex hypothesis
about the underlying neural process. Specifically, the goals of the case study described
here were to: (1) test which hypothesis about the neural process better describes the joint
dataset, and (2) generate new insights about the underlying neurocognitive process through
analysis of the posterior distributions of selected model parameters. Accomplishing the
first objective will demonstrate that neurocognitive process model (NCPMs) are useful for
hypothesis testing. Accomplishing the second objective will demonstrate how the hierarchical
nature of the technique naturally leads to new conclusions about the nature of the latent
neurocognitive process underlying the observed data.
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Dataset
We analyzed a published, open dataset (Li et al., 2014) that included electrophysiological
recordings from motor cortex and behavioral data from 99 sessions across 19 mice. In each
trial, a trained mouse performed a simple spatial discrimination task while electrophysiology
data was simultaneously recorded (see Figure 4.1). The goal of the task was to indicate with
a lick whether a pole was presented in an anterior or posterior position relative to the right
whisker pad. Each trial began when the pole descended, signaling the start of the sample
period. The pole remained down for 1.3 seconds, during which time the mouse used its
whiskers to detect the pole’s position. When the pole was removed, the sample period ended
and the 1.3-second delay period began. During the delay, the mouse attempted to retain
the perceived position of the pole in memory until a brief auditory cue signaled the start of
the response period. At any time after the cue, the mouse was permitted to lick one of two
ports to indicate its response. Licking the left port indicated the pole was thought to have
been in the anterior position, while licking the right port indicated the pole was thought to
have been in the posterior position. In our analysis, the behavioral data, y, is the observed
lick direction.
(a) (b)
Figure 4.1 . Spatial discrimination task. Mice were trained to discriminate between two bar
positions. (a) The time course of each trial. (b) Mapping between stimulus bar position
and correct response. Throughout this article, red will indicate a left response, and blue will
indicate a right response. Reproduced from Li, Chen, Guo, Gerfen, & Svoboda, 2015.
While mice performed the behavioral task, extracellular recordings were taken from left
anterior lateral motor cortex (ALM) using a 32-channel electrode. In each session, between
137
2 and 29 pyramidal units1 (mean = 12.6) were identified. In our analysis, the neural data,
x, are the binned spike counts (bin width = 100ms) for each 1.3-second trial epoch. Only
units classified as pyramidal were included. Data from trials where the mouse licked before
the cue, the mouse did not lick, or optogenetics were used to alter the neuronal response
were excluded; no other exclusions of mice, sessions, units, or trials were made.
Models
In their 2015 Nature paper, the authors of this dataset describe their analysis of this
data and their subsequent conclusions concerning the function and purpose of this section
of motor cortex (Li et al., 2015). Specifically, Li and colleagues assert that a majority of
pyramidal neurons in ALM encode the planned motor response in their average firing rate.
As such, they contend that the ALM region in mice may be seen as a homologue of human
premotor cortex.
We designed the neurocognitive process models described in this section not only to
test and hopefully validate these conclusions, but furthermore to add to our understanding
of the neurocognitive process by which ALM supports planned decision behaviors. The
models were designed to be as simple as possible while still capturing key features of the
experimental context and qualitative theories about the underlying neurocognitive process.
These key features included: (1) Li and colleagues’ (2015) finding that ALM neurons encode
the planned lick direction in their firing rate, (2) the principle of population coding (i.e.,
pooling across neurons with different preferences), (3) the binary nature of the behavioral
response, and (4) individual differences across mice. By accounting for these ideas directly
in the models, each NCPM is able to make a comprehensive, strong theoretical statement
1When describing neural data collected through extracellular recordings, the term unit is generally pre-
ferred over neuron. This is because neurons’ membrane potentials are not directly measured, but rather
voltage fluctuations at various points in the extracellular space are recorded and subsequently analyzed to
derive the timing and source of action potentials. This post hoc analysis, known as spike sorting, is not
error-proof; sometimes signals from one neuron might be assigned to two separate sources, or signals from
two neurons might be assigned to a single source. Because the source of action potentials uncovered in the
voltage traces is inferred, the term unit is used to emphasize the uncertainty.
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about the origin of motor behavior from neural signals.
The two versions of the model are distinguished by how they assume the planned lick
direction is encoded in the spike train data. Our first model assumes, consistent with Li and
colleagues’ analysis, that the planned lick direction is encoded in the average firing rate. In
other words, our first model assumes ALM neurons encode planned decision behaviors using
a rate code. Our second model considers the alternative theory that the planned behavior is
encoded in the firing rate in time-dependent manner. This time-dependent rate code model
accounts for the possibility that ALM neurons rely on a difference in firing rate during a only
short time interval to encode the planned behavioral response. By comparing the adequacy
of these models in simultaneously describing both types of data, we intend to compare the
viability of these theories about the latent neural process, while still accounting for the
complexity of the behavioral data and potential individual differences across mice.
Rate code model
We begin our description of the neurocognitive process expressed in our first model (as
depicted in Figure 4.2) with the distribution of the neural data, which is submitted to the
model as binned spike counts. For each trial, t, the number of spikes, x, observed in each
bin, i, for each unit, u, is assumed to be generated via a Poisson process:
xmstui ∼ Poisson(λmstu)
with some underlying rate, λ:
λmstu ∼ Gamma(αm, θm) (1)
that is constrained to be positive.
Li and colleagues (2015) observed that a majority of units were selective for the planned
behavioral response. This selectivity is captured by the preference parameter, pi, for each
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Figure 4.2 . Graphical model representation of the rate code model. White and gray nodes
indicate model parameters and data, respectively. Connections among the white and gray
nodes express the core neurocognitive process captured by the model. Light blue nodes
indicate mouse-level hyperparameters, and dark blue nodes indicate experiment-level hyper-
parameters.
unit:
pimsu ∼ Normal(µm, τm)
where positive values for pi indicate a selectivity for left responses, negative values pi indicate
a selectivity for right responses, and values near zero indicate that the unit is not selective.
The preference parameters are used to pool the rates across the population of neural units
in order to produce a consensus regarding the planned response on each trial. Specifically,
the rate parameters are summed using the preferences as weights. In this way, the responses
of units with strong preferences (|pi| º 0) are upweighted, while the responses of units with
no or minimal preference (|pi| ≈ 0) are largely discounted. However, the neural population
response may not be the only factor that determines the observed behavioral response. To
account for the possibility that individual mice have a bias to lick in a particular direction
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regardless of the bar position presented, we include a baseline bias parameter, pi0:
pi0m ∼ Normal(γ, φ)
which is interpreted in the same way as the preference parameter. Combining the mouse-
specific baseline behavioral bias with the trial-specific consensus neural response provides
the overall bias, β, toward a left or right response on a given trial:
βmst = pi0m +
Ums∑
u=1
λmstupimsu (2)
By subjecting the bias parameter to a logistic function, it is constrained to the [0, 1] interval.
The transformed bias parameter may now be used as the success probability parameter in a
Bernoulli process to generate the observed response:
ymst ∼ Bernoulli(ilogit(βmst)) (3)
Values of β near 1 will generate a left response (y = 1) with a high probability, while values
near 0 will generate a right response (y = 0) with a high probability. Values of β near 0.5
indicate that there is no tendency toward either a left or right response based on the mouse’s
behavioral tendencies or the neural response, and a random response would be generated.
The equations above serve to quantify the theoretical description of the underlying pro-
cess occurring on each trial. Of special note is the deterministic statement in Equation (2),
which links the behavioral model (i.e., the Bernoulli process) to the neural model (i.e., the
Poisson process) by allowing the consensus in the neural population to mathematically de-
termine the behavioral response probability. That this link between the model components
is a deterministic statement, describing a unidirectional effect, rather than a multivariate
stochastic distribution, describing bidirectional latent relationships among parameters, dis-
tinguishes this model as a neurocognitive process model.
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In order to account for neural and behavioral data from all sessions and all mice simul-
taneously, random effects of session and mouse are included. To accomplish this hierarchical
extension, prior distributions for mouse-level hyperparameters are specified:
µm ∼ Normal(η, ζ)
τm ∼ Gamma(κ, o)
αm ∼ Gamma(υ, ε)
θm ∼ Gamma(χ, ψ)
Two of these mouse-level hyperparameters have straightforward interpretations: µm, the
mean unit preference for an individual mouse, and τm, the standard deviation of unit pref-
erences for an individual mouse. The proper interpretation of the other two mouse-level
hyperparameters, αm and θm, is less intuitive. However, these parameters need not have
clear interpretations in and of themselves in order to be of meaningful theoretical conse-
quence. These parameters are included to effect the assumption that the rate parameter
inferred on each trial is drawn from some hierarchical distribution of rates that is unique to
each mouse (see Equation (1)).
All four mouse-level parameters are themselves assumed to be drawn from experiment-
wide distributions. To complete the model specification, a prior is specified for each param-
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eter used to define an experiment-wide distribution:
η ∼ Normal(0, 10)
ζ ∼ Gamma(.1, .1)
κ ∼ Gamma(.1, .1)
o ∼ Gamma(.1, .1)
υ ∼ Gamma(.1, .1)
ε ∼ Gamma(.1, .1)
χ ∼ Gamma(.1, .1)
ψ ∼ Gamma(.1, .1)
With the exception of η, which captures the mean preference across all units in the entire
experiment, assigning a semantic interpretation to many of these experiment-level hyper-
parameters again proves difficult. Yet each is necessary to include in order to provide a
comprehensive account of the entire dataset.
Time-dependent rate code model
In the rate code model, the behavioral data is in part determined by the consensus in
the neural response, as captured by the neural component. This neural component was
built from the assumption that the behavioral response is encoded in the average firing rate
specifically. This assumption about the method of encoding used by ALM neurons was
based on Li and colleagues’ (2015) use of differences in the total number of spikes observed
on each trial type to assess selectivity. While this strategy is able to easily detect units that
exhibit some degree of selectivity across an entire trial epoch, it would make it difficult to
detect units that are reliably selective on shorter time scales. If ALM neurons instead rely
on time-dependent firing rates to encode the planned behavior, then our first model might
be underestimating the number of selective units.
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In order to capture this possibility in our second model, rather than inferring a rate
parameter directly from the binned spike count data, we will first assess the of the selective
value of each time bin for a given unit, then use those values to produce a weighted rate. If
this time-dependent rate code model provides a better account of the latent neurocognitive
process, we expect that it might not only allow for an improved assessment of selectivity and
enable the model to better capture the observed data.
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Figure 4.3 . Graphical model representation of the time-dependent rate code model.
We implemented the time-dependent rate code model by extending the neural component
of the rate code model, specifically by incorporating a gamma regression layer in the neural
model component. In the rate code model, all I bins are viewed as interchangeable by
the model. Whether a spike count was from the first bin or the last bin on a given trial
was irrelevant; every bin observed on a given trial was assumed to have equal predictive
value. Specifically, the number of spikes, x, observed on each trial, t, was assumed to be
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Poisson-distributed with some underlying rate, λ:
λmstu ∼ Gamma(αm, θm)
xmstui ∼ Poisson(λmstu)
To create our second model, these equations will removed from the model and replaced.
In our second model’s alternative specification of the neural component, bins are no longer
considered interchangeable; the identity of the bins is important, as now each is permitted
to have a different predictive value. The rate observed on each trial is again assumed to be
gamma-distributed:
λmstu ∼ Gamma
(
αm,
αm
θmstu
)
however, we now include a linear predictor of the mean of the gamma distribution:
θmstu = .001 +
I∑
i=1
xmstuiωmsui
The two new equations above state that the mean rate observed on each trial, θ, is a linear
combination of the binned spike count, x, and the corresponding importance of that bin in
distinguishing between left and right responses, ω. (A small value, .001, is also included in
the definition of the linear predictor to ensure that, in the event that no spikes are observed
on a given trial (∀ i : xmstui = 0), we will not produce an undefined value for the second
parameter of the prior distribution for λ.) It is important to note that this bin importance
parameter is not trial-specific, as it reflects the predictive value of a given time bin across
trials for a given unit.
By setting a truncated normal prior on bin importance, it is constrained to positive
values:
ωmsui ∼ Normal(χm, ψm)I(0,∞)
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High values of ω indicate that the number of spikes observed in a given bin are informative
with respect to the observed behavioral response. Values of ω near 0 indicate that a bin
is not informative. The incorporation of bin weighting in the distribution for λ affects its
interpretation. It is no longer a true rate parameter, but now is rather more of an assessment
of the neural activity across a given trial, based on how that activity generally informs the
eventual behavioral response.
The prior for ω is hierarchically extended to address the neural data across all sessions
and all mice. For clarity and brevity, prior specifications for the mouse-level parameters, χ
and ψ, and for the pursuant experiment-level hyperparameters are omitted here. We also
omit the remainder of the model specification as it applies to the shape parameter, α, the
unit preferences, pi, the baseline behavioral biases, pi0, the combined trial-specific bias, β,
and the behavioral response, y, as this will all be the same as in the rate code model.
Results
A comparative test of two complex hypotheses
We begin our analysis of Li and colleagues’ dataset (Li et al., 2014) by performing a
model comparison to test whether it is more likely that ALM neurons encode the planned
behavioral response using a rate code or a time-dependent rate code. This not only tests an
important research question, but also serves to demonstrate the how neurocognitive process
models are naturally suited to theory testing.
We elected to use deviance information criterion (DIC; Spiegelhalter, Best, Carlin, & Van
Der Linde, 2002, 2014) as our model comparison metric as it was designed to compare hier-
archical Bayesian models specifically and is easily calculated from MCMC samples.2 Similar
to other model comparison metrics used in Bayesian analysis, the DIC balances goodness of
fit against model complexity, as the DIC assesses deviance while heavily penalizing models
2DIC is highly sensitive to imperfect convergence of the MCMC chains. As such, we will require (1) a
Gelman-Rubin diagnostic statistic (Rˆ; Gelman & Rubin, 1992) under 1.01 for all model parameters, and
(2) a DIC value that appears stable across quartiles of samples.
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with a high effective number of model parameters. Although the raw DIC value is not easily
interpreted, comparatively low DIC values (i.e., at least 3–7 units lower; Spiegelhalter et al.,
2002) indicate notably better fit. Thus, we will observe the difference in DIC values for the
two neurocognitive process models.
We found that the rate code model provided a better fit to the joint dataset than the
time-dependent rate code model (∆DIC = 75.12 × 102). This result provides quantitative
evidence that it is more likely that ALM neurons encode the planned response in their
average firing rate, than the alternative that ALM neurons are reliably selective on shorter
time scales. Now that we have inferred which theoretical neurocognitive process is more
likely, we may look more closely at the behavior of the superior model to learn more about
the latent process.
New conclusions about the underlying neurocognitive process
Because we implemented the rate code model in a hierarchical Bayesian framework, we
can use the posterior distributions of model parameters which have meaningful semantic
interpretations as the basis for new inferences about the nature of the underlying neurocog-
nitive process. We began by examining the selectivity of individual units as captured by
the preference parameters, pi. Specifically, we sought to evaluate Li and colleagues’ (2015)
conclusion that a majority of ALM neurons are selective for the behavioral response.
Visual comparison of unit preference parameter point estimates, pˆi, to the raw data (see
Figure 4.4) suggests that the model produces sensible inferences about the selectivity of
individual units. As mentioned in our earlier description of the rate code model’s specifi-
cation, preference parameters are interpreted such that positive values indicate a selectivity
for left responses, negative values indicate a selectivity for right response, and values near 0
indicate no selectivity. Therefore units for which the 95% credible interval3 of the preference
3Credible intervals are similar in concept to confidence intervals, but are more directly interpretable (see
Morey, Hoekstra, Rouder, Lee, & Wagenmakers, 2016, for an accessible overview). A 95% credible interval
is a range of possible parameter values that contains the true value of the parameter with 95% probability.
In our calculations, the lower and upper bounds are the 2.5th and 97.5th percentile of the posterior samples,
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Figure 4.4 . Raw data for units with different inferred preferences. Raster plots (top) and
peristimulus time histograms (PSTHs; bottom) of units for which the model generated point
estimates indicating: (a) no preference (pˆi = 0.07), (b) a moderate preference for a left
response (pˆi = 1.56), and (c) a strong preference for right responses (pˆi = −3.45).
parameter posterior distribution did not include 0 were classified as selective. If the 95%
credible interval included 0, the unit was classified as not selective.
These classifications were used to infer the proportion of units across the entire experi-
ment that were selective for the upcoming response during the preparatory interval (i.e., the
sample and delay periods, before a response might be executed). Only a minority of units
(∼20%) were found to be selective for the upcoming motor response during the preparatory
interval. As this general pattern was consistent across all 99 sessions (see Figure 4.5), it
suggests that only a subset of ALM neurons encode the planned response. This conclusion
stands in stark contrast to Li and colleagues’ finding that ∼50% of units exhibit selectivity
for the behavioral response before it is executed.
To explore this conflict further, we used the rate code model a second time to analyze
the behavioral responses and the neural data from the response interval only. The number
of units that were selective during this trial epoch was inferred in the same fashion. This
second application of the model enabled us to assess separately the proportion of units that
were selective for the planned response, the proportion of units that were selective for the
executed response, and the proportion of units that were not selective at any point at all
during the trial period. This also permitted us to compare our results more directly against
respectively.
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Figure 4.5 . Posterior distributions of preference parameters for all units in each of three
sessions. Circles represent point estimates, pˆi, and bars represent 95% credible intervals.
Units classified as selective are marked in black. Units classified as not selective are marked
in red. Regardless of the number of units observed in a given session, the same pattern
emerges: Only a minority of units are selective for the upcoming response.
Li and colleagues’ (2015) results. Our findings are presented in Figure 4.6.
We again observe a striking difference in conclusion. Li and colleagues (2015) assert that,
across the entire trial period, 73% of units are selective for the motor response, while the
neurocognitive process model suggests that just 43% are selective.
That the inferred number of selective units is lower is not entirely unexpected: Given
that this is a hierarchical model, the number of units classified as selective would likely be
lower due to shrinkage, meaning the drawing of all parameter estimates toward the group
mean (in this case, the population mean of unit preferences, ηˆ ≈ 0). However, given that the
proportion of units classified as selective during the response interval in our analysis is almost
the same as in Li and colleagues’ (2015) analysis, the effect of shrinkage may be minimal.
We contend that the reason for the large discrepancy in the proportion of units classified
as selective is that Li and colleagues’ method of analysis4 disregarded the complexity of the
relationship between the neural and behavioral data. Specifically, their method led to an
overestimation because the neural data from each unit was considered in isolation. In the
neurocognitive process model, the neural data from each unit was considered not only in
the context of the population of units, but also in the context of the larger neurocognitive
process, which accounted for purely behavioral elements (i.e., the baseline bias of each mouse,
41,245 t-tests, no correction for multiple comparisons.
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Figure 4.6 . Proportion of units that are selective during different trial epochs. Although
the proportion of units found to exhibit selectivity during the response epoch is similar, the
proportion of units found to be selective during the sample and delay epochs (i.e., during
the preparatory interval, before a response was made) is notably smaller in our analysis. As
a result, we observe that overall far more units exhibit no selectivity at any point during the
trial period than was observed in Li and colleagues’ (2015) analysis.
pi0). As such, the model was able to provide a clearer assessment of what variability is due
to the unit selectivity versus other factors, and thereby provide inferences that are arguably
more valid.
Finally, we investigated whether individual mice exhibited response biases by examin-
ing the posterior distributions for the baseline bias parameters, pi0, for each mouse. (This
parameter is interpreted similarly to the unit preference parameters, pi.) If there were no
response biases other than that which was accounted for by the neural model component,
then the posterior distributions of the baseline bias for each mouse, pi0m , should be centered
on 0. This is not observed. While there is no population-wide bias (γˆ ≈ 0), the majority of
individual mice have strong response biases regardless of trial type. As shown in Figure 4.7,
13 of 19 mice have credible intervals for pi0 that do not include 0. This suggests that mice
exhibit notable individual differences beyond that which can be explained by the available
neural data from ALM.
These secondary analyses show that, because we formulate neurocognitive process models
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Figure 4.7 . Posterior distributions of baseline bias parameters for each mouse. Circles
represent point estimates, pi0, and bars represent 95% credible intervals. The color of the
point estimate marker indicates the strength of the bias. Red indicates the mouse has a
strong bias toward a left response, blue indicates the mouse has a strong bias toward a right
response, and purple indicates no or minimal bias.
in a hierarchical Bayesian framework, we can use the model to make novel types of conclusions
about both cognitive aspects and neural aspects of the latent process. As such, our approach
not only facilitates hypothesis testing, but also allows us to make novel statements about
specific features of the underlying neurocognitive process through estimation-based analyses.
Discussion
Through this case analysis, we showcased the unique advantages of the neurocognitive
process modeling approach as a method of developing joint models of neural and behavioral
data in a hierarchical Bayesian framework. The first such advantage we sought to highlight
is the flexibility of the technique. A neurocognitive process model is defined by the inclusion
of a deterministic statement linking the neural and behavioral components, however, the
design of each of these components can and should be tailored to the experimental context,
and likewise can and should be structurally altered to capture researchers’ hypotheses about
unobserved features of neural and cognitive processes.
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Each neurocognitive process model component — and the linkage between the compo-
nents — may be independently altered and extended. Here, we demonstrated how to alter
the structure of the neural component to incorporate a different, rival theory of the un-
derlying neural process. Another possible way to alter the neural component is to use a
different likelihood function entirely. In this way, one could define a neurocognitive process
model that accounts for fMRI, EEG, or other types of neural data in place of spike counts.
Similarly, one could also swap out the behavioral component of the model in order to accom-
modate a different experimental context. The selection of the cognitive model component
allows a neurocognitive process model both to account for new types of behavioral data, such
as continuous accuracy (e.g., distance from a target position), and simultaneously, a differ-
ent theoretical account of the underlying cognitive process (e.g., a decision tree, a memory
process, or a categorization process).
The second advantage that we showcased here was the relative ease of conducting model
comparisons. Often hypotheses concerning joint datasets are put in terms of mechanisms:
One area connects to another in order to enhance, inhibit, or otherwise modulate its activity,
a given area of cortex encodes one aspect of a stimulus or response, a particular computation
is performed by neurons in a given an area. These hypotheses are difficult to assess with
current Bayesian joint modeling techniques (e.g. Turner et al., 2013), as such methods are
only intended to capture abstract linear relationships. However, the neurocognitive process
modeling approach provides a structured method for instantiating complex theories in a
model, even when the theory incorporates many abstract ideas and principles on both the
behavioral and neural side.
For some, the high level of theoretical commitment required to formulate a neurocognitive
process model may be seen as restrictive and undesirable. However, if multiple plausible hy-
potheses are captured in each of a handful of models, a model comparison might be performed
across a large set of models to quantitatively determine which theories are comparatively
more plausible based on the observed data. Furthermore, if a viable comprehensive theory is
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not currently available, and thus an exploratory analysis of a joint dataset is the goal, then
the aforementioned work by Turner and colleagues (Turner et al., 2013) should be the pre-
ferred approach, as it is an excellent approach to theory generation. We see neurocognitive
process models less as a direct competitor to other approaches, and more as a complementary
technique.
It is our hope that the introduction of neurocogntive process models adds a useful new
technique to our collective analytic toolbox. While we acknowledge that these models may
be labor-intensive to specify and computationally resource-intensive to fit, we believe the
opportunities they present for theory testing are worth the effort.
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